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Chapter I
Introduction
A distinguishing feature of the recent financial crises was the simultaneous disruption of
intermediation in both the financial markets and the real sector. Arbitrage failure and
collapse of durable goods spending occurred side by side, together triggering the huge
contraction in output and employment. To understand the links between arbitrage and
durable goods investment, it is essential to have a framework that captures key aspects
of the dynamic frictions that cause price anomalies and concurrent deterioration in both
financial and real activities. For this purpose, in this thesis we focus on studying the
interaction between arbitrage trading and real economic activities in the presence of
financial frictions.
The limits of arbitrage reflect the existence of financial frictions that prevent
arbitrageurs to fully eliminate price anomalies. In this thesis, we model the financial
frictions in terms of collateral constraints and use it to link arbitrage trading with real
sector activities. As in Gromb and Vayanos (2002, 2017), we model arbitrage in the context
of market segmentation. In particular, we assume that ordinary investors within each
market have varying asset demands. Market segmentation thus leads to price discrepancies
among similar assets. This creates arbitrage opportunities to those financial intermediaries
who can trade in all markets. In our settings, collateral constraints serve as a guarantee
to ensure that the market participants honor their liabilities. To prevent possible defaults,
the trading parties with future liabilities are required to post su cient collateral in advance
so that they won’t have the incentive to walk away from their liabilities. Furthermore,
arbitrageurs are specialized financial intermediaries, who also engage in the production
process or intermediation in the real sector. The collateral requirements allow them to use
the capital investment to back their arbitrage trades. In this sense, collateral constraints
limit intermediaries’ arbitrage capacity as a function of their capital. In turn, their capital
investment is also determined by the arbitrage profits.
In the first chapter, we focus on riskless arbitrage. We develop a general equilibrium
framework that combines a conventional macroeconomic model with segmented financial
markets. We derive analytically the dynamics of arbitrage trades, asset prices and the
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aggregate capital growth. Moreover, the framework also allows us to study the implications
of multiple equilibria. We find that when the economy is free of unanticipated shocks,
arbitrage activities can leverage up the capital investment in the real sector and boost
the aggregate output. Meanwhile, the capital growth in turn supports more arbitrage
trades. However, this mutually enhancing relationship also renders the economy vulnerable
to potential adverse shocks. A tiny or temporary shock might cause a severe crisis by
triggering a regime switch that pushes the economy towards a low-welfare equilibrium.
Furthermore, our analysis on regime shifts between di↵erent equilibria also sheds light on
the study of post-crisis recovery patterns.
In our second chapter, we focus on risky arbitrage. We assume that market participants
do not have perfect foresight of future asset demands. Intermediaries obtain arbitrage
profits by speculating on the convergence of the price spreads. However, if the future
price spread instead widens up due to the volatile market demands, they would su↵er
losses in their trading positions. In this framework, we investigate intermediaries’ trading
strategies in equilibrium and the relevant impacts on durable goods investment. We find
that intermediaries tend to be more conservative in trading when the arbitrage opportunity
is more profitable, and more aggressive otherwise. This seemingly counterintuitive strategy
is attributable to both endogenous collateral constraints and the price externality. The
collateral constraint becomes endogenously looser when the arbitrage profitability is low,
thus encouraging more arbitrage trades. Furthermore, we also compare the market
stability under di↵erent collateral policies. We show that a tighter collateral policy helps
curb the intermediaries’ tendency to overinvest and stabilize the economy at the cost of
market liquidity. In contrast, a looser collateral policy supports a more liquid market and
less mispricing. However, it might also amplify intermediaries’ losses from overinvestment
and render the economy more fragile in the wake of unanticipated large demand shocks.
In the third chapter, we study the intermediation failure in the real sector associated
with arbitrage trading. We develop a dynamic model that features financial accelerator
e↵ects, market liquidity co-movement and sudden self-fulfilling market collapse. We show
that a tiny, temporary shock can lead to significant, persistent disruptions in both financial
and real sectors. Specifically, when intermediaries are forced to unwind some arbitrage
trades in a downturn, the price moves against their positions and incurs losses. Such losses
further trigger a fire sale of the durable goods, suppressing the capital price and lifting the
haircut rate. Accordingly, it becomes increasingly di cult for intermediaries to exploit
arbitrage opportunities and to intermediate in the real sector. In this way, the loss spiral
2
and the liquidity spiral reinforce each other. Furthermore, we model the sudden market
collapse as the sunspot equilibrium in which all intermediaries become insolvent and are
denied access to renewed fundings through arbitrage trades.
3
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Chapter II
Best Friend or Worst Enemy? –
Dynamics and Multiple Equilibria
with Arbitrage, Production and
Collateral Constraints
This paper is a theoretical study into how arbitrage trading a↵ects and is
a↵ected by aggregate economic activities over the business cycle. We develop
a tractable framework incorporating limits of arbitrage within a conventional
macroeconomic model. By featuring a wide range of collateral categories, we
derive the model dynamics analytically to illustrate the role of arbitrage trading
in the expansion of the aggregate economy. Also, our discussion of the multiple
equilibria allows us to examine the nonlinear aspects of financial crises through
regime switching, and to shed lights on the implications of post-crisis recovery.
Keywords: limit of arbitrage, financial intermediary, segmented markets,
financial crises, market liquidity, multiple equilibria, collateral constraints,
externality
JEL Classification: D52 D58 E44 G01 G12
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II.1 Introduction
This paper is a theoretical study into how arbitrage trading a↵ects and is a↵ected by
the aggregate economic activities over the business cycle. In particular, for an economy
featuring endogenous financial constraints and allowing for a wide range of collaterals, we
examine the role of arbitrage activities on the growth and contractions in the real sector.
By characterizing multiple equilibria, we ask whether a regime shift, triggered by a tiny
shock, can cause severe disruptions in the financial intermediation and spill over to the
production. We illustrate how the regime shift might complicate the post-crisis recovery.
For this purpose, we consider an infinite horizon economy in which households from
two segmented markets have di↵erent asset demands. This gives rise to potential
price discrepancies between identical assets and creates arbitrage opportunities for the
intermediaries. Though intermediaries can profit from exploiting the price spreads, they
also face financial frictions, i.e., collateral constraints. Such constraints arise naturally
because the households cannot compel intermediaries to honor the contracts unless their
asset positions are secured. In our setting, intermediaries’ durable goods investment plays
a dual role: both as a production factor and as collateral in arbitrage activities. Through
collateral constraints, intermediaries’ capital investment limits their arbitrage capacity. In
turn, intermediaries finance their capital expenses with proceeds from arbitrage trading.
By deriving a closed-form solution to the model dynamics, we show that intermediaries’
arbitrage capacity and capital investment reinforce each other.
We start with a baseline model without asset demand shocks. We find that there
is a mutually enhancing relationship between arbitrage trading and aggregate capital
investment. On one hand, arbitrage activities help boost aggregate output by providing
extra funding for capital investment. By intermediating asset demands across markets,
arbitrageurs are essentially obtaining loans from households with zero or even negative
interest rates. This e↵ectively lowers the marginal cost of capital and thus encourages
producers to expand their production scales. On the other hand, the amplified capital
investment also provides collateral to support more arbitrage trades.
We then characterize and discuss the implications of multiple equilibria on arbitrage
trading and aggregate output. Under certain parameterizations, we are able to derive two
distinct and robust steady states. They correspond to di↵erent regimes of the economy.
For example, there might exist two steady states, featuring di↵erent levels of arbitrage
trades and price spreads. As more arbitrage trades support better risk sharing among
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households, there is a Pareto improvement if the economy shifts from the bad regime with
less trading volumes to the good one. However, crises might arise if the shock happens to
trigger the shift of the opposite direction.
Suppose that the economy were initially in a good regime. An abrupt, tiny shock, either
in production or in asset demands, could open up the possibility for a financial crisis. For
instance, the shock might at first only cause some small losses to intermediaries, which
prompts them to reduce the capital investment and their arbitrage trades subsequently.
However, as they cannot internalize the price impact of their trading volumes, this makes
the following price spread widen up and move against their initial positions. As a
result, intermediaries su↵er further losses in the financial markets. However, the losses
could become more alarming if agents panic and altogether move the economy towards
a bad regime, featuring even wider price spreads. Since the initial trading volumes are
relatively larger in the pre-shock regime, such unfavorable price movement thus might
lead to more severe financial distresses or even a complete collapse of the intermediary
sector. Accordingly, the impoverished intermediaries have to further cut down their capital
investment and arbitrage scales, inducing sharp contractions in the aggregate output and
market liquidity.
At first, it appears like crises only occur when the economy shifts from a good regime
to a bad one, fueled by the pessimistic market sentiment. However, we show that similar
disruptions can still arise, even if the economy converges to a good regime after the shock.
In fact, independent of the market sentiment being positive or not, as long as the post-
shock regime features a more divergent price spread than the initial one, intermediaries
will su↵er losses in their speculative positions. If their pre-shock trading volumes happen
to be large, then the following financial distress can pose a serious threat to the market
stability and the overall economy.
‘ Furthermore, our discussion of multiple equilibria allows us to draw implications on
the post-crisis recovery. In contrast with the self-correcting feature in Gromb and Vayanos
(2017), we find that the possibility of regime shifts in arbitrage trading complicates
the post-shock recovery. Apart from slowing down the recapitalization process due to
magnified losses, the shifts in regime might also derail the recovery in both the financial
and real sectors. For example, the market liquidity supply might only rebound partially
to a lower level in the new regime. Moreover, if the economy switches to a regime without
any mispricings, then arbitrageurs can no longer exploit profits to further fund the capital
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investments. Consequently, the aggregate output and employment end up experiencing a
slow and limited recovery.
To our knowledge, we are the first to set up a theoretical framework that integrates
speculations across segmented markets into a conventional macroeconomic model through
collateral constrained intermediaries. The paper complements the literature that focuses
on asset mispricings arising from financial frictions. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) are the
first to study how trading restrictions may a↵ect arbitrageurs’ capability to eliminate
price anomalies. Due to asymmetric information and moral hazard, arbitrageurs bear
insolvency risk under the margin requirement. Our setup of the market segmentation
borrows heavily from Gromb and Vayanos (2002, 2017). They propose a dynamic model
in which financially constrained arbitrageurs intermediate asset demands across segmented
markets. Our main departure from these models is that we allow for a broader range of
assets (as opposed to only the riskless asset) to serve as collateral in the arbitrage trading.
This enables us to study the spillover e↵ects between the financial and real sector. Also,
instead of emphasizing the self-correcting dynamics as in Gromb and Vayanos (2017), our
model highlights the discussion of multiple equilibria and the corresponding regime shifts,
which might derail the recovery process after the shocks.
Our paper also shares features with many other models of financially constrained
arbitrageurs. For example, Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) study the feedback loops
of arbitrageurs’ funding liquidity and market liquidity, and how they interact through
the collateral constraints. The funding liquidity in their model captures the arbitrageurs’
capability of raising debt to facilitate the arbitrage trading. Our model di↵ers in the source
and the objective of arbitrageurs’ funding. The major funding comes from arbitrage profits
rather than from direct borrowing, and it is used to reinvest in productive capital. Hence,
the funding liquidity is reflected by the market liquidity of financial assets. In He and
Krishnamurthy (2012, 2013), arbitrageurs can raise funds from less sophisticated investors
to invest in a risky financial security, but this external funding has to below an exogenous
ratio of their own wealth. Liu and Longsta↵ (2004) study the optimal arbitrage strategy
of risk-averse, collateral-constrained arbitrageurs in a partial equilibrium. Xiong (2001)
and Kyle and Xiong (2001) examine the impact of arbitrage capital on asset prices by
analyzing the wealth e↵ects of arbitrageurs with log utility in a continuous-time model.
However, the above papers do not study the impact of arbitrage trading on the growth in
the real sector.
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In addition, our paper is related to macroeconomic models stressing the pecuniary
externality. In our model, when intermediaries collectively reduce their arbitrage volumes,
the price spread would diverge and move against their initial positions. Some recent work
also underscores similar externality, as borrowers do not internalize the impact of their
own leverage decisions on the systemic risk. Examples include Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe
(2016); Lorenzoni (2008); Bianchi (2011); Chari and Kehoe (2016); and Brunnermeier and
Sannikov (2014).
Also, this model adds to a fast growing literature stressing collateral constraints as
financial frictions and their impact on asset pricing and aggregate economic activities.
In general, there are two main approaches of modeling collateral constraints. The first
generally assumes that there is no external enforcement to prevent potential default.
Accordingly, lenders or other collateral receiving parties have to take into account of
the future default possibility ex ante, based on which they impose the specific collateral
requirements. In this category, the collateral constraints often limit the current borrowing
or trading activities as a function of future asset prices. Examples are Kiyotaki and Moore
(1997), Chien and Lustig (2010), Ku¨bler and Schmedders (2003). The other approach
assumes implicitly that there is no default in the economy. Typically, the collateral
constraints are modeled with current asset prices, as it is assumed implicitly that agents
would never walk away from their liabilities. In these models, agents do not have to
calculate or estimate future asset prices. This allows for more flexibility in modeling
shocks and uncertainty. For instance, Bianchi (2011), Mendoza (2010) and Schmitt-Grohe´
and Uribe (2016) model the endogenous borrowing constraints with the current relative
prices. Our model belongs to the first approach and assumes limited liability in the wake
of default.
Moreover, our framework falls within a general class of macro-finance models that
feature multiple equilibria to characterize business cycles. Gertler and Kiyotaki (2015)
study the bank runs in an economy where bank asset liquidation prices are endogenously
determined and a↵ect whether a sunspot equilibrium exists. Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe
(2016) establish the existence of multiple equilibria in open-economy models in which
pessimistic views about the collateral value induce the economy to slide into self-fulfilling
crises.
Finally, this paper also joins the literature considering the slow recovery from the Great
Recession as a transition between di↵erent regimes. Shimer (2012) and Fajgelbaum et al.
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(2017) are examples discussing the existence of multiple equilibria and the transitions from
one steady state to the other in the context of after-shock recovery.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces our baseline model.
Section 3 characterizes the equilibrium. Section 4 contains our discussion of the steady
states. Section 5 studies the existence and statics of multiple equilibria. Section 6 extends
the multiple steady state analysis to various impulse responses and recovery patterns
following unexpected shocks. Section 7 concludes with a discussion of our contribution.
The Appendix includes all the proofs.
II.2 Baseline Model
II.2.1 Representative Households
We consider two segmented markets, A and B, in an infinite horizon economy with one
perishable good. Each market is populated with an identical continuum of representative
households (hereinafter HH), which constitute a measure of l. Each household receives
natural endowments in each period, which follow an exogenous process of the form
eit = b+ u
i
t 1✓t, i 2 {A,B},
where eit is the endowment of one household in period t and market i, b is a constant
and uit 1✓t is the endowment shock. In particular, {✓t}1t=1 is a sequence of independent
identically distributed random variables, each of which follows a symmetric distribution
around zero on a bounded support S = ⇥ ✓¯, ✓¯⇤, where ✓¯ > 0. In short, we call ✓t the
shock unit. uit 1 is the shock intensity and is always revealed one period earlier. Thus,
HH know their hedging demand one period in advance.
We assume that the shock intensity in two markets are identical in magnitude but
opposite in direction:
uAt =  uBt > 0.
This setup provides a simple way to motivate the real-world price wedges between
similar assets from the diverse demands in segmented markets. For expositional
convenience, we further assume that ut ⌘ uAt = u > 0 is constant for all t. Naturally,
without intermediation, the consumption paths in the two markets are perfectly negatively
correlated. Thus, HH from di↵erent markets have opposite hedging demands.
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HH’s expected utility is given by
Et
" 1X
s=0
 s ln
 
Cit+s
 #
, i 2 {A,B},
where C it+s is HH’s t+ s consumption in market i, i 2 {A,B}, and 0 <   < 1. To ensure
non-negative consumptions for HH, we set b  u✓¯ > 0.
II.2.2 Financial Assets
In addition, there exists an identical financial asset within each market, which is long-lived,
in zero-net supply and pays out a dividend equal to ✓t in t. Since its dividend exactly
mimics the shock unit in each period, such asset can serve as a perfect hedging instrument
for HH.
Due to HH’s opposite hedging demands, the asset prices, i.e. P it , i 2 {A,B}, di↵er
across markets without further intermediation. As HH in market A always experience
a positive amount of shock units, i.e., u = uAt > 0, they are eager to sell the assets to
neutralize their endowment shocks. To the extent market A has negative asset demands
while market B has the opposite, prices in market A tend to be lower than in market B.
We define the price di↵erence between the two markets as
 t := P
B
t   PAt .
II.2.3 Intermediaries
Outside the two markets, there also exists a continuum of measure one of competitive,
risk averse and infinitely lived intermediaries (hereinafter IM). Unlike HH, IM can trade
financial assets simultaneously in both markets. The non-zero price discrepancies create
potential arbitrage opportunities for them. They can gain immediate profit by entering
long positions in the low-price market and taking short ones in the high-price region. By
doing so, they also provide market liquidity to HH in both markets. To ease exposition,
we assume further that IM will incur inhibitive cost if they fail to take balanced positions
across markets. As a result, in order to ensure a net zero position of financial assets,
IM’s positions in two markets must be equal in size but di↵er in signs. Denote xt as IM’s
11
Market A Market B
The Intermediaries
Endowment
Process
Endowment
Process
Production
Process
Financial
Asset ✓t
Financial
Asset ✓t
+x  x
wage wage
labor labor
Endowment
Shock +ut 1✓t
Endowment
Shock  ut 1✓t
Figure II.1: The structure of the economic system.
position in market A
xt := x
A
t =  xBt .
As in Gromb and Vayanos (2002, 2017), we use xt as a measure of market liquidity.
Apart from intermediating asset demands between markets, IM also play a crucial
role in aggregate production by investing capital as entrepreneurs. For simplicity, we
assume IM have the unique capability to convert the perishable consumption goods into
physical capital and vice versa, whereas HH can only convert capital into consumption.
Accordingly, IM organize the production sector in the economy by providing capital input
and hiring HH from both markets as labor. The production has a constant return to scale
and its output function follows a Cobb-Douglas form
f (Kt, Lt) = aK
↵
t L
 
t ,
where a is the total productivity parameter, ↵ and   are the output elasticity of capital Kt
and labor Lt respectively. In addition, the capital depreciation rate is  . IM compensate
HH with a competitive wage for their labor.
IM’s expected utility is given by
Et
" 1X
s=0
⇢s ln
 
CIMt+s
 #
,
where CIMt+s is IM’s t+ s consumption and 0 < ⇢ < 1.
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II.2.4 Collateral Constraints
The only friction in this model comes from the HH’s collateral requirements when they
trade securities with IM. The constraints arise from the perpetual nature of the financial
assets. Unlike the one-period contracts, in which asset prices collapse to zero in the next
period, the positions of long-lived securities in this model remain alive and bear value in
all future periods. The sequential trading of these assets thus obliges IM to first clear
their previous positions before taking new ones in both markets. As will become clear,
such liquidation of previous arbitrage positions usually involves an obligated payment to
HH.
In order to ensure that IM honor their contracts later, HH require IM to deposit
collateral up to the amount that they would not have an incentive to walk away in the
next period. To be consistent with the real-world liquidation as well as the literature of
limited liability (see e.g., Ku¨bler and Schmedders (2003) and Chien and Lustig (2010)), we
further assume that in case of default HH can only grab IM’s depreciated capital, without
being able to confiscate their capital rent. Hence, IM’s collateral constraints are
(1   )Kt   xt t+1   0,
where  xt t+1 =
P
i2{A,B} x
i
tP
i
t+1 is the IM’s due obligation or the value of their previous
arbitrage positions.
As will be shown later, despite the following obligations, IM’s trading still qualifies as
arbitrage. This is because IM can essentially roll over their payment infinitely with gains
from new positions.
II.2.5 Optimization Problems
Since HH draw no utility from leisure, the labor input is constant, Lt = L = 2l. IM’s
optimization problem is given by:
max
CIMt+s,x
i
t+s,Kt+s
Et
" 1X
s=0
⇢s ln
 
CIMt+s
 #
, i 2 {A,B}
13
subject to
CIMt+s +Kt+s =
X
i2{A,B}
xit+s 1P
i
t+s| {z }
obligations
 
X
i2{A,B}
xit+sP
i
t+s| {z }
arbitrage income
+F (Kt+s 1) + (1   )Kt+s 1
X
i2{A,B}
xit+sP
i
t+s+1 + (1   )Kt+s   0,
where F (Kt+s 1) = a(1   )K↵t+s 1L  .
Similar to the settings in Gromb and Vayanos (2002, 2017), IM are subject to both
budget and collateral constraints. In period t, IM choose the consumption CIMt , new
capital investment level Kt and the asset position in both markets xit, i 2 {A,B}, to
maximize their utility.
HH, on the other hand, cannot save or invest in physical capital. They earn their labor
income from the production process. They are only subject to budget constraints. In each
period t, they choose their consumption Cit and asset position y
i
t to solve the following
problem:
max
Cit+s,y
i
t+s
Et
" 1X
s=0
 s log
 
Cit+s
 #
, i 2 {A,B},
subject to
Cit+s =
 
yit+s 1
 
P it+s + ✓t+s
   yit+sP it+s | {z }
income from trading financial assets
+ a K↵t+s 1L
  1| {z }
labor income
+
 
b+ uit+s 1✓t+s
 | {z }
endowment
= P it+s
 
yit+s 1   yit+s
 
+ a K↵t+s 1L
  1 + b+
 
uit+s 1 + y
i
t+s 1
 
✓t+s. (II.1)
Ideally, HH would like to take a position equal to yit =  uit in period t so that they are
fully protected from endowment shocks in t+ 1.
II.2.6 Equilibrium
Given the initial capital investment K0 and agents’ asset positions x0 and yi0, i 2 {A,B},
an equilibrium is described by the price process P it , capital investment Kt, asset holdings
yit and x
i
t, and consumption choices C
IM
t and C
i
t such that
• all agents solve their optimization problems given prices;
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• markets clear for financial assets, that is yitl + xit = 0.
II.3 Equilibrium Characterization
In this section, we focus on characterizing the equilibrium price di↵erences, market
liquidity, consumptions and capital investments. As we restrict IM to take balanced
positions, IM’s above optimization problem can be simplified as follows:
max
CIMt+s,xt+s,Kt+s
Et
" 1X
s=0
⇢s log
 
CIMt+s
 #
,
subject to
CIMt+s +Kt+s =  xt+s 1 t+s| {z }
obligation
+ xt+s t+s| {z }
arbitrage income
+F (Kt+s 1) + (1   )Kt+s 1, (II.2)
  xt+s t+s+1 + (1   )Kt+s   0. (II.3)
The Euler conditions for IM are given by
  ⇢
t+s
CIMt+s
+
⇢t+s+1
CIMt+s+1
 
F 0 (Kt+s) + 1   
 
+  t+s(1   ) = 0, (II.4)
⇢t t+s
CIMt+s
  ⇢
t+s+1 t+s+1
CIMt+s+1
   t+s t+s+1 = 0, (II.5)
where  t+s   0 is the Lagrange multiplier for the collateral constraint (II.3). The
transversality conditions (TVC) take the form
lim
T!1
⇢T+1
 T+1
CIMT+1
xT = 0, (II.6)
lim
T!1
⇢T+1
F 0 (KT ) + 1   
CIMT+1
KT = 0. (II.7)
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Likewise, HH’s first order conditions are
P it
Cit
=  Et

P it+1 + ✓t+1
Cit+1
 
, i 2 {A,B}. (II.8)
Also the TVC for HH is given by
lim
T!1
 T
P iT
CiT
yiT = 0, i 2 {A,B}. (II.9)
Obviously, one trivia equilibrium is xt = ut, 8t. That is, from the initial period on, IM
provide full liquidity in both markets and eliminate any price di↵erence  t = 0, 8t. In
this case, the required collateral is zero at all times and the collateral constraints are
constantly slack. As a result, there is no arbitrage opportunity for IM and the economy
thus resembles the one in neoclassical growth model. However, as will become clear later,
for the settings in which alternative equilibria are possible, such a trivia equilibrium is not
as robust compared to others. This is because IM are competitive, when  t = 0 they are
indi↵erent from taking any positions and thus they do not necessarily have incentives to
commit to providing full liquidity. However, equilibrium with binding collateral constraints
leaves IM no other options except sticking to the equilibrium positions. Therefore, in this
instance, we rather focus on the more robust equilibrium. We regard the trivial one as a
degenerate case and exclude it from the scope of our discussion.
First, we look at the equilibrium price di↵erence.
Lemma II.1. Define pAt (✓t) and p
B
t (✓t) to be the time t equilibrium prices in markets A
and B as functions of ✓t. It follows that
pAt (") =  pBt ( "),
where " 2 ⇥ ✓¯, ✓¯⇤.
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Proposition II.1. In equilibrium, the asset prices are given by
PAt =  
CAt
CAt + C
B
t
 t =  
✓
1
2
+
(u  xt 1/l) ✓t
2w (Kt 1)
◆
 t, (II.10)
PBt =
CBt
CAt + C
B
t
 t =
✓
1
2
  (u  xt 1/l) ✓t
2w (Kt 1)
◆
 t, (II.11)
and the price di↵erence
 t =
2w (Kt 1)
Mt + (xt   xt 1) /l , (II.12)
where
w (Kt 1) := a K↵t 1L
  1 + b,
Mt :=
0@Et
24 1X
j=1
 j
✓t+j
CBt+j
351A 1 .
Moreover,  t is independent of the realization of shock units ✓t, 8t.
Given the price di↵erence  t, the price in i is proportional to market i’s consumption
share relative to all HH’s consumptions. In particular, this share depends on the realization
of the shock unit ✓t. Both prices are decreasing with ✓t. In contrast, the price di↵erence
 t, as a whole, is independent of the specific realization of the shock units.
Intuitively, from IM’s perspective as they take a zero net position in the financial assets,
their consumptions are not a↵ected by any of the realization of dividends ✓t across time.
Technically, from HH’s Euler conditions, we make use of the log utility and the symmetric
distribution of the shock unit ✓t. We further find that the independence of  t on ✓t also
holds for the cases where HH have CRRA utility and ✓t follows a two-point distribution.
Proposition II.2. Given the shock intensity u and the distribution of {✓t}, there exists
a unique threshold value ⇢¯ > 0 for the IM’s discount factor such that:
1. If ⇢ > ⇢¯, then IM’s positions xt = ul and the price spread  t = 0 for all t.
2. Else, if 0 < ⇢  ⇢¯:
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• When IM’s collateral constraints are binding, then their asset positions xt follow
xt 2 (0, ul) and  t+1 = (1   )Kt
xt
(II.13)
• When IM’s collateral constraints are slack, then
xt  0, and  t+1
 t
= F 0 (Kt) + 1   . (II.14)
Proposition II.2 shows that IM’s varying degree of patience gives rise to a di↵erent form
of equilibrium. As will become clear later, it also leads to distinct forms of steady states.
In particular, if IM are su ciently patient, then the markets expect them to accumulate
enough collateral to eliminate all the price gaps in the long run. Such a prospect in turn
prompts the markets from the very beginning to price the assets in a way that e↵ectively
clears away all the financial frictions for IM. Hence, even if IM’s initial capital investment
level is low, the market prices still react to allow them to provide full liquidity. As a
consequence, IM are always able to overcome the collateral constraints and remove any
potential mispricing resulting from market segmentation. In this instance, the economy
resembles the one in the neoclassical growth model with frictionless financial markets.
On the other hand, if IM are not as patient, the market liquidity in equilibrium depends
on whether IM are collateral constrained. Specifically, if IM’s collateral constraints are
binding, they take arbitrage positions by providing liquidity to HH in both markets. Put
di↵erently, they satisfy HH’s asset demands by entering long positions in the low price
market A and short positions in the high price region B. As the collateral restricts their
position sizes, IM can only bring the price gaps closer, without completely eliminating
them. In contrast, if IM are not collateral constrained, they will take opposite positions
relative to arbitrage trading by competing liquidity with HH. This only happens in the first
few periods when IM enter the financial markets with a huge amount of wealth. In order to
smooth their whole consumption paths, IM tend to save and transfer resources into future
periods. In this respect, IM regard the financial assets as savings instruments parallel to
the physical investment, rather than an arbitrage device. By taking the opposite positions
of arbitrage, in the next period IM expect to receive positive income from settlement
of previous asset investment instead of paying out obligations. Meanwhile, as a saving
instrument, the marginal return of taking one unit of asset in both markets should equal
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to that of the capital investment in equilibrium. Nevertheless, in this event, IM’s trading
widens up the price di↵erences even further and exacerbates the dearth of liquidity supply
in both markets.
This di↵ers with Gromb and Vayanos (2017). They conclude that, before fully closing
the price gaps, the spread decreases with arbitrageurs’ wealth. Here, due to the motive of
consumption smoothing, IM’s excessive wealth induces more scarcity in liquidity supply
and enlarges the price di↵erences even further. The contrast mainly results from the
di↵erent marginal returns of IM’s saving instruments. In Gromb and Vayanos (2017),
arbitrageurs can resort to a risk-free asset with constant interest rate, whereas in our
model IM are facing a decreasing marginal return of their physical investment.
Next we focus on the dynamics of IM’s consumption, wealth and capital investment
when their collateral constraints are binding.
Proposition II.3. With initial wealth W0, when IM’s collateral constraints are binding
in t, their consumption and capital investments evolve according to
Ct = (1  ↵⇢)Wt, Kt = ↵⇢µtWt, (II.15)
where
µt :=
 t+1
 t+1   (1   ) t > 1.
IM’s wealth dynamics is given by
Wt+1 = F (Kt) + (1   )Kt   xt t+1 = F (Kt) = F (↵⇢µtWt) . (II.16)
When IM’s collateral constraints keep binding, IM’s remaining capital (1  )Kt exactly
o↵sets their obligated cash outflow  xt t+1. Thus IM are left with the capital rent F (Kt)
as wealth, which will later be allocated for their consumption and savings.
Equation (II.15) shows that IM are myopic. Independent of their income level, they
allocate a fixed proportion of their wealth to savings and consumption. In particular, they
save St = ↵⇢Wt, and this proportion increases with the capital productivity and their
patience level to delay consumptions. However, IM’s savings are not the only source to
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form the new capital investment Kt. The other part comes from the entire amount of
immediate arbitrage income xt t. That is, IM reinvest all of their arbitrage income in the
production sector. Thus,
Kt = ↵⇢Wt + xt t = ↵⇢Wt +
(1   )Kt t
 t+1
= ↵⇢µtWt.
Why would IM reinvest all in capital? From a producer’s perspective, the arbitrage
income xt t can be viewed as a one-period loan borrowed from HH. Likewise, the
corresponding obligation xt t+1 in the next period can be seen as the due repayment.
In equilibrium, the e↵ective interest rate of such a loan is lower than the marginal return
of capital investment F 0 (Kt) + 1   . Compared with sacrificing one unit of consumption
to save for one unit of physical capital, this low-rate loan o↵ers a less painful alternative to
increase capital investment. Therefore, it is in IM’s favor to make full use of such external
financing to leverage up their production scale and gain higher capital rent for the next
period. Meanwhile, the expanded production also means higher wage/employment in both
markets. In this sense, we can conclude that the arbitrage activities help boost the real
economy by providing favorable credits to producers.
Proposition II.4. Given IM’s initial wealth W0 > 0, an equilibrium exists in which price
di↵erences  t, IM’s capital investment Kt and the market liquidity xt are deterministic.
In equilibrium, prices are non-negative in the market with negative shock intensity, i.e.
market B, and non-positive in the market where the shock intensity is positive, i.e. market
A.
II.4 Steady States
When the shock intensity is constant, i.e., ut = u, there are steady states in which the
price di↵erence, market liquidity and capital investment stay the same across time. In
addition, there exist multiple steady states under certain conditions.
Proposition II.5. Given the shock intensity u and the distribution of {✓t}, there exists
a unique threshold value ⇢¯ > 0 for the IM’s discount factor such that:
1. If ⇢ > ⇢¯, there exists a unique steady state with slack collateral constraints for IM.
In particular,
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• IM provide full liquidity and eliminate any price gaps in the steady state, i.e.
x⇤s = ul and  ⇤s = 0.
• IM’s capital investment and wealth converge to K⇤s = F 0 1
⇣
1 ⇢(1  )
⇢
⌘
and
W ⇤s = F (K⇤s ) + (1   )K⇤s .
2. Else if 0 < ⇢  ⇢¯, there exists steady state(s) with binding collateral constraints.
Moreover, in the steady state(s),
• IM’s capital investment and wealth converge to
K⇤b = F
0 1
✓
 
⇢
◆
> F
0 1
✓
1  ⇢(1   )
⇢
◆
, W ⇤b = F (K
⇤
b ) .
• IM provide only partial liquidity and thus cannot eliminate the price di↵erence
completely: 0 < x⇤b < ul,  
⇤
b > 0. In particular, the price spread converges to
 ⇤b =
2 w (K⇤b )
1    E
"
✓
w
 
K⇤b
    u  x⇤b/l  ✓
#
> 0. (II.17)
• IM’s total transaction volume from arbitrage amounts to x⇤b ⇤b = (1   )K⇤b .
Intuitively, patient IM (i.e. ⇢ > ⇢¯) tend to save enough collateral to eliminate
potential price di↵erences. As a result, there are no unexploited arbitrage opportunities in
equilibrium. Accordingly, the steady state level of IM’s capital investment, consumption
and wealth resemble those in the neoclassical growth model. In contrast, impatient IM
wouldn’t save enough capital to eliminate all arbitrage opportunities. As they are always
collateral constrained, they can only a↵ord to provide partial liquidity. In this situation,
one would observe persistent price di↵erences across segmented markets.
In a sense, the existence and exploitation of arbitrage opportunities allow IM to obtain
external financing from HH. IM’s arbitrage income at the steady state is essentially a
nominal zero-interest loan. Since the price di↵erences are constant, every period IM earn
the same amount of arbitrage income as their due obligations. In other words, IM receive
new loans in each period, which exactly o↵set their repayment of the previous debt. In
view of this, IM’s trading is indeed arbitrage in nature, as IM are able to infinitely roll
over their debt with new ones in the long run. In particular, the scale of this periodical
external financing equals to a fixed ratio of IM’s capital x⇤b 
⇤
b = (1   )K⇤b .
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Thanks to the external financing from arbitrage opportunities, IM’s production
investment level in the steady states thus increases to K⇤b = F
0 1 ( /⇢), which is higher
than that of its counterpart in the neoclassical growth model. Interestingly, because of the
di↵erent possibilities of gaining external financing in the steady states, there might exist
situations such that though ⇢1 < ⇢¯ < ⇢2, the long run capital investment level turns out
to have the converse relation K⇤1 > K⇤2 .
II.5 Multiple Equilibria
Proposition II.6. If ⇢ = ⇢¯, there exists a unique steady state with a binding collateral
constraint. Otherwise if ⇢ 2 (0, ⇢¯), there exist two distinct collateral constrained steady
states, denoted as SS1 := (x⇤1, ⇤1,K⇤1 ) and SS2 := (x⇤2, ⇤2,K⇤2 ), with 0 < x⇤1 < x⇤2 < ul and
 ⇤1 >  ⇤2 > 0. In particular:
• In both steady states, the capital investment levels are identical, i.e. K⇤1 = K⇤2 =
K⇤b = F
0 1 ( /⇢).
• Moreover, K⇤b , x⇤1 and  ⇤2 increase with ⇢, whereas x⇤2 and  ⇤1 decrease with ⇢.
From Proposition II.5, we know that IM’s steady state capital investment is indepen-
dent of the particular levels of market liquidity or price spreads. Moreover, with binding
collateral constraints, IM’s steady state collateral amounts to not only a fixed part of the
capital investment, but also their periodical obligation. IM’s obligation at steady state is
the product of the price spread and their arbitrage position size in each market. All else
equal, the price spread decreases with IM’s position size. Hence, given the obligation or
their product being constant, there might exist more than one possible set of values for
price spread and market liquidity.
Within the technical settings of our baseline model, for economies with impatient IM,
i.e., ⇢ 2 (0, ⇢¯], we find two robust collateral binding steady states. The special case is
⇢ = ⇢¯, where essentially two steady states coincide with each other. Because IM have the
same level of long-run capital investment and consumption in both steady states, they are
indi↵erent to either of the two.
However, for HH the two distinct regimes have di↵erent welfare implications. As
illustrated by a numerical example, in the left graph of Figure II.2, the two steady states
di↵er in their level of market liquidity and the price spread. The steady state on the
left, i.e., SS1, features lower market liquidity x⇤1, larger price spread  ⇤1 and higher price
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Figure II.2: a = 4, b = 60, u = 10, ↵ =   = 0.5,   = 0.4,   = 0.9, ✓¯ = 2 and ✓ follows a
two-point distribution. The horizontal line is (1   )K⇤b (⇢), where K⇤b is the steady state
capital. The left chart is when ⇢ = 0.5, and the right one is when ⇢ = ⇢¯ = 0.94. The blue
lines are the possible products of equilibrium x and   given that the steady state capital
is K⇤b (⇢). The interaction point(s) are the steady state position size(s) x
⇤
1 and x
⇤
2 (x
⇤).
volatilities. In contrasts, the other (SS2) has more liquidity supply x⇤2, a narrower spread
 ⇤2 and lower price volatilities. Given that HH receive the same amount of labor income in
both steady states, they prefer SS2 over SS1, because more market liquidity allows them
to better hedge against their endowment shocks. Thus, transiting from SS1 to SS2 is a
Pareto improvement. In what follows, we call SS1 the unhealthy steady state/regime and
refer to SS2 as the healthy one.
Moreover, as IM become more patient, i.e., ⇢ increases within the range of (0, ⇢¯], the
two steady states also get “closer” to each other. The di↵erences between the two steady
state market liquidities and price spreads become smaller. The extreme case is when ⇢ = ⇢¯
and the healthy and unhealthy steady states are identical to one another.
Proposition II.7. All else equal, the cuto↵ value ⇢¯ of IM’s discount factor increases
with the shock intensity u. For two otherwise identical economies with di↵erent shock
intensity, e.g., u1 < u2, if IM’s discount factor ⇢ is less than either of the cuto↵ values,
then it follows:
• K⇤b [u1] = K⇤b [u2];
• x⇤1 [u1] > x⇤1 [u2],  ⇤1 [u1] <  ⇤1 [u2];
• x⇤2 [u1] < x⇤2 [u2],  ⇤2 [u1] >  ⇤2 [u2],
where SSi [uj ] := (K⇤b [uj ] , x
⇤
i [uj ] ,  
⇤
i [uj ]), i 2 {1, 2}, is the corresponding steady state
in the economy with shock intensity uj, j 2 {1, 2}.
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Figure II.3: a = 8, b = 40, ↵ =   = 0.5,   = 0.4,   = 0.9, ✓¯ = 2 and ✓ follows a two-point
distribution. The horizontal line is (1  )K⇤b , where K⇤b is the binding steady state capital.
The x ⇤ lines are the possible product of equilibrium x and   given that the steady state
capital is K⇤b and the corresponding shock intensity. Each interaction point corresponds
to a binding steady state position size x⇤.
As shown in Figure II.3, all else equal, an economy with larger shock intensity allows IM
of the more patient type to leverage up the aggregate production through arbitrage. On the
other hand, for a given type of IM, as long as they are collateral constrained in the steady
states, the level of shock intensity in the economy does not a↵ect their aggregate capital
investment. However, the gap between healthy and unhealthy steady states in terms of
market liquidity and price spreads expands with increasing shock intensity. Comparably,
HH enjoy better risk sharing at the healthy steady state in the economy with larger shock
intensity, whereas they also su↵er more from the lack of hedging capabilities if they end
up in a bad steady state.
Proposition II.8. All else equal, the cuto↵ value ⇢¯ of IM’s discount factor decreases with
the total productivity parameter a. For two otherwise identical economies with di↵erent
productivity factors, e.g. a1 < a2, if IM’s discount factor ⇢ is less than either of the cuto↵
values, then it follows:
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Figure II.4: b = 60, u = 10, ↵ =   = 0.5,   = 0.4,   = 0.9, ✓¯ = 2 and ✓ follows a two-point
distribution. The horizontal lines are (1  )K⇤b (a, ⇢), where K⇤b (a, ⇢) is the binding steady
state capital. The blue lines are the possible product of equilibrium x and   given that
the steady state capital is K⇤b (⇢). Each interaction point corresponds to a binding steady
state position size x⇤. The upper left is when a = 4 and ⇢ = ⇢¯ = 0.94. The upper right is
when a = 6 and ⇢ = ⇢¯ = 0.608. The lower left is when a = 4 and ⇢ = 0.5. The lower right
is when a = 6 and ⇢ = 0.5.
• K⇤b [a1] < K⇤b [a2] ;
• x⇤1 [a1] < x⇤1 [a2] , x⇤2 [a1] > x⇤2 [a2] ;
•  ⇤1 [a1] >  ⇤1 [a2] ,  ⇤2 [a1] <  ⇤2 [a2] ;
where SSi [aj ] := (K⇤b [aj ] , x
⇤
i [aj ] ,  
⇤
i [aj ]), i 2 {1, 2}, is the corresponding steady state in
the economy with total productivity factor aj, j 2 {1, 2}.
Figure II.4 compares the collateral binding steady states of economies with di↵erent
total productivity factors. All else equal, higher productivities allow IM to save more
capital as collateral in absolute terms. This e↵ectively lowers the threshold value of IM’s
discount factor to eliminate arbitrage opportunities. Put it di↵erently, in an economy
with larger productivity factor, only IM of the relatively more impatient type are able to
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gain positive arbitrage profits. Meanwhile, a higher productivity factor also pushes up the
steady state capital, which benefits both IM and HH with higher production income.
When comparing the binding steady states of otherwise equal economies, as shown in
the lower two graphs, a higher productivity factor helps narrow down the gap between
healthy and unhealthy regimes. HH in an economy with higher productivity are better
o↵ at the bad steady state in terms of higher wage and more risk sharing. However, the
comparison becomes complicated at the healthy state, as it is determined by the trade-o↵
between higher wage and lower market liquidity supply.
II.6 Implications on Recovery
In this section, we explore the implications of our model for two related issues. First, how
does the economy adjust over time following sudden changes in aggregate capital or shock
intensity? Second, what is the impact of potential regime shifts on the recovery of the
economy? To better examine the corresponding reactions, we only consider shocks relative
to the steady states of our baseline model illustrated in Proposition II.5.
II.6.1 Recovery from Sudden Losses in IM’s Wealth
To study how the economy recovers from sudden losses in IM’s wealth, we consider the
following thought experiment. Suppose that in period t IM’s wealth drops below its steady
state value. This could result from, for example, an unexpected shock in their previous
capital investment such as a natural disaster, or one asset failing to pay the due dividend.
In the following, we investigate both the immediate and long run e↵ects that such shocks
have on aggregate output (which is also an indicator of employment), market liquidity and
price spreads.
From Proposition II.6, when the collateral constraints are binding and ⇢ 2 (0, ⇢¯), there
exist two di↵erent robust equilibria. They are equally likely and their occurrences are
driven by animal spirits. Thus, it is possible that an unexpected shock could trigger
changes in market consensus and result in the following convergence to a di↵erent steady
state. Given this possibility, we assume that if there were a negative shock hitting the
IM’s wealth, the market expectation of the future steady state would either remain the
same or turn to a worse one. In other words, following an adverse shock the market
consensus would not become more optimistic than before. This assumption is based on
the belief that IM’s shrinking wealth is usually associated with the prospect of reduced
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investment and employment (wage rate). In particular, we define a regime shift as the
economy moving from one steady state to another. That is, from a healthy regime to an
unhealthy one, or from an unhealthy steady state to a healthy one.
Corollary II.1. Suppose that IM’s wealth suddenly drops in period t below its steady state
value and all agents keep the same expectation of the future steady state as before.
• The immediate e↵ect is that the physical investment and market liquidity decrease,
whereas the price discrepancy increases:
Kt < K
⇤, xt < x⇤,  t >  ⇤.
• Following this immediate reaction, capital investment, market liquidity and price
spreads revert gradually towards their pre-shock steady state levels:
Kt < Kt+1 < · · · < K⇤, xt < xt+1 < · · · < x⇤,  t >  t+1 > · · · >  ⇤.
Corollary II.1 shows that when there are no regime shifts caused by changes in market
sentiment, the shock reaction confirms the self-correcting pattern as described in Gromb
and Vayanos (2017). In particular, the short-term drops of capital and increases of the
price spread indicate that both the marginal return of production and the immediate
arbitrage profitability rise above the steady state levels. These two factors serve as
favorable forces to pull IM’s wealth back to the pre-shock status. In the long run, the
economy gradually reverts to its previous steady state.
However, this kind of recovery pattern only occurs as a special case in our model,
when there is no regime switching after the shocks. When agents panic following a
negative shock, the market sentiment about future economic prospect typically becomes
more pessimistic. As a result, the market might expect a regime shift from the previous
healthy steady state to a future unhealthy one. In this case, the resulting recovery paths
will not necessarily exhibit the above ideal self-reverting feature.
Corollary II.2. Suppose that starting from a healthy steady state SSh : (K⇤h, x
⇤
h,  
⇤
h),
IM’s wealth suddenly drops in period t below its initial value. Meanwhile, markets panic
and anticipate that the economy would move towards the unhealthy steady state SSu :
(K⇤u, x⇤u,  ⇤u).
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• If the equilibrium exists, compared to the case where there is no regime shift, then
the immediate reaction is that both capital investment and market liquidity tumble
more sharply, and the price spread also rises more significantly.
Kt < Kh,t < K
⇤
u = K
⇤
h, xt < xu,t < xh,t < x
⇤
h,  t >  u,t >  h,t >  
⇤
h,
where (Ks,t, xs,t,  s,t) , s 2 {h, u}, are the corresponding equilibrium level of capital
investment, market liquidity and price spread in t after the shock, if all else equal
and there is no regime shift from the pre-shock steady state s.
• Following the immediate reaction, IM’s capital reverts gradually towards its pre-shock
level. However, the price spreads and market liquidity only converge to the unhealthy
steady state levels:
Kt < Kt+1 < · · · < K⇤u = K⇤h, xt < xt+1 < · · · < x⇤u < x⇤h,  t !  ⇤u >  ⇤h.
Figure II.5 illustrates the equilibrium paths when there is a regime shift triggered by
an unexpected negative shock. Compared to the previous benchmark recovery case, the
market reacts more dramatically. Before the shock, IM carry over a larger size of arbitrage
positions x⇤h from the previous period at the healthy steady state. Meanwhile, the panic
market sentiment anticipates an unhealthy steady state in the future with a wider price
spread  ⇤u. To accommodate the changing price expectation, an immediate sharp spike
in the current price gap  t prevails. As IM’s obligation reflects the combined two large
quantities, x⇤h and  t, they are suddenly confronted with huge financial losses relative to
the benchmark case.
As IM’s initial loss in wealth is amplified by the huge obligation, they are forced to
heavily scale back the capital investment and liquidity supply. If IM’s obligation exceeds
their total production income, equilibrium no longer exists. This can be interpreted as a
bankrupt or bank run scenario, in which the entire production sector collapses and both
financial markets enter an autarky state. Without external aids to IM, the economy risks
falling into an absorbing state with permanent recession and no self-recovery capability.
In the long run, surviving IM gradually increase their capital investment and expand
their liquidity supply. However, due to the heavier financial losses, it takes longer for IM
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Figure II.5: Impulse response from SSh to SSu after a sudden loss in IM’s wealth.
Parameter set: a = 8, b = 60, u = 10, ↵ = 0.5,   = 0.8,   = 0.5,   = 0.4, ✓¯ = 2,
⇢ = 0.6, L = 2, initial loss  W = 9. ✓t follows a two-point distribution.
to recover their production scale, compared to the above benchmark case. What is worse,
even after IM’s wealth fully revives from the negative shock, HH will end up trapped in
the unhealthy steady state with less protection against their endowment shocks. In this
sense, the market liquidity would never completely recover.
II.6.2 Spillover E↵ects
So far, we have explored the amplification e↵ects of arbitrage activities on the real
economy. In the following, we will look at the corresponding spillover e↵ects that the
arbitrage activities have on the production sector. In particular, we analyze the impact of
financial market shocks on IM’s wealth through arbitrage activities, and how this a↵ects
the aggregate production. For this purpose, we study the reactions following sudden
changes in the financial asset demands.
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Response to Sudden Increase in Shock Intensity
In this section, we look into how the economy reacts to a sudden increase in the shock
intensity. Specifically, we conduct the following thought experiment. Suppose that in
period t the shock intensity ut jumps abruptly to a higher level u1 > u and stays there for
all future periods. For HH, this means their natural endowment processes become more
volatile and accordingly their asset demands increase. By taking into account the multiple
equilibria, we consider both the immediate and long run responses with di↵erent pre-shock
states. We start with the case in which the collateral constraints of the pre-shock steady
states are slack.
Corollary II.3. Suppose ⇢  ⇢¯ and at t from a certain steady state (K⇤, x⇤,  ⇤) there is
a sudden increase in the shock intensity, u! u1 > u.
• If the markets expect an unhealthy steady state SSu : (K⇤, x⇤u,  ⇤u) following the
shock,
– then immediately the price spread soars  t >  ⇤, whereas capital investment
and market liquidity slump, i.e. Kt < K⇤ and xt < x⇤.
– In the long run, if the equilibrium exists, the capital investment gradually
recovers to its pre-shock state K⇤. However, the market liquidity and price
spread only converge to the unhealthy steady state levels, x⇤u < x⇤ and  ⇤u >  ⇤.
• Else if the markets anticipate a healthy steady state SSh : (K⇤, x⇤2,  ⇤h),
– then immediately the spread shrinks  t <  ⇤, whereas capital investment and
market supply increase, i.e. Kt > K⇤ and xt > x⇤.
– Over time, IM’s physical investment gradually falls o↵ to its pre-shock state
Kt > Kt+1 > · · · > K⇤. Meanwhile, the market liquidity and the spread
converge to the healthy steady state levels, x⇤h > x
⇤ and  ⇤h <  
⇤.
When the shock intensity increases to u1, the threshold value for IM’s discount factor
also increases, e.g. ⇢¯! ⇢¯1. As exemplified in Figure II.6, for impatient IM, i.e. ⇢ < ⇢¯, the
collateral constraints in the steady states stay binding before and after the shock.
The above corollary implies that independent of the starting regime, if the markets
expect a bad steady state after the shock, then everyone gets worse o↵. Instead, if agents
anticipate a healthy future regime, both HH and IM can benefit. This is because as
the shock intensity increases, the gap between the healthy and unhealthy regime gets
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Figure II.6: a = 8, b = 40, ↵ =   = 0.5,   = 0.4, ⇢ = 0.7,   = 0.9, ✓¯ = 2 and ✓ follows a
two-point distribution. The horizontal line is (1    )K⇤b , where K⇤b is the binding steady
state capital. The x ⇤ lines are the possible product of equilibrium x and   given that the
steady state capital is K⇤b and the corresponding shock intensity. Each interaction point
corresponds to a binding steady state position size x⇤.
more spread out. The healthy ones tend to be more “healthy” in terms of higher market
liquidity, while the bad ones get “worse”. When markets are optimistic about the future
and anticipate a healthy regime, as shown in Figure II.8, the prospect of future narrower
spread translates into a decline in current price gap. IM in e↵ect receive an unexpected
gain from their arbitrage positions, as their due obligation suddenly drops. Thus, the
inflated IM’s wealth immediately spills into the real economy as IM expand the capital
investment. Meanwhile, HH receive higher wage in the short term and eventually enjoy
better protection despite the increasing exposure.
By contrast, if markets expect an unhealthy regime with a wider price gap, disasters
could happen. As shown in Figure II.7, the current price spread soars instantly to reflect
the long run pessimism. IM suddenly encounter an unexpected increase in their obligations
or a loss in their arbitrage positions. Such damage to IM’s total income forces them to
reduce the capital investment and liquidity supply. Similar to the previous discussion,
in some extreme case, when the losses exceed IM’s total income, there would exist no
equilibrium. Before reaching the new steady state, IM su↵er from less consumption and
wealth, while HH are worse o↵ from both lower wage and poorer risk sharing against
higher exposure.
Corollary II.4. Suppose in period t from a certain steady state (K⇤, x⇤,  ⇤) there is a
sudden increase in the shock intensity, i.e. u! u1 > u, then the threshold value for IM’s
discount factor jumps from ⇢¯ to ⇢¯1 > ⇢¯.
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Figure II.7: Impulse responses from a previous healthy steady state to a new unhealthy
steady state after the shock intensity increases from u1 = 9.9 to u2 = 12. Parameter set:
a = 8, b = 60, ↵ = 0.5,   = 0.8,   = 0.5,   = 0.4, ✓¯ = 2, ⇢ = 0.6, L = 2. ✓t follows a
two-point distribution.
• If ⇢ > ⇢¯1, then IM immediately increase their position size u to u1. Both the price
spread and capital investment remain the same, i.e.  t =  t+1 = · · · =  ⇤ = 0 and
Kt = Kt+1 = · · · = K⇤.
• If ⇢¯ < ⇢  ⇢¯1 and u   x0⇤, where x0⇤ is the expected steady state liquidity level
after the shock, then immediately the spread increases,  t > 0 and market liquidity
drops xt < u. In the long run, if equilibrium exists, the capital investment gradually
increases to K⇤b = F
0 1( /⇢) > K⇤. IM only provide partial liquidity and the price
spreads are positive.
If IM are extremely patient, i.e. ⇢ > ⇢¯1, then the steady states before and after the
shock have slack collateral constraints, in which IM constantly provide full liquidity. For
IM of the less patient type, i.e. ⇢¯ < ⇢   ⇢¯1, the pre-shock steady state is collateral
unconstrained, while the ones after the shock have binding constraints.
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Figure II.8: Impulse responses from a previous healthy steady state to a new healthy
steady state after the shock intensity increases from u1 = 10 to u2 = 12. Parameter set:
a = 8, b = 60, ↵ = 0.5,   = 0.8,   = 0.5,   = 0.4, ✓¯ = 2, ⇢ = 0.6, L = 2. {✓t} follows a
two-point distribution.
Previous discussions might give us the illusion that disasters can only happen when the
markets are pessimistic and expect an unhealthy future regime. However, this corollary
shows it might not be the case. Instead, even with most optimistic anticipations, similar
disasters could still occur. In the case of ⇢¯ < ⇢ < ⇢¯1, as shown in Figure II.9, both after-
shock steady states have positive price spreads with binding collateral constraints. Thus,
even if the markets expect a healthy future regime, the price gap still jumps up immediately
to accommodate the anticipated long run prices. Again, this causes IM unexpected losses
in the financial markets, which will further depress the capital expenditure and liquidity
supply. In case IM cannot a↵ord to cover for the loss, no equilibrium would exist and the
disastrous recession will last.
In the long term, as demonstrated in Figure II.10, surviving IM are able to exploit
the arbitrage profits and increase the capital investment up to a higher level than the
pre-shock state, i.e. K⇤b > K
⇤. However, HH cannot maintain full risk sharing anymore,
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Figure II.9: a = 8, b = 40, ↵ =   = 0.5,   = 0.4,   = 0.9, ✓¯ = 2 and ✓ follows two-point
distribution. The horizontal line is (1  )K⇤b , where K⇤b is the binding steady state capital.
The x ⇤ lines are the possible product of equilibrium x and   given that the steady state
capital is K⇤b and the corresponding shock intensity. Each interaction point corresponds
to a binding steady state position size x⇤. With u1 = 8, there exist no binding steady
state.
as IM’s binding collateral constraints hinder them from providing full liquidity in either
of the steady states.
Response to Sudden Decrease in Shock Intensity
Likewise, we consider the following thought experiment. Suppose that in period t the
shock intensity ut plunges from its previous level u to u2 < u and sticks to it for all future
periods. HH’s natural endowment processes have thus become less volatile, suppressing
their appetite for financial assets in both markets. In the below we study both the
instantaneous and long run e↵ects of such an unexpected drop on capital investment,
market liquidity and price spreads.
We start with the case in which the collateral constraints of the ensuing steady states
are slack.
Corollary II.5. Suppose in period t at a certain steady state (K⇤, x⇤,  ⇤), there is a
sudden drop in the shock intensity, i.e. u ! u2 < u. Then the threshold value for IM’s
discount factor decreases from ⇢¯ to ⇢¯2 < ⇢¯.
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Figure II.10: Impulse responses from a previous slack steady state to an unhealthy binding
steady state SS1 after the shock intensity increases from u1 = 4.5 to u2 = 10. Parameter
set: a = 8, b = 60, ↵ = 0.5,   = 0.8,   = 0.5,   = 0.4, ✓¯ = 2, ⇢ = 0.6, L = 2. ✓t follows a
two-point distribution.
• If ⇢   ⇢¯, IM immediately reduce their liquidity supply from u to u2. Both the price
spreads and capital investment remain the same, i.e.  t =  t+1 = · · · =  ⇤ = 0 and
Kt = Kt+1 = · · · = K⇤.
• If ⇢¯2 < ⇢ < ⇢¯, the price spread  t plunges to zero. IM provide full liquidity to both
markets, i.e. xt = u2. The ensuing capital investment rises, i.e. Kt > K⇤. In the
long run, the capital falls to the corresponding steady state level as in the neoclassical
growth model, i.e. Kt > Kt+1 > · · · > K⇤s .
For patient IM, i.e. ⇢ > ⇢¯, their collateral requirement at the steady state before
and after the shock remain unconstrained. Thus, they are able to adjust and provide full
liquidity immediately after the shock.
For IM with discount factor ⇢¯2 < ⇢ < ⇢¯, their collateral constraints are no longer
binding after the shock. Thus, they can fully satisfy HH’s asset demands and close out
the price gaps. As a result, their obligation disappears immediately after the shock,
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leaving them with unexpected gains. With extra wealth, IM can temporarily raise their
capital investment Kt > K⇤ and consumption. However, as they can no longer harness
the external financing to boost the production, the capital investment eventually falls o↵
to the balanced level in the neoclassical growth model, i.e. K⇤s < K⇤. Thus, in the long
run, both IM and HH su↵er from less production income compared to the pre-shock state.
Corollary II.6. Suppose ⇢  ⇢¯2 and at a certain steady state SS := (K⇤, x⇤,  ⇤) there
is a sudden fall in the shock intensity in t, u! u2 < u. Denote SS0 := (K 0⇤, x0⇤,  0⇤) as
the expected ensuing steady state following the shock.
• If SS is an unhealthy steady state,
– then immediately the price spread slumps and the capital investment and market
supply expand, i.e.  t <  0⇤, Kt > K⇤ and xt > x0⇤.
– In the long run, the physical investment falls to its pre-shock size, the market
liquidity and the price spreads converge to the expected steady state levels, i.e.
Kt > Kt+1 > · · · > K⇤, xt > xt+1 > · · · > x0⇤ and  t <  t+1 < · · · <  0⇤.
• If SS is a healthy steady state,
– then immediately the price spread surges, the capital investment and market
liquidity drop, i.e.  t >  0⇤ >  ⇤, Kt < K⇤ and xt < x0⇤ < x⇤.
– In the long run, if an equilibrium exists, the capital investment gradually grows
to its pre-shock scale K⇤ = K 0⇤. The market liquidity and price spreads converge
to the new steady state levels, i.e. x0⇤ and  0⇤.
This corollary indicates that regardless of the prospected future steady state, if the
economy is at an unhealthy (healthy) pre-shock regime, then everyone will become better
(worse) o↵ following the shock. It follows that when the shock intensity drops, the
discrepancy between the good and bad steady state, in terms of market liquidity and price
gaps, narrows down. When the pre-shock economy is already at an unhealthy state with a
wide price gap, then the expected spread in any future regime following the intensity drop
turns out to be smaller. This gives rise to an immediate decline in the price di↵erence,
which further helps IM ease up the budget from reduced obligations. As shown in Figure
II.11, even moving to an unhealthy regime, the resulting capital investment and liquidity
supply still rise up, which benefit both HH and IM. In the long run, as the liquidity stays
at a higher level, HH enjoy better risk sharing.
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Figure II.11: Impulse responses from a previous unhealthy steady state to a new unhealthy
steady state after the shock intensity drops from u1 = 12 to u2 = 10. Parameter set: a = 8,
b = 60, ↵ = 0.5,   = 0.8,   = 0.5,   = 0.4, ✓¯ = 2, ⇢ = 0.6, L = 2. ✓t follows a two-point
distribution.
Unfortunately, there will always be a financial crisis and following recessions, if
the pre-shock state is a healthy one. This holds even when the market sentiment is
highly optimistic and anticipates a healthy forthcoming steady state after the shock.
As illustrated in Figure II.12, even at the healthy anticipated steady state, the price
spread is wider. This prompts an instant jump in the current price gap, which hurts IM’s
wealth through excessive obligations. With a shrinking budget, IM have to scale back
the production investment and asset supply. In case IM’s wealth drops below zero, no
equilibrium would exist. During the recovery process, both IM and HH su↵er from less
production income. Besides, HH are exposed to more volatile endowment processes after
the shock, despite that the shock intensity has fallen.
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Figure II.12: Impulse responses from a previous healthy steady state to a new healthy
steady state after the shock intensity drops from u1 = 12 to u2 = 10. Parameter set:
a = 8, b = 60, ↵ = 0.5,   = 0.8,   = 0.5,   = 0.4, ✓¯ = 2, ⇢ = 0.6, L = 2. ✓t follows a
two-point distribution.
II.7 Conclusion
In this paper, we develop a highly tractable general equilibrium model of collateral
constrained arbitrage and associate it with aggregate economic activities. With this simple
model, we mainly address two issues: how financial frictions a↵ect the limits of arbitrage
from the asset pricing point of view; and how the arbitrage trading a↵ects and is a↵ected
by the real activities.
At the first level, we illustrate that persistent price gaps between identical assets arise
from a lack of market liquidity. The scarcity occurs in two distinct cases. One situation
is when arbitrageurs are collateral constrained and they cannot a↵ord to provide full
liquidity to the markets. In this event, the price spreads are negatively correlated with
arbitrageurs’ collateral holdings or wealth. The other scenario is rather rare. It only
happens when intermediaries carry huge initial wealth and are eager to transfer current
excessive resources to the future periods. Out of consumption smoothing motives, they
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would rather take the opposite positions relative to arbitrage trading. By doing this,
they are essentially competing for liquidity with other investors, instead of providing it
to the markets. In fact, they contribute to exacerbating rather than easing the scarcity.
As a result, the price discrepancies widen even further and bear positive correlation with
intermediaries’ wealth.
From the macroeconomic point of view, we explore both the constructive and
detrimental e↵ects of arbitrage on the real economy. We show that in normal times,
arbitrage activities essentially bring low-cost external funds to the real sector. This helps
expand the investment scale and boost the aggregate output. However, in the wake of
sudden shocks, arbitrage trading also amplifies intermediaries’ losses through significant
price movements arising from the regime shift. The resulting financial distress is then fed
back to the real economy and causes further recessions. Finally, the possibility of regime
switches complicates the post-crisis recovery process. This follows from the chances that
the ensuing long run steady state does not necessarily coincide with the pre-shock one.
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II.A Proofs
II.A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. We prove the lemma through backward induction. Suppose at s = t+ T ,
pAt+T (") =  pBt+T ( ").
Define cis(✓s) to be the equilibrium consumption of HH in i at time s as a function of ✓s,
for i 2 {A,B}. Since {✓s} follows a symmetric distribution around zero, then it must hold
that
pAt+T (")
cAt+T (")
=  p
B
t+T ( ")
cBt+T ( ")
.
Thus,
 TE
"
PAt+T
CAt+T
#
=   TE
"
PBt+T
CBt+T
#
.
as cAt+T (") = c
B
t+T ( "), which follows from households’ budget constraints.
At s = T + t  1, from the first order condition of households, we have
PAt+T 1 =  C
A
t+T 1E
"
✓t+T + PAt+T
CAt+T
#
,
PBt+T 1 =  C
B
t+T 1E
"
✓t+T + PBt+T
CBt+T
#
.
Substituting CAt+T 1 and C
B
t+T 1 with the households’ budget constraints at t+ T   1, it
follows that
pAt+T 1(") =  pBt+T 1( "),
cAt+T 1(") = c
B
t+T 1( ").
Likewise, one can derive
pAt (") =  pBt ( "),
cAt (") = c
B
t ( ").
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On the other hand, one can rewrite pit(") as
pAt (") = c
A
t (")
0@ TX
j=1
 jE
"
✓t+j
CAt+j
#
+  TE
"
PAt+T
CAt+T
#1A
=  pBt ( ")
= cBt ( ")
0@ TX
j=1
 jE
"
✓t+j
CBt+j
#
+  TE
"
PBt+T
CBt+T
#1A .
When T !1, according to the TVC in market A and B,
lim
T!1
  T P
A
T
CAT
yAT = 0,
lim
T!1
 T
PBT
CBT
yBT = 0.
If the steady state prices limT!1 P it+T 6= 0, then it must hold yit+T 6= 0 in equilibrium.
Otherwise, some IM can make an arbitrage profit by increasing liquidity providing. Thus,
in this case,
lim
T!1
 TE
"
PAt+T
CAt+T
#
=   lim
T!1
 TE
"
PBt+T
CBt+T
#
= 0. (II.18)
Else if limT!1 P it+T = 0, Equation (II.18) obviously holds as well.
Therefore, we have
pAt (") = c
A
t (") lim
T!1
0@ TX
j=1
 jE
"
✓t+j
cAt+j
#
+  TE
"
pAt+T
cAt+T
#1A
= cAt (")
0@ 1X
j=1
 jE
"
✓t+j
CAt+j
#1A
=  pBt ( ")
= cBt ( ")
0@ 1X
j=1
 jE
"
✓t+j
CBt+j
#1A .
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II.A.2 Proof of Proposition II.1
Proof. From Lemma 1, we know that
pAt (") =  pBt ( ").
Also, from households’ budget constraints,
cAt (") =  pAt (")
 
yAt   yAt 1
 
+ w (Kt 1) +
 
u+ yAt 1
 
"
= pAt (") (xt   xt 1) /l + w (Kt 1) + (u  xt 1/l) ",
where w(K) = a K↵L  + b, is a function of K.
Similarly,
cBt (") =  pBt (") (xt   xt 1) /l + w (Kt 1)  (u  xt 1/l) ".
Thus, it is obvious that
cAt (") = c
B
t ( "),
E

✓t+s + PAt+s
CAt+s
 
=  E

✓t+s + PBt+s
CBt+s
 
, 8s 2 {1, 2, . . . }.
From households’ first order conditions, it follows that
 t ⌘ PBt   PAt
=  CBt E
"
✓t+1 + PBt+1
CBt+1
#
   CAt E
"
✓t+1 + PAt+1
CAt+1
#
=  
 
CAt + C
B
t
 
E
"
✓t+1 + PBt+1
CBt+1
#
.
Thus,
PBt =  C
B
t E
"
✓t+1 + PBt+1
CBt+1
#
=
CBt
CAt + C
B
t
 t.
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Likewise,
PAt =  
CAt
CAt + C
B
t
 t.
Substituting Cit with HH’s budget constraints in i, i 2 {A,B}, one can obtain the following
after rearranging
PBt =
w (Kt 1)  (u  xt 1/l) ✓t
2w (Kt 1)
 t,
PAt =  
w (Kt 1) + (u  xt 1/l) ✓t
2w (Kt 1)
 t.
On the other hand, if we continue decompose  t,
 t =  C
B
t E
"
✓t+1 + PBt+1
CBt+1
#
   CAt E
"
✓t+1 + PAt+1
CAt+1
#
=  
⇥ PBt (xt   xt 1) /l + w (Kt 1)  (u  xt 1/l) ✓t⇤E
"
✓t+1 + PBt+1
CBt+1
#
    ⇥PAt (xt   xt 1) /l + w (Kt 1) + (u  xt 1/l) ✓t⇤E
"
✓t+1 + PAt+1
CAt+1
#
=   [  t (xt   xt 1) /l + 2w (Kt 1)]E
"
✓t+1 + PBt+1
CBt+1
#
.
After rearranging and repeatedly substituting with HH’s first order condition, we can get
 t ⌘ PBt   PAt
=
2w (Kt 1)
Mt + (xt   xt 1) /l .
where
1/Mt :=
1X
j=1
 jEt
"
✓t+j
CBt+j
#
,
which is independent of the realization of ✓t.
As IM take a net zero position in the financial markets, when ut is constant, their
optimization problems are deterministic. Accordingly, xt, xt 1, Kt 1 are all independent
of the realization of ✓t in equilibrium. Hence the price di↵erence  t doesn’t depend on any
particular ✓t realization.
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II.A.3 Proof of Proposition II.2
Proof. First, we prove for ⇢ > ⇢¯, any xt 6= ul or  t 6= 0 won’t hold in equilibrium. Second,
we prove for ⇢  ⇢¯, when the collateral constraint is slack for IM, it must hold that xt  0
and  t > 0. Last, we prove for ⇢  ⇢¯, when the collateral constraint is binding for IM,
xt 2 (0, ul). The pricing for the price gap follows naturally from the collateral constraint.
As proved in Proposition II.5, when ⇢ > ⇢¯, the steady state price gap and market
liquidity are  ⇤ = 0 and x⇤ = ul. Suppose IM only reaches the steady state position
x⇤ = ul in period t and before t they choose xs 6= ul in equilibrium, 8s < t. Without
loss of generality, we suppose in t  1, IM choose xt 1 6= ul and from the pricing formula
in equilibrium  t 1 6= 0. We know that in period t,  t = 0. Thus, in t   1, IM are not
collateral constrained. Given  t 1 6= 0, a certain IM can make an arbitrage profit by
taking x0t 1 = xt 1+ x such that  t 1 x > 0 without assuming any increased obligation
in t. Therefore, xt 1 6= ul cannot hold in equilibrium. Thus, xt 1 = ul and  t 1 = 0 must
hold. Similarly, this applies to all s < t.
As proved in Proposition II.5, when ⇢  ⇢¯, the steady state price gap and market
liquidity are  ⇤ > 0 and 0 < x⇤ < ul. Suppose in this case when the collateral constraint
is slack for IM, xt > 0 holds in equilibrium. Then from the budget constraints and the
first order condition of IM, we have
cIMt = F (Kt 1) + (1   )Kt 1   (xt 1   xt) t  Kt,
cIMt+1 = F (Kt) + (1   )Kt   (xt   xt+1) t+1  Kt+1,
F 0 (Kt) + 1    =  t+1
 t
, (II.19)
and
 xt t+1 + (1   )Kt > 0.
Assume certain IM choose to take x0t = xt   ✏ and K 0t = Kt   ✏ t in t, where ✏ t > 0 and
 x0t t+1 + (1    )K 0t > 0. From the budget constraint, we can find that in this way its
consumption in t stay the same as others, i.e. c0t = cIMt . However, in t+1 if this IM choose
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the same Kt+1 and xt+1, then
c0t+1 = F
 
K 0t
 
+ (1   )K 0t  
 
x0t   xt+1
 
 t+1  Kt+1
= F (Kt   ✏ t) + (1   ) (Kt   ✏ t)  (xt   ✏  xt+1) t+1  Kt+1,
c0t+1   cIMt+1 = F (Kt   ✏ t)  F (Kt) + (1   ) ( ✏ t) + ✏ t+1
= F (Kt   ✏ t)  F (Kt) + F 0 (Kt) ✏ t > 0.
The last equation follows from Equation (II.19), and the inequality holds because F (·)
is a concave function of Kt. Thus, these IM can increase their utility by deviating from
xt. Therefore, if ⇢  ⇢¯, xt > 0 does not hold in equilibrium under the slack collateral
constraints. The relationship between price spreads between t and t + 1 follows from
Equation (II.19).
Next we prove when the collateral constraints are binding for IM in t, then their
positions in equilibrium must satisfy xt 2 (0, ul). In particular, we show this by
invalidating the cases xt  0 and xt   ul.
Suppose in equilibrium there exists xt  0 when ⇢  ⇢¯ and IM’s collateral constraints
are binding in t, i.e. xt t+1 = (1   )Kt. Thus,  t+1 < 0. From IM’s first order condition
with respect to xt, it must also hold that  t < 0. Otherwise, certain IM can make
arbitrage profit by taking x0t > 0. From HH’s side, this means PBt+1 < 0 and PBt < 0, as
PBt = C
B
t  t/
 
CAt + C
B
t
 
.
Since xt < 0, it follows
E
"
✓t+1
CBt+1
#
= E
"
✓t+1
w (Kt) + PBt+1 (xt   xt+1) /l   (u  xt/l) ✓t+1
#
= E
24 ✓t+1
(w (Kt)  (u  xt/l) ✓t+1)
⇣
1 +  t+1(xt xt+1)/l2w(Kt)
⌘
35 > 0.
The last equation comes from
PBt+1 =
w (Kt)  (u  xt/l) ✓t+1
2w (Kt)
 t+1.
The inequality holds because when ✓t+1 = ✏ > 0, cBt+1(✏) < c
B
t+1( ✏) when xt  0.
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Assume that from t + 1 onwards, IM’s position sequence {xt+s} in equilibrium stays
below ul, i.e. xt+s < ul, until some period t+ T , for s 2 {1, 2, . . . , T   1}. Thus,
E

✓t+s
CBt+s
 
> 0, 8s  T.
If T =1, then from the pricing formula,
PBt
CBt
= lim
T!1
 Et
"
✓t+1
CBt+1
#
+ . . .+  TEt
"
✓t+T
CBt+1
#
+  TEt
"
PBt+T
CBt+T
#
,
one can conclude that if PBt < 0,
lim
T!1
 TEt
"
PBt+T
CBt+T
#
< 0
must hold. However, this violates HH’s TVC.
Else if T < 1, i.e. xt+T   ul, suppose PBt+T  0 holds. In this case if  t+T+1  0,
then at t+ T IM’s collateral constraints are not binding, xt+T t+T+1  0. However, from
previous proof, we know that if they slack, it must have xt+T < 0. Thus, PBt+T  0
cannot hold. Now suppose  t+T+1 > 0. However, given  t+T < 0 and  t+T+1 > 0, certain
competitive IM can make arbitrage profit by changing their positions from xt+T   ul to
x0t+T < 0.
Therefore, when xt  0,  t  0 and  t+1  0 cannot possibly hold. Thus, if xt  0,
we must have  t > 0 and  t+1 > 0. However, this contradicts with the binding condition,
i.e. xt t+1 = (1   )Kt > 0. Thus, xt  0 cannot hold in equilibrium when the collateral
constraints are binding. In the same fashion, when xt   ul, we can derive  t+1  0.
This again doesn’t satisfy IM’s binding conditions. Consequently, when IM are collateral
constrained in equilibrium, xt 2 (0, ul). By definition,  t+1 = (1   )Kt/xt.
II.A.4 Proof of Proposition II.3
Proof. We start proving the proposition by assuming that some IM only living for T = 2
periods. We suppose further that all IM’s collateral constraints are binding in t = 1 and
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their initial wealth isW1. There the two-period living IM’s optimization problems become
max
CIM1 ,C
IM
2 ,x1,K1
log
 
CIM1
 
+ ⇢ log
 
CIM2
 
,
subject to
(i) CIM1 +K1 =W1 + x1 1,
(ii) CIM2 = F (K1) + (1   )K1   x1 2,
(iii) (1   )K0   x0 1.
As they have binding collateral constraints, (1   )K1 = x1 2.
Applying first order conditions, we have
  1
CIM1
+
⇢ (F 0 (K1) + 1   )
CIM2
+  1(1   ) = 0,
 1
CIM1
   2
CIM2
   1 2 = 0,
where  1 > 0 is the Lagrange multiplier for the collateral constraint at t = 1.
Solving all the above equations, we obtain
CIM1 =
W1
1 + ↵⇢
,
K1 =
↵⇢W1
(1 + ↵⇢)S1
, where S1 = 1  (1   ) 1
 2
=
1
µ1
.
Similarly, for some IM living for periods of T 2 {3, . . .}, and IM’s collateral constraints
are binding for t 2 {1, 2, . . . , T   1}, we obtain
CIM1 =
W1
1 + ↵⇢+ ↵2⇢2 + . . .+ ↵T 1⇢T 1
,
K1 =
 
↵⇢+ ↵2⇢2 + . . .+ ↵T 1⇢T 1
 
µ1W1
1 + ↵⇢+ ↵2⇢2 + . . .+ ↵T 1⇢T 1
.
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When T !1,
CIM1 = lim
T!1
W1
1 + ↵⇢+ ↵2⇢2 + · · ·+ ↵T 1⇢T 1 = (1  ↵⇢)W1.
K1 = ↵⇢µ1W1.
Likewise, starting with period t and when
Wt = F (Kt 1) + (1   )Kt 1   xt 1 t = F (Kt 1)
due to binding collateral constraints, obviously we can extend the above to period t, for
all t = 1, 2, . . ..
CIMt = (1  ↵⇢)Wt.
Kt = ↵⇢µtWt.
Wt+1 = F (Kt) .
Also one can easily check that with binding collateral constraints, the steady state level
of IM’s consumption, capital investment and market liquidity, as shown in Proposition 5,
are also consistent with IM’s TVC.
II.A.5 Proof of Proposition II.4
Proof. From Proposition II.2, we know that for given technology and endowment shocks,
if ⇢ > ⇢¯, the economy resembles one in the neoclassical model with frictionless financial
markets, i.e. xt = ul. Obviously, in this instance, the equilibrium exists.
Otherwise, if ⇢  ⇢¯, when IM’s collateral constraints are binding, one can solve the
equilibrium backwards through Equation (II.12), (II.13), (II.15), (II.16), (II.17). When the
collateral constraints are slack for the initial few periods, one can also solve the equilibrium
through Equation (II.14), (II.4), (II.12), as well as both types of agents’ budget constraints.
Meanwhile, IM hold opposite positions in two markets and xit =  yitl ensures that markets
clear for financial assets.
50
With the assumption of the shock intensity being constant, i.e. ut = u, and IM having
net zero positions of financial assets, IM are not exposed to any idiosyncratic shocks from
✓t, IM’s optimization problems are deterministic ones. Hence, in equilibrium the quantities 
 t, xt, yit, Kt
 
are also deterministic.
As implied by Proposition II.2, in equilibrium IM’s position in the markets with positive
shock intensity will not exceed the total asset demands, i.e. xt  ul. Therefore,  t   0
and from Equation (II.10) and (II.11), PAt  0 and PBt   0.
II.A.6 Proof of Proposition II.5
Proof. To facilitate later proving, first we derive the steady state price spreads in
dependent of collateral constraints being slack or not.
 ⇤t := P
B⇤
t   PA⇤t
=  CB⇤t E
"
PB⇤t+1 + ✓t+1
CB⇤t+1
#
   CA⇤t E
"
PA⇤t+1 + ✓t+1
CA⇤t+1
#
=  
 
CB⇤t + C
A⇤
t
 
E
"
PB⇤t+1 + ✓t+1
CB⇤t+1
#
= 2 w (K⇤)
 
 t+1
CA⇤t+1 + CB⇤t+1
+ E
"
✓t+1
CB⇤t+1
#!
= 2 w (K⇤)
✓
 ⇤t+1
2w (K⇤)
+ E

✓t+1
w (K⇤)  (u  x⇤/l) ✓t+1
 ◆
,
where the first equation is by definition, the second is derived directly from the first order
condition of HH, the third one is from Proposition 1 and Lemma 1, the fourth equation
follows from PB⇤t =
 tCBt
CAt +C
B
t
, and the final equation is straight derived by HH’s steady state
budget constraints. Thus, rearranging the above and equating  ⇤t =  ⇤t+1 as the steady
state property, we get
 ⇤ =
2 w (K⇤)
1    E

✓
w (K⇤)  (u  x⇤/l) ✓
 
.
It follows straightforward that when x⇤ = ul,  ⇤ = 0, and when x⇤ < ul,  ⇤ > 0.
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Part 1 - Proof of the Slack Steady State
Given the steady state is one with slack collateral constraints, as IM are competitive, it
must satisfy x⇤ = ul and  ⇤ = 0. Suppose it doesn’t, e.g.  ⇤ 6= 0 or x⇤ 6= ul. If  ⇤ 6= 0,
since IM are not collateral constrained, they will increase or decrease their position to
arbitrage the price di↵erence, until in equilibrium  ⇤ = 0. Likewise if x⇤ < ul (or x⇤ > ul),
from the HH’s pricing we must have  ⇤ > 0 ( ⇤ < 0). Again, IM will make sure x⇤ = ul
and  ⇤ = 0.
Meanwhile, as in the slack steady state all arbitrage opportunities are eliminated. Thus
the IM’s budget constraints in the long run is equivalent to
CIMt = F (Kt 1) + (1   )Kt 1  Kt.
Combining with the first order condition and equating Kt = Kt 1 = . . . = K⇤, one can
yield K⇤ = K⇤s = F
0 1
⇣
1 ⇢(1  )
⇢
⌘
, which is the same as that in neoclassical growth model.
Part 2 - Proof of the Binding Steady States
As the collateral constraints are binding in these states, we can have (1    )K⇤ = x⇤ ⇤.
From the first order conditions of IM, by equating capital investment, asset positions
and spreads across periods to (K⇤, x⇤,  ⇤) we can derive K⇤b = F
0 1( /⇢). Since  /⇢ <
(1  ⇢(1   )) /⇢ and F 0 1(K) is a decreasing function of K, one can conclude that K⇤b >
K⇤s .
Part 3 - Proof of the Existence of the Cuto↵ Value
Define a function k(⇢) := F 0 1( /⇢) as the potential long-run capital investment level,
given that the equilibrium can support a steady state with binding collateral constraints
and when IM’s discount factor is ⇢.
Also we define the following function of IM’s discount factor ⇢ and steady state position
x⇤ as the corresponding steady state price spread:
 (x⇤, ⇢) :=
2 
1   w(k(⇢))E

✓
w(k(⇢))  (u  x⇤/l) ✓
 
.
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Since if there is a binding steady state, it must satisfy the collateral constraint (1  
 )k(⇢) = x⇤ (x⇤, ⇢). Thus we construct a product function of steady state position and
spread G(x, ⇢) and an auxiliary function g(x, ⇢, ✓).
G(x, ⇢) := x (x, ⇢) = x
2 
1   w(k(⇢))E

✓
w(k(⇢))  (u  x/l)✓
 
.
g(x, ⇢, ✓) :=
x✓
w(k(⇢))  (u  x/l)✓ .
Because
@g(x, ⇢, ✓)
@x
=
✓w(k(⇢))  u✓2
(w(k(⇢))  (u  x/l)✓)2
and
@g2(x, ⇢, ✓)
@x2
=
 2✓2 (w(k(⇢))  u✓)
l (w(k(⇢))  (u  x/l)✓)3 < 0,
where x 2 [0, ul], g(x, ⇢, ✓) is a strict local concave function of x over [0, ul], given ⇢ and
✓. Note that here we apply w(k(⇢))  u✓ > eit   u✓¯ > 0.
Similarly, since
G(x, ⇢) =
2 
1   w(k(⇢))
Z ✓¯
 ✓¯
g(x, ⇢, ✓)p(✓)d✓, .
where p(✓) is the PDF of ✓, G(x, ⇢) is also a strict local concave function with respect to
x over [0, ul] given ⇢. Moreover,
@G(x, ⇢)
@x
    
x=0
=
Z ✓¯
 ✓¯
✓w(k(⇢))  u✓2
(w(k(⇢))  (u  x/l)✓)2 p(✓)d✓
     
x=0
=
Z ✓¯
 ✓¯
✓
(w(k(⇢))  u✓)p(✓)d✓ > 0,
@G(x, ⇢)
@x
    
x=ul
=
Z ✓¯
 ✓¯
✓w(k(⇢))  u✓2
(w(k(⇢))  (u  x/l)✓)2 p(✓)d✓
     
x=ul
=
Z ✓¯
 ✓¯
✓w(k(⇢))  u✓2
(w(k(⇢)))2
p(✓)d✓
=
Z ✓¯
 ✓¯
 u✓2
(w(k(⇢)))2
p(✓)d✓ < 0,
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Therefore, given ⇢, G(x, ⇢) has a unique interior maximal value on some x¯ 2 (0, ul), where
@G(x, ⇢)
@x
    
x=x¯
= 0.
On the other hand, rearranging G(x, ⇢),
G(x, ⇢) =
2 
1   
Z ✓¯
 ✓¯
w(k(⇢))x✓
w(k(⇢))  (u  x/l)✓p(✓)d✓
=
2 
1   
Z ✓¯
 ✓¯
x✓
1  (u  x/l)✓/w(k(⇢))p(✓)d✓.
It is straightforward to show @G(x, ⇢)/@⇢ < 0. Thus, G(x, ⇢) is a decreasing function of ⇢.
To prove for the existence of a cut-o↵ ⇢¯, which determines IM’s discount factor ⇢
corresponding to a slack steady state or a binding one, we define new auxiliary functions
H(⇢) and Q(⇢):
H(⇢) := max
x
G(x, ⇢),
Q(⇢) := H(⇢)  (1   )k(⇢).
If the economy supports binding steady states, it must satisfy Q(⇢)   0. When Q(⇢) < 0,
it means that the collateral is su cient to eliminate any arbitrage opportunities and can
only support steady states with slack collateral constraints. This is because that if there
exist binding steady states, then given ⇢, G (x⇤, ⇢)   (1    )k(⇢) = 0 should have real
solutions of x⇤ 2 (0, ul). Since G (x⇤, ⇢)   (1    )k(⇢) < Q(⇢), if Q(⇢) < 0, then there is
no solution of x⇤ given this value of ⇢ that can support any binding steady state. As Q(⇢)
is a continuous and strictly decreasing function of ⇢, there exists a unique cuto↵ value ⇢¯,
such that Q (⇢¯)) = 0. That is, if ⇢ above this ⇢¯, Q(⇢) < 0, there is only slack steady state.
Whereas when ⇢  ⇢¯, G (x⇤, ⇢)  (1   )k(⇢) = 0 has real solutions on (0, ul), there exist
binding steady states.
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II.A.7 Proof of Proposition II.6
Proof. To prove for the existence of two distinct steady states, for any given ⇢0 2 (0, ⇢¯],
define an auxiliary function J (x, ⇢0) := G (x, ⇢0)   (1    )k (⇢0)  Q (⇢0), where G(x, ⇢),
Q(⇢) and k(⇢) is constructed in the proof of Proposition II.5. Thus, Q (⇢0)   0, for
⇢0 2 [0, ⇢¯]. Obviously, J (x, ⇢0) is a continuous function and only when x = x¯, which is the
global maximizer, is J (x, ⇢0) equal to Q (⇢0).
To prove for the existence of two distinct steady states, we adopt the functions G(x, ⇢),
Q(⇢) and k(⇢) defined in Proposition II.5 and construct a new auxiliary function
J(x, ⇢) := G(x, ⇢)  (1   )k(⇢) = x (x, ⇢)  (1   )k(⇢)  Q  ⇢0  .
Inheriting features from G(x, ⇢) and k(⇢), it is obvious that J(x, ⇢) is a strictly concave
function of x and a decreasing function of ⇢. Moreover, when J(x, ⇢) = 0 has real solutions
in (0, ul), it means that there exists binding steady states given ⇢, and the solutions x⇤
correspond to the steady state market liquidity.
Also, by definition,
Q(⇢) = max
x
J(x, ⇢).
From proof in Proposition II.5, we know that Q(⇢) is a decreasing function of ⇢ and when
Q(⇢) < 0, there is no binding steady states possible. When Q(⇢) = 0, ⇢ = ⇢¯. Meanwhile,
when ⇢ = ⇢¯, if there exists any binding steady state at all, it must satisfy
J (x, ⇢¯) = 0.
Thus, J (x, ⇢¯) = Q (⇢¯). Given J(x, ⇢) is a strictly concave function of x and given J(x, ⇢) =
Q(⇢) only holds when x equals to the global maximizer x¯ (⇢¯), we can conclude that x⇤ =
x¯ (⇢¯) is the only solution. Therefore, when ⇢ = ⇢¯, there is a unique binding steady state
with x⇤ = x¯ (⇢¯) as its market liquidity.
When 0 < ⇢ < ⇢¯, then
Q(⇢) = max
x
J(x, ⇢) > 0.
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Denote x(⇢) as the global maximizer of J(x, ⇢), given ⇢. Since by definition,
J(0, ⇢) < 0, J(ul, ⇢) < 0,
given J(x, ⇢) is a strictly concave function of x, there must exist two distinct solutions
x⇤1 2 (0, x¯(⇢)) and x⇤2 2 (x¯(⇢), ul) to J(x, ⇢) = 0. Thus, when 0 < ⇢ < ⇢¯, there exist two
distinct binding steady states with di↵erent levels of market liquidity, i.e. x⇤1 < x⇤2.
As both steady states satisfy the binding collateral constraints x⇤j ⇤j = (1    )K⇤b ,
j 2 {1, 2}, where K⇤b = k(⇢) is a strictly increasing function of ⇢. Thus, the two steady
states share the same capital investment level K⇤b = k(⇢). On the other hand, if x
⇤ in one
is smaller than the other, the steady state price spread must be higher than the other.
That is, if x⇤1 < x⇤2, then  ⇤1 >  ⇤2.
From HH’s perspective, as in both steady states they have the same labor income and
w(k(⇢)) because of the common K⇤, higher x⇤ reduces their consumption volatility. Thus
HH’s utility is strictly higher in SS2 with larger market liquidity x⇤2 > x⇤1.
Furthermore, as J(x, ⇢) is a decreasing function of ⇢. Thus, J (x, ⇢1) < J (x, ⇢2), if
⇢1 > ⇢2. On the other hand,
@J(x, ⇢)
@x
    
x2(0,x¯(⇢))
=
@G(x, ⇢)
@x
    
x2(0,x¯(⇢))
> 0,
@J(x, ⇢)
@x
    
x2(x¯(⇢),ul)
=
@G(x, ⇢)
@x
    
x2(x¯(⇢),ul)
< 0.
That is, for x 2 (0, x¯(⇢)), J(x, ⇢) is an increasing function of x. Thus, for J (x1, ⇢1) =
J (x01, ⇢2) = 0, where x1, x01 2 (0, x¯(⇢)), it must hold x1 > x01. The market liquidity
in SS1 increases with ⇢. Similarly, x⇤2 in SS2 decreases with ⇢, i.e. x02 > x2. As k(⇢)
is an increasing function of ⇢, K⇤b (⇢1) > K
⇤
b (⇢2). From binding collateral constraints,
x2 2 = (1   )K⇤b (⇢1) and x02 02 = (1   )K⇤b (⇢2), we can conclude that  2 >  02. Since it
is easy to verify that
@ (x, ⇢)
@x
< 0,
@ (x, ⇢)
@⇢
< 0,
we can also derive  1 <  01.
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II.A.8 Proof of Proposition II.7
Proof. If we modify the definition of functions  (x, ⇢), G(x, ⇢), g(x, ⇢, ✓), J(x, ⇢), H(⇢)
and Q(⇢) in the proof of Proposition II.5 and Proposition II.6 by extending them also as
functions of the shock intensity u, then we get
 (x, ⇢, u) :=  ⇤ (x⇤,K⇤) =
2 
1   w(k(⇢))E

✓
w(k(⇢))  (u  x/l)✓
 
,
G(x, ⇢, u) := x (x, ⇢, u) = x
2 
1   w(k(⇢))E

✓
w(k(⇢))  (u  x/l)✓
 
,
g(x, ⇢, u, ✓) :=
x✓
w(k(⇢))  (u  x/l)✓ ,
J(x, ⇢, u) := G(x, ⇢, u)  (1   )k(⇢),
H(⇢, u) := max
x
G(x, ⇢, u),
Q(⇢, u) := H(⇢, u)  (1   )k(⇢).
In particular,
@g(x, ⇢, u, ✓)
@u
=
x✓2
(w(k(⇢))  (u  x/l)✓)2   0,
Similarly, @G(x, ⇢, u)/@u > 0, @J(x, ⇢, u)/@u > 0, for x 2 (0, ul]. If follows naturally
that @H(⇢, u)/@u > 0 and @Q(⇢, u)/@u > 0. Thus, suppose if u1 < u2, then Q (⇢, u1) <
Q (⇢, u2).
What determines the cuto↵ value ⇢¯ for a given u is the ⇢0 such that Q (⇢0, u) = 0. As
Q(⇢, u) is a decreasing function of ⇢ and an increasing function of u, to satisfy
Q (⇢¯1, u1) = 0,
Q (⇢¯2, u2) = 0.
we must have ⇢¯1 < ⇢¯2 if u1 < u2. Thus, the cuto↵ value increases with u.
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From the property of G(x, ⇢, u), it is apparent that J(x, ⇢, u) is a strictly concave
function of x. By definition,
@J(x, ⇢, u)
@x
    
x=0
> 0;
@J(x, ⇢, u)
@x
    
x=ul
< 0;
@J(x, ⇢, u)
@x
    
x=x¯
= 0.
@J(x, ⇢, u)/@x is a continuous function of x, thus, we can conclude @J(x, ⇢, u)/@x > 0 for
x 2 (0, x¯) and @J(x, ⇢, u)/@x < 0 for x 2 (x¯, ul). What determines the steady state x⇤ in
both x 2 (0, x¯) and x 2 (x¯, ul) is that they must satisfy J (x⇤, ⇢, u) = 0.
Previously we know @J(x, ⇢, u)/@u > 0, so if u1 < u2, for a given x, J (x, ⇢, u1) <
J (x, ⇢, u2). As J(x, ⇢, u) is an increasing function of x at x⇤1 [uj ], j 2 {1, 2}, to satisfy
J (x1 [u1] , ⇢, u1) = 0 and J (x1 [u2] , ⇢, u2) = 0 simultaneously, we must have x⇤1 [u1] >
x⇤1 [u2]. The similar also applies for SS2, where the opposite holds, x⇤2 [u1] < x⇤2 [u2].
Also, the steady state capital investment level K⇤b = k(⇢) is only determined by ⇢ and
stay independent of u. Thus, in the two economies with the same discount factor ⇢ of IM,
K⇤b [u1] = K
⇤
b [u2] = k(⇢).
II.A.9 Proof of Proposition II.8
Proof. To facilitate the proof, we first redefine
k(⇢, a) = F 0 1
✓
 
⇢
◆
=
✓
 
a⇢↵L 
◆1/(↵ 1)
as the steady state capital investment level, given that the equilibrium can support a
steady state with binding collateral constraints, IM’s discount factor is ⇢ and the total
productivity factor is a. It is straightforward that
@k(⇢, a)
@a
> 0.
Thus, all else equal, K⇤b [a1] < K
⇤
b [a2], if a1 < a2.
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Also redefine the following function of steady state price di↵erence in terms of ⇢, a and
steady state position x:
 (x, ⇢, a) :=
2 
1   w(k(⇢, a))E

✓
w(k(⇢, a))  (u  x/l)✓
 
.
Following the similar approach, we reconstruct the functionsG(x, ⇢, a), H(⇢, a) andQ(⇢, a)
by including the total productivity parameter a.
G(x, ⇢, a) := x (x, ⇢, a) = x
2 
1   w(k(⇢, a))E

✓
w(k(⇢, a))  (u  x/l)✓
 
,
H(⇢, a) := max
x
G(x, ⇢, a),
Q(⇢, a) := H(⇢, a)  (1   )k(⇢, a),
J(x, ⇢, a) := G(x, ⇢, a)  (1   )k(⇢, a).
It is easy to show that
@G(x, ⇢, a)
@a
< 0,
@G(x, ⇢, a)
@⇢
< 0;
@Q(⇢, a)
@a
< 0,
@Q(⇢, a)
@⇢
< 0.
The cuto↵ value ⇢¯ for IM’s discount factor defined in Proposition II.5 is determined by
Q (⇢¯, a) = 0. Suppose if a1 < a2, then Q (⇢¯, a1) > Q (⇢¯, a2). The cuto↵ values must follow
⇢¯1 > ⇢¯2, so that
Q (⇢¯1, a1) = 0 and Q (⇢¯2, a2) = 0.
Thus, all else equal, the cuto↵ discount factor ⇢¯, which satisfy Q (⇢¯, a) = 0, decreases with
a.
Given ⇢, the steady state x⇤(a) is the solution to J(x, ⇢, a) = 0. Since J(x, ⇢, a) is a
strictly concave function with respect to x, and
@J(x, ⇢, a)
@x
    
x=0
> 0,
@J(x, ⇢, a)
@⇢
    
x=ul
< 0,
@J(x, ⇢, a)
@⇢
    
x=x¯(a)
= 0,
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where x¯(a) 2 (0, ul) is the solution to Q (x, ⇢¯, a) = 0, J(x, ⇢, a) is an increasing function
of x in (0, x¯(a)) and a decreasing function in (x¯(a), ul). Also, for ⇢ < ⇢¯ by definition one
can easily verify
J(0, ⇢, a) < 0, J (x¯(a), ⇢, a) > 0, J(ul, ⇢, a) < 0.
The second relation holds because J (x¯(a), ⇢, a) = Q(⇢, a), Q (⇢¯, a) = 0, and @Q(⇢, a)/@⇢ <
0. Thus, there exist one unique x⇤1 2 (0, x¯(a)) and one unique x⇤2 2 (x¯(a), ul) as solutions
to J (x⇤, ⇢, a) = 0. In particular,
@J(x, ⇢, a)
@a
< 0.
If a1 < a2, to satisfy both J (x1, ⇢, a1) = 0 and J (x01, ⇢, a2) = 0, we must have x1 < x01,
where x1 2 (0, x¯(a1)) and x01 2 (0, x¯(a2)). Similarly, x2 > x02 holds, where x2 2 (x¯(a1), ul)
and x02 2 (x¯(a2), ul).
In the binding steady state, the collateral constraints hold with equality, i.e. (1  
 )K⇤ [a1] = x⇤2 [a1] ⇤2 [a1] and (1   )K⇤ [a2] = x⇤2 [a2] ⇤2 [a2]. Since K⇤ [a1] < K⇤ [a2] and
x⇤2 [a1] > x⇤2 [a2], it follows naturally  ⇤2 [a1] <  ⇤2 [a2].
Also,
@ (x, ⇢, a)
@x
< 0,
@ (x, ⇢, a)
@a
< 0.
As x⇤1 [a1] < x⇤1 [a2] and a1 < a2, it follows straightforward that  ⇤1 [a1] >  ⇤1 [a2].
II.A.10 Proof of Corollary II.1
Proof. We first show the properties of capital investment Kt. First we claim that Kt
increases with IM’s wealth level. If it is a binding state, it follows from Proposition II.3,
@Kt
@Wt
> 0. Similarly, @xt@Kt > 0. Thus when IM’s wealth reduces, e.g., Wt < W
⇤, both Kt
and xt also drop.
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For the price spreads, given the previous steady state values x⇤t 1 and K⇤t 1, from the
pricing formulas derived from Proposition II.1 and Lemma 1, we have
 t =
 
CAt + C
B
t
 0@ 1X
j=1
 jE
"
✓t+j
CBt+j
#1A
= (  t (xt   xt 1) /l + 2w (Kt 1))
0@ 1X
j=1
 jE
"
✓t+j
CBt+j
!35 .
Rearraging the above yields
 t =
2w
⇥
K⇤t 1
⇤✓P1
j=1  
jE

✓t+j
CBt+j
 ◆ 1
+
 
xt   x⇤t 1
 
/l
=
2w
⇥
K⇤t 1
⇤
Mt +
 
xt   x⇤t 1
 
/l
.
Compare to the steady state price gap, one can easily prove that
Mt :=
0@ 1X
j=1
 jE
"
✓t+j
CBt+j
#1A 1 < M⇤
from HH’s budget constraints. As xt   x⇤ < 0, the immediate price spread  t >  ⇤.
The long-term e↵ects follow naturally from Proposition II.5.
II.A.11 Proof of Corollary II.2
Proof. We start the proving by comparing with two alternative thought scenarios.
(1) The same shock hits the economy at the unhealthy steady state (K⇤u, x⇤u,  ⇤u) and the
after-shock market expectation is to revert to the same pre-shock state.
(2) The same shock hits the economy at the healthy steady state (K⇤h, x
⇤
h,  
⇤
h) and the
after-shock market expectation is to revert to the same pre-shock state.
61
From Corollary II.1, we know IM’s obligated cash outflow immediately after the shock
in both scenarios are x⇤u u,t and x⇤h h,t. In addition,  u,t >  h,t, which follows from the
pricing formulas of  t and Proposition II.6.
Now consider the scenario described in Corollary II.2, that is, starting from the healthy
steady state and head to the unhealthy one. Compared with Scenario 2, we can derive
 t >  u,t. This is because the corollary scenario only di↵ers in the pre-shock position size
x⇤h. Even for the same after-shock price  u,t, IM will incur larger obligated cash outflow
x⇤h u,t > x
⇤
u u,t. Thus, IM’s wealth loss get amplified more compared to Scenario 2 case.
From the proof of Corollary II.1, Kt and xt drops more: Kt < Ku,t, xt < xu,t and  t >  u,t.
Similarly, compared with Scenario 1, because  t >  u,t >  h,t, the obligated cash
outflow at t is larger, x⇤h t > x
⇤
h u,t. Thus, Kt and xt drops more: Kt < Kh,t, xt < xu,t <
xh,t.
The feature of the long-term convergence follows from Proposition II.5.
II.A.12 Proof of Corollary II.3
Proof. When the economy is expected to move towards an unhealthy new steady state,
where the long-run position size x⇤1 < x⇤ and price spread  ⇤1 >  ⇤, the immediate e↵ects
follow from the analysis in the proof of Corollary II.4.
If the economy switches to a healthy new steady state, where the long-run position
size x⇤2 > x⇤ and price spread  ⇤2 <  ⇤, the immediate reaction is that the price gap  t
decreases. This can be traced back from the pricing formula with the lower  ⇤2 as terminal
point, when we assume all other variables stay the same. Thus, IM have less than expected
cash outflow at t, or increase in wealth, e.g. Wt > W ⇤. Hence, this induces IM to increase
capital investment Kt > K⇤. To smooth the consumption, IM will only gradually increase
the liquidity supply over time, e.g. xt < xt+1 < . . . . Both Kt and xt in turn result in
 t <  ⇤.
In the long run, following from Proposition II.5 and Proposition II.7, IM will gradually
reduce capital investment to K⇤, increases liquidity supply to the new steady state level
xt < xt+1 < . . . < x⇤2. In the meantime, price gaps also falls to  ⇤2.
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II.A.13 Proof of Corollary II.4
Proof. From Proposition II.7, it follows that the cuto↵ value for IM’s discount factor ⇢¯
increases after u jumps.
If ⇢ > ⇢¯1, IM are very patient and their collateral constraints are slack in both pre-shock
and after-shock steady states. That is, in the long run IM provide full liquidity to markets
and K⇤ = K⇤s ,  ⇤ = 0 in both cases. From Proposition II.2, we know the model resembles
the neoclassical growth model with frictionless markets for very patient IM. Thus, before
and after the shock, IM provide full liquidity and any price gaps are fully eliminated.
Therefore, ut = u1 and  t =  ⇤ = 0. Both IM’s wealth and capital investment stay the
same.
If ⇢¯ < ⇢  ⇢¯1, IM are expected to switch from a slack state to a binding one. IM carry
position size x⇤ = u from previous period. Similar to the analysis in the Corollary II.2,
the expectation of long-run positive price gap increases the immediate price gap  t > 0.
Therefore, IM su↵er unexpected losses in wealth through their now positive obligated cash
outflow and must reduce their capital investment Kt < K⇤ and liquidity supply xt < u.
Especially when the market expectation of the new steady state is the unhealthy one,
the price gap could increases so dramatically that the cash outflow u t exceeds the total
production income, causing IM’s bankruptcy. The long-run recovery path follows directly
from Proposition II.6 and Proposition II.7.
II.A.14 Proof of Corollary II.5
Proof. From Proposition II.2, after the shock if ⇢ > ⇢¯2, IM will immediately close up all
price gaps by providing full liquidity, i.e. xt = u2. However, if ⇢ > ⇢¯, the price spreads
stay zero before and after shock, IM’s wealth and thus capital investment are not a↵ected
by the shock.
If ⇢¯2 < ⇢  ⇢¯, the price spreads are positive before the shock and after the shock
collapse to zero. Thus, IM’s obligated cash outflows in t reduce to zero. IM gain
unexpected wealth through reduced obligation. After shock, their capital investment
will be the same as in the neoclassical models. With increased wealth, they will raise
their capital investment immediately, i.e. Kt > K⇤ > K⇤s . From Proposition II.5 and
Proposition II.7, in the long run, IM’s capital will gradually falls to the new steady state
level K⇤s .
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II.A.15 Proof of Corollary II.6
Proof. The proof of short-run e↵ects when starting from a healthy steady state
(K⇤, x⇤2,  ⇤2) is in the same argument as the proof of the first part of Corollary II.4.
Similar to the proof of Corollary II.5, as the new steady state price spread  0⇤ <  ⇤,
K⇤ = K 0⇤ and x0⇤ > x⇤,  t <  ⇤. Thus, IM’s obligated cash outflow reduces unexpectedly
and this increases their wealth. As a result, Kt > K⇤ and xt > x⇤. The collateral
constraints keep slack until IM reach the new steady state.
The long-run e↵ects follow from Proposition II.5 and Proposition II.7.
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Chapter III
Risky Arbitrage and Collateral Policies
We construct a dynamic model economy in which investors from segmented
markets have varying financial asset demands. Intermediaries make arbitrage
profits by exploiting the price spreads across markets. Meanwhile, they are
required to separately post collateral to support arbitrage trades. We show
that with volatile asset demands, arbitrage becomes risky. With information
friction, a looser collateral policy might render the economy more vulnerable
to extremely large demand shocks, while a tighter collateral constraint helps
maintain the stability at the cost of market liquidity supply.
Keywords: collateral constraints, limit of arbitrage, market liquidity,
segmented markets
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III.1 Introduction
This paper is a theoretical study into how financial arbitrage interacts with the aggregate
economic activities through collateral constraints. For an economy in which collateral
constraints are endogenously determined, we examine the limits of arbitrage and the
persistence of price discrepancies between identical financial assets in segmented markets.
Especially, we ask how the risk arising from volatile asset demands might a↵ect the market
liquidity, asset prices and aggregate durable goods investment. Also, we investigate how
inaccurate foresight on the market demand might trigger systemic risk, in the sense that
the negative impacts in the financial markets spill over to the real sector. We are centrally
interested in exploring under which collateral policy the economy becomes more resilient
in the event of various unanticipated demand shocks.
For this purpose, we consider a dynamic production economy in which households
from two segmented markets have opposite asset demands, but can only trade with each
other indirectly through competitive intermediaries. The opposite asset demands lead to
price discrepancies between identical assets in two markets and create potential arbitrage
opportunities for the intermediaries. While the intermediaries can profit from exploiting
the price di↵erences, they also face separate collateral constraints in each market. Such
constraints arise naturally because the households cannot force intermediaries to honor
the contracts unless their asset positions are secured. In our setting, intermediaries’
durable goods investment plays a dual role: not only as capital for production, but also
serves as collateral for trading assets. Thus, the endogenous collateral constraints limit
intermediaries’ asset positions as a function of their collateral holdings. In this way,
intermediaries’ capital investment a↵ects and is a↵ected by the arbitrage trades. This
dynamic interaction turns out to be a powerful transmission channel by which the e↵ects
of information friction persist, amplify and spread out.
In our baseline model, we assume that all agents have perfect foresight of future asset
demand shocks. With this assumption, intermediaries’ arbitrage is essentially riskless:
while each of the legs of an arbitrage trade is risky, the risks o↵set each other across
markets. We derive analytically the model dynamics and the steady states of the market
liquidity, asset prices as well as the aggregate capital investment. Given a unique steady
state, the economy exhibits the self-recovery feature after being hit by unexpected shocks.
Later we extend our model by introducing volatile market demands. As intermediaries
do not have perfect foresight of the future market demand, their arbitrage positions
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now become risky: the future price spread is no longer deterministic and might move
against them. As intermediaries make arbitrage profits by speculating on the convergence
of the future price wedge, they might incur heavy losses if the spread instead further
widens up. To investigate intermediaries’ trading strategy in the presence of demand risk,
we first assume they have perfect information of the underlying distribution of future
market demands. Compared to the riskless arbitrage case, intermediaries tend to be more
aggressive in trading when the market demand and the resulting arbitrage profitability
are low, and more conservative if otherwise. This is because demand risk helps enlarge the
price spread and increase the arbitrage profitability for intermediaries. When the market
demand is low, the endogenous collateral constraint becomes looser, allowing them to
trade more. However, when the arbitrage profitability is higher, the resulting collateral
constraint tightens up and becomes more inhibitive for intermediaries to expand their
volumes.
To draw more welfare implications of the risky arbitrage, we also investigate the
impacts of di↵erent collateral policies on intermediaries’ arbitrage trading and capital
investment. We define the tightness of collateral policies by the value-at-risk (VAR)
that the collateral constraints impose on future loss recovery from default. We find
that in general, a looser collateral policy features higher market liquidity supply and
benefits household investors with more risk sharing. However, since intermediaries cannot
internalize the impact of their trading volume on prices, their arbitrage profitability is
relatively lower compared to that under a tighter collateral policy. Accordingly, there
is also less aggregate capital investment in the economy due to the income e↵ect. In
contrast, a tighter collateral constraint induces higher trading profitability and more
capital expenses at the cost of market liquidity supply.
Furthermore, we extend our analysis by introducing information friction, in the sense
that agents do not have perfect information of the underlying risk and are subject to
unanticipated demand shocks. Within this framework, we compare the shock responses
under di↵erent collateral policies. We show that without knowing the possibility of the
extreme shocks, intermediaries tend to overinvest in the arbitrage trades. This allows for
more liquid financial markets and less mispricing among assets. However, it also renders
the economy vulnerable to systemic risk when some low-probability, extreme shocks occur.
Comparably, intermediaries under a looser collateral policy get hit more severely in the
wake of a surprisingly large demand shock. This is because the suddenly widened price
spread amplifies the losses of their overinvestment. As a result, the following financial
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distress spills over to the real sector and causes contractions. However, when the market
demand is unexpectedly low, they are relatively better o↵. The resulting narrower price
spread alleviates the negative consequence of the overinvestment. In contrast, a tighter
collateral policy helps curb intermediaries’ overinvestment tendency and better maintain
stability in the event of unanticipated huge shocks.
The contribution of our paper is to set up a model linking risky arbitrage and durable
goods investment, and provide a new prospective to study arbitrage trading strategies
and collateral policies. Our paper complements a growing literature on the limits of
arbitrage, and especially to its strand stressing arbitrageurs’ collateral constraints. We
contribute to this literature by integrating the arbitrage trading into a macroeconomic
model. Our setup of arbitrage trading borrows heavily from Gromb and Vayanos (2002,
2017). There they develop a general equilibrium model in which collateral constrained
arbitrageurs intermediate trade across segmented markets. Our main departure from
these models is that we allow for a broader range of assets (as opposed to only the riskless
asset) to serve as collateral in the financial market. This enables us to study the spillover
e↵ects between the financial and real sector. Also, rather than stressing the self-correcting
feature of the riskless arbitrage as in Gromb and Vayanos (2017), our model emphasizes
the risky arbitrage in the presence of volatile asset demands and information friction.
We also compare the robustness of the economy under various collateral policies towards
unanticipated demand shocks, as in the crisis times.
Our paper also shares similarities with many other models featuring financially
constrained arbitrageurs. To name a few, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) are the first to
study how trading restrictions may a↵ect arbitrageurs’ capability to correct mispricing.
Due to frictions arising from the asymmetric information and moral hazard, arbitrageurs
bear insolvency risk related to the margin requirement. Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009)
study the feedback loops of arbitrageurs’ funding liquidity and market liquidity, and how
they interact through the collateral constraints. The funding liquidity in their model
captures the arbitrageurs’ capability of raising debt to facilitate the arbitrage trading.
Comparably, our principle di↵erence lies in the source and objective of arbitrageurs’
funding. In our model, the major funding comes from arbitrage profits rather than
from direct borrowing, and it is reinvested into capital and consumptions. Hence, the
funding liquidity here is reflected by the market liquidity of financial assets. In He and
Krishnamurthy (2012, 2013), arbitrageurs can raise funds from other investors to invest
in a risky financial security, but this external funding cannot exceed a given ratio of
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their own wealth. Liu and Longsta↵ (2004) derive the optimal arbitrage strategy of
risk-averse, collateral-constrained arbitrageurs in a partial equilibrium. We di↵er from
them by demonstrating that due to the price externality, arbitrageurs tend to undertake
countercyclical trading strategies in the wake of volatile demands. Xiong (2001) and Kyle
and Xiong (2001) examine the impact of arbitrage capital on asset prices by studying the
wealth e↵ects of arbitrageurs with log utility in a continuous - time model.
Our model is also related to a fast growing literature focusing on the impact of collateral
constraints as financial frictions on asset pricing and aggregate economic activities. In
general, there are two main approaches of modeling collateral constraints. The first
approach generally assumes that there is no external enforcement to prevent potential
default. Accordingly, lenders or other collateral receiving parties have to take into account
of the future default possibility ex ante, based on which they impose the specific collateral
requirements. In these models, the collateral constraints often limit the current borrowing
or trading activities as a function of future asset prices. Examples are Kiyotaki and Moore
(1997), Ku¨bler and Schmedders (2003), Chien and Lustig (2010). The other approach
assumes implicitly that there is no default in the economy. They model the collateral
constraints in terms of current asset prices and assume implicitly that agents would never
walk away from their liabilities. In these models, agents do not have to calculate or
estimate future asset prices. This allows for more flexibility in modeling shocks and
uncertainty. For instance, Mendoza (2010), Bianchi (2011) and Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe
(2016) model the endogenous borrowing constraints with the current relative prices. Our
model belongs to the first approach and assumes limited liability in case of default.
III.2 Baseline Model
Figure III.1 shows the basic structure of our model. We consider a discrete time, infinite
horizon economy with two segmented markets, market A and B. There are two types
of competitive agents: household investors within each single market and specialized
intermediaries. Each constitute a continuum of unit measure.
Within each segmented market, there exists an identical, long-lived risky financial
asset, which pays out dividends in every period and is each in zero net supply. We identify
them in di↵erent markets as asset A and B. Households in market A (B) can only trade
asset A (B). As will become clear later, households’ demands for the risky asset is opposite
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in market A and B. Intermediaries can exploit arbitrage profits by speculating on the price
spreads between segmented markets.
III.2.1 Households
We assume households in each market are competitive, live infinitely and share the same
preference. Each household receives natural endowments in every period, which follow an
exogenous process of the form
eit = ht + u
i
t 1✓t, i 2 {A,B},
where eit is the endowment of one household in period t and market i, ht is a constant
and uit 1✓t is the endowment shock. In particular, {✓t}1t=1 is a sequence of independent
identically distributed random variables, each of which follows a symmetric distribution
around zero on a bounded support S = ⇥ ✓¯, ✓¯⇤, where ✓¯ > 0. We refer to ✓t as the shock
unit. uit 1 is the random shock intensity and is independent of {✓t}. It is always revealed
one period ahead, so households know their hedging demand in advance.
We assume that the shock intensities in the two markets are identical in magnitude
but opposite in their signs:
uAt =  uBt > 0.
This setup provides a simple way to motivate the real-world price spreads between
similar assets from the diverse demands in segmented markets. Without further
intermediation, the volatilities of the consumption paths in the two markets are perfectly
negatively correlated. Thus, households from the two markets have opposite hedging
demands.
Households’ expected utility is given by
Et
" 1X
s=0
 s ln
 
cit+s
 #
, i 2 {A,B},
where cit+s is households’ t + s consumption in market i, i 2 {A,B}, and 0 <   < 1. To
ensure non-negative consumptions for households, we set htut 1✓¯ > 0 for all t.
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III.2.2 Financial Assets
Within each market, there is an identical financial asset. It is long-lived, in zero-net supply
and pays out a dividend equal to ✓t in t. As the dividend mirrors the shock unit perfectly,
it serves as an ideal hedging instrument for households.
Since the hedging demands in the two markets are opposite, the asset price, i.e. P it ,
i 2 {A,B}, would di↵er if there were no intermediation. As households in market A always
encounter a positive amount of shock units, i.e., ut = uAt > 0, they are inclined to sell the
assets to neutralize their endowment shocks. To the extent that market A has negative
asset demands while market B has the opposite, prices in market A tend to be lower than
in market B. We define the price di↵erence between the two markets as
 t := P
B
t   PAt .
III.2.3 Intermediaries
Outside the two markets, there is a continuum of measure one of competitive, homogeneous
and infinitely lived intermediaries. Unlike household investors, they can trade financial
assets simultaneously in both markets. The price spreads create potential arbitrage
opportunities for them. They can earn profits by entering long positions in the low-price
market and taking short ones in the high-price region. By doing so, they also provide
market liquidity to households in both markets. To simplify analysis, we assume further
that intermediaries will incur inhibitive cost if they do not take net zero positions.
Consequently, their positions in the two markets must be identical in magnitude yet
opposite in the signs. Denote xt as their positions in market A
xt := x
A
t =  xBt .
As in Gromb and Vayanos (2002, 2017), we use xt as a measure of market liquidity.
In addition to intermediating asset demands between markets, intermediaries also
play an important role in aggregate production by investing capital as entrepreneurs.
For simplicity, we assume they have the unique capability to convert the perishable
consumption goods one-to-one into physical capital and vice versa. Accordingly, they
organize the production sector in the economy and receive income from production in
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period t+ 1 by investing Kt units of capital at t:
yt+1 = Zt+1Kt + (1   )Kt, (III.1)
where Zt+1 is the productivity factor and   2 [0, 1] is the depreciation rate. Zt+1Kt is the
production output and (1   )Kt is the residual capital after depreciation.
Their expected utility is given by
Et
" 1X
s=0
⇢s ln
 
cIMt+s
 #
,
where cIMt+s is IM’s t+ s consumption and 0 < ⇢ < 1.
The assumptions regarding intermediaries aim to capture the sophisticated investors in
reality, such as hedge funds and investment banks with wide investment spectrum. Those
investors are less constrained by regulatory restrictions or informational asymmetry that
lead to potential market segmentation. For instance, some international hedge funds
diversify their investment across sectors ranging from high-tech start-ups to stock markets
across borders.
III.2.4 Collateral Constraint
The financial friction in this model comes from the intermediaries’ collateral constraints
when they engage in arbitrage trade. The constraints arise from the long-lived feature of
the financial assets. In contrast to the one-period contracts, in which asset prices collapse
to zero in the next period, the positions of long-lived securities remain alive and carry value
in all future periods. The sequential trading of these assets thus obliges intermediaries to
repay the liability from their previous positions before taking new ones in both markets.
As will become clear, such liquidation of previous arbitrage positions usually involves some
due payments to households.
In order to ensure that intermediaries honor their contracts later, households require
them to deposit collateral up to the amount that they would not have an incentive to
walk away in the next period. Intermediaries are requested to do so market by market
and cannot use positions in one market to collateralize trades in another, due to the
segmentation. That is, they have to separately post collateral to cover the maximal
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Figure III.1: The structure of the economic system.
potential future loss in each market. To be consistent with the real-world liquidation as well
as the literature of limited liability, we further assume that in case of default households
can only grab intermediaries’ depreciated capital, without being able to confiscate their
production output.
Denote xit as intermediaries’ position in asset i and Kt as her total physical investment.
The total value of the intermediaries’ margin account in both market in period t+ 1 has
to satisfy X
i2{A,B}
✓
xitP
i
t+1 +min
✓t+1
 
xit✓t+1
 ◆
+ (1   )Kt   0. (III.2)
With this, we can imply that the collateral constraints become more restrictive when the
dividend become more volatile, i.e., ✓¯ is higher. This is because intermediaries have to put
more collateral per unit of position to insure households. Also, if the price gap at t+ 1 is
larger, more capital is required, as this is positively related to the future liability arising
from current positions. This particular form di↵ers with the one in Zhang (2017). Here,
intermediaries have to collateralize for their maximal liability separately in each market,
while they only have to prepare to cover their actual liability in Zhang (2017). Thus, the
collateral constraints in the present model is strictly tighter.
In this way, the collateral constraint limits the intermediaries’ positions and their
ability to exploit arbitrage opportunities as a function of their capital investment. As a
result, the durable goods investment derives value not only from production, but also from
its role serving as collateral in the financial markets.
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III.2.5 Optimization Problems
The intermediaries’ optimization problem is to maximize their utility by choosing the
optimal level of consumption cIMt , physical investmentKt and positions x
i
t in both financial
markets:
max
cIMs ,x
i
s,Ks
Et
" 1X
s=t+1
⇢s t ln
 
cIMs
 #
, i 2 {A,B}.
subject to the budget constraint
cIMt =
X
i2{A,B}
xit 1P
i
t| {z }
value of previous
period’s positions
 
X
i2{A,B}
xitP
i
t| {z }
immediate proceeds
from taking
new positions
+ZtKt 1 + (1   )Kt 1  Kt| {z }
production income
= (xt   xt 1) t + ZtKt 1 + (1   )Kt 1  Kt,
and the following collateral constraint
X
i2{A,B}
✓
xitP
i
t+1 +min
✓t+1
 
xit✓t+1
 ◆
+ (1   )Kt   0.
Or put simply,
(1   )Kt   xt
 
 t+1 + 2✓¯
 
. (III.3)
The corresponding transversality condition is
lim
t!1 ⇢
t+1E
"
(Zt + 1   )Kt
cIMt+1
#
= 0.
lim
t!1 ⇢
t+1E
"
 t+1xt
cIMt+1
#
= 0.
Compared to the intermediaries, households are not restricted by the collateral
constraint. Their optimization problem is given by
max
cis,y
i
s
E
" 1X
s=t
 s t ln
 
cis
 #
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subject to the dynamic budget constraint
cit = h+
 
yit 1   yit
 
P it +
 
yit 1 + u
i
t 1
 
✓t, for i 2 {A,B}.
Ideally, given enough liquidity supply, the households would like to take a position size of
yit =  uit to eliminate all the consumption risk arising from ✓t.
Likewise, the corresponding transversality condition is
lim
t!1 
tE

P it y
i
t
cit
 
= 0.
III.2.6 Sequential Equilibrium
Given the initial capital investment K0 and agents’ asset positions x0 and yi0, i 2 {A,B},
an equilibrium is described by the price process P it , capital investment Kt, asset holdings
yit and x
i
t, and consumption choices C
IM
t and C
i
t such that
• all agents solve their optimization problems given prices;
• markets clear for financial assets, that is yit + xit = 0.
III.3 Riskless Arbitrage
To illustrate how the model works, we first characterize the equilibrium under a
deterministic shock intensity {uit}. Within this setting, the only uncertainty thus arises
from the shock unit ✓t. Since intermediaries hold zero net positions of financial assets,
their capital investment and arbitrage trading decisions are una↵ected by the realization
of ✓t. As will become clear later, under this condition, intermediaries’ arbitrage trades are
riskless and their optimization problems reduce to be deterministic.
As the technology is a linear function of the capital input, we make use of this simple
form and construct the following conjecture of intermediaries’ value function:
V IMt (Kt 1, xt 1) = C ln ((Zt + 1   )Kt 1   xt 1 t) +Dt, (III.4)
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where C is a constant and Dt is a deterministic function of t.
Proposition III.1. The value function of an intermediary in period t is given by (III.4),
where C = ⇢/(1  ⇢). The intermediary’s optimal consumption is
cIMt = (1  ⇢) [(Zt + 1   )Kt 1   xt 1 t] = (1  ⇢)Wt, (III.5)
where
Wt := (Zt + 1   )Kt 1   xt 1 t
is the intermediary’s wealth at the beginning of t.
This proposition shows that intermediaries are myopic as they will always consume a
fixed portion of their total wealth, independent of the wealth level and investment returns.
Unlike the intermediaries, the households’ still face uncertainty from the shock unit
✓t, even when {ut} is deterministic. From their budget constraint, we can see that the
households’ exposure to ✓t+1 is the sum of their asset position yit and the shock intensity ut.
In particular, we conjecture that under the certainty case, the households’ value function
in period t is
Vi,t
 
yit
 
= Et
⇥
O ln
 
yit +Q
i
t
 
+N it
⇤
(III.6)
where O is a constant, Qit and N
i
t are deterministic functions of the next period’s shock
✓t+1 and price level P it+1.
Proposition III.2. The value function of an household i, i 2 {A,B}, in period t is given
by (III.6), where O =  /(1   ).
First, we look at the equilibrium price di↵erence.
Lemma III.1. Define PAt (✓t) and P
B
t (✓t) to be the time t equilibrium prices in market
A and B as functions of ✓t. It follows that
PAt (") =  PBt ( "),
where " 2 ⇥ ✓¯, ✓¯⇤.
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Proposition III.3. In equilibrium, the asset prices are given by
PAt =  
cAt
cAt + c
B
t
 t =  
✓
1
2
+
(u  xt 1) ✓t
2h
◆
 t, (III.7)
PBt =
cBt
cAt + c
B
t
 t =
✓
1
2
  (u  xt 1) ✓t
2h
◆
 t, (III.8)
and the price di↵erence
 t =
2h
Mt + (xt   xt 1) , (III.9)
where
Mt :=
0@Et
24 1X
j=1
 j
✓t+j
cBt+j
351A 1 .
Moreover,  t is independent of the realization of shock units ✓t, 8t.
Given the price di↵erence  t, the price in i is proportional to market i’s consumption
share relative to households’ total endowment in both markets. Specifically, the proportion
depends on the realization of ✓t. The prices in both market decrease with ✓t. However,
the price di↵erence  t, as a whole, is independent of the specific realization of ✓t.
Intuitively, since intermediaries take a zero net position in the financial assets, their
consumptions are independent of the realization of ✓t. Technically, from households’ first
order conditions, we make use of the logarithmic utility and the symmetric distribution
of ✓t. We further find that the independence of  t on ✓t also holds for the cases where
households have more general CRRA utility and ✓t follows a two-point distribution.
III.3.1 Dynamics of Intermediaries’ Capital
With deterministic shock intensity and the myopic feature of intermediaries, we can derive
the dynamics of their capital growth.
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Proposition III.4. Intermediaries’ capital grows according to
Kt = ⇢GtKt 1, (III.10)
where Gt is the growth rate.
• If
Kt 1   2u✓¯
⇢(1   ) (Zt + 1   ) ,
then the collateral constraints at t are slack, with Gt = Zt + 1    . Intermediaries
only receive income from production.
• Else if
Kt 1 <
2u✓¯
⇢(1   ) (Zt + 1   ) ,
then intermediaries’ collateral constraints are binding, with
Gt =
Zt + 1      (1  ) t t+2✓¯
1  (1  ) t
 t+1+2✓¯
> Zt + 1   .
Intermediaries capital growth rate is accelerated by their arbitrage activities.
When intermediaries’ initial capital exceeds the threshold value defined in Proposition
III.4, then they have enough collateral to eliminate any price discrepancies and thus can
provide full liquidity to households in both sides. However, this also means the extinction
of arbitrage opportunities for intermediaries. Consequently, intermediaries only receive
income from the production sector in this case.
On the other hand, when intermediaries’ financial constraints are binding, they cannot
absorb all the price spreads and only provide partial liquidity to both markets. In this
case, they are able to earn positive arbitrage income through exploiting the current price
spreads. They only have to repay a lower amount of liability in the next period, as the price
gap dwindles. By reinvesting the proceeds to the durable goods, they are able to expand
the production. In this sense, arbitrage opportunities o↵er intermediaries a channel to
obtain external funding with a negative interest rate to leverage up their original savings.
The higher the current price spread  t is, the more leverage intermediaries can attain
from arbitrage. As intermediaries’ capital investment increases, so does their capability to
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provide more liquidity. In turn, the price gaps diminish gradually and the capital growth
also slows down accordingly.
Proposition III.5. When the shock intensity ut is deterministic, a competitive equilib-
rium exists in which the price spread  t, intermediaries’ capital investment Kt and the
positions of the financial assets xit are deterministic.
III.3.2 Steady State
We now consider a stationary version of the model, with Zt = Z, ht = h and ut = u.
Proposition III.6. Given the shock intensity ut and productivity factor Zt are constant,
i.e., ut = u and Zt = Z for all t = 0, 1, 2, . . .,
• if ⇢(Z + 1    ) > 1, Kt increases towards K = 1, xt converges to x⇤ = u, and  t
decreases to  ⇤ = 0.
• If ⇢(Z + 1   ) = 1,
– if the initial capital is K0   2u✓¯/(1    ), then Kt stays at K0, xt = u, and
 t = 0;
– else if K0 < 2u✓¯/(1    ), then Kt increases towards K⇤ = 2u✓¯/(1    ), xt
converges to x⇤ = u and  t decreases to  ⇤ = 0.
• Else if ⇢G¯ < 1, where
G¯ := max
s
8<:Z + 1     
(1  ) s
 s+2✓¯
1  (1  ) s
 s+1+2✓¯
9=; ,
then both Kt and xt decrease to zero, and  t increases towards
 ⇤ = 2h
 
1   Et

✓t+1
h  u✓t+1
 
• Otherwise,  t converges to
 ⇤ = 2
1  ⇢(Z + 1   )
⇢Z     ✓¯, (III.11)
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xt and Kt converge to values x⇤ and K⇤, with x⇤ < u being the solution to
 ⇤ = 2h
 
1   Et

✓t+1
h+ (x⇤   u) ✓t+1
 
,
and K⇤ = x⇤
 
 ⇤ + 2✓¯
 
/(1   ).
If the intermediaries are extremely patient, their capital and wealth will explode over
time. During this process, they provide full liquidity to both financial markets and close
up any price discrepancies.
In the less patient case, i.e., ⇢(Z + 1   ) = 1, the steady-state level of capital is also
su cient to support a slack collateral constraint, i.e., K⇤   2u✓¯/(1    ). Also, the price
discrepancy eventually diminishes to zero and intermediaries provide full liquidity to both
markets, i.e., xt = u. This is because any non-zero price gap would induce unconstrained
intermediaries to increase their position x⇤ in the financial assets for more arbitrage profit.
As a result, similar to the previous scenario, intermediaries receive income solely from
production.
However, when intermediaries are not patient enough, they do not have the tendency
to invest much capital over time to maintain slack collateral constraints. For extremely
impatient intermediaries, i.e., ⇢G¯ < 1, even with the relatively high arbitrage proceeds
compared to their own savings, they still cannot maintain the level of their previous capital
investment. Hence, their capital stocks keep diminishing until zero. The same happens
for their position sizes in both markets. Eventually, the price disparage would converge
to the autarky case.
For the not so extreme type, intermediaries are able to reach a steady level of capital
investment, consumption and partial liquidity supply, i.e., x⇤ < u. The collateral
constraints are binding in the steady state. In this scenario, intermediaries’ arbitrage
income xt t in each period exactly o↵sets with their liability xt 1 t. One can regard
the arbitrage income as a nominal zero-interest loan borrowed from households by
intermediaries to leverage up their capital investment. As intermediaries can always roll
over the old contracts with the same amount of new loans, they would never have to repay
their initial loans. Thus, intermediaries’ arbitrage trading is indeed riskless.
The pricing expression, i.e., Equation (III.11), shows that the steady state price gap
decreases with intermediaries’ time preference ⇢⇤ and productivity Z, while it increases
with the depreciation rate   and the volatility parameter of the endowment shocks, i.e., ✓¯.
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III.4 Risky Arbitrage
Having explored the riskless arbitrage in which ut = u, we now turn our attention to the
more general cases with random shock intensity series {ut}. One of the key di↵erences
is that intermediaries’ optimization problem is no longer a deterministic one. Rather,
intermediaries now face uncertain returns of their arbitrage trading, as the resulting
liability arising from settlement depends on the realization of the shock intensity in the
next period. In this sense, the previous described arbitrage trading now becomes risky.
In this context, we aim to study intermediaries’ trading strategy in the wake of demand
risks. Also, we are interested in examining how di↵erent policies on collateral constraints
may a↵ect the overall welfare, aggregate output, as well as intermediaries’ capability to
eliminate mispricing and provide liquidity. In particular, di↵erent policies on collateral
constraints in our model impose di↵erent value-at-risk (VAR) control on intermediaries’
trading positions. We further investigate how they might a↵ect the overall market stability
and real activities in the presence of unanticipated demand shocks.
For this purpose, we conduct two numerical exercises. In the first experiment, we
assume that all agents have perfect information of the underlying distribution of the
shock intensity {ut} and that there are no unanticipated shocks. We compare the
welfare implications, capital accumulation, market liquidity as well as price spreads under
collateral constraints of varying degree of tightness, in the equilibrium paths with or
without low-probability realization of ut. In the second exercise, we include the possibility
that the agents might experience some unanticipated shocks in {ut}, and assume that
they cannot quickly update their belief over the distribution of {ut} in a short time. This
allows us to investigate whether the tighter or looser collateral constraints help stabilize
the overall economy in crisis times. For example, we compare intermediaries’ financial
robustness towards extreme unanticipated shocks under di↵erent collateral policies.
In particular, we conduct the two thought experiments through the numerical
computation of a concise four-period model. We solve the model and simulate with all
possible paths of {ut}. We then compare the dynamics of capital accumulation, market
liquidity and asset prices in equilibrium. In the following, before we present our numerical
examples, we will first introduce the specifics of the four-period model and define the
tightness of collateral constraints in our exercise.1
1We also attach the computation of an infinite-horizon model, including the detailed recursive formation
and computation algorithm, in the appendix.
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III.4.1 The Four-Period Model
The four-period model inherits the same setup from the previous general model, except
both the assets’ and the agents’ lifespan, as the name suggests, extend only four time
intervals i.e., t 2 {1, 2, 3, 4}. In particular, at t = 4 there will be no trading of the financial
assets in neither market, since after this period all agents cease to exist and no households
demand the assets to hedge their risk anymore. As a result, the prices converge to zero in
both markets.
Thus, the intermediaries’ optimization problem in the four-period model with initial
physical capital K0 and asset position x0 can be represented as:
max
 
lnCIM1 + ⇢E
⇥
lnCIM2
⇤
+ ⇢2E
⇥
lnCIM3
⇤
+ ⇢3E
⇥
lnCIM4
⇤ 
,
where the maximum is taken over
 
CIM1 , C
IM
2 , C
IM
3 , C
IM
4 ,K1,K2,K3, x1, x2, x3
 
subject to
the budget constraints at t 2 {1, 2, 3, 4}:
CIM1 =
 
PA1   PB1
 
(x0   x1) + (Z1 + 1   )K0  K1,
CIM2 =
 
PA2   PB2
 
(x1   x2) + (Z2 + 1   )K1  K2,
CIM3 =
 
PA3   PB3
 
(x2   x3) + (Z3 + 1   )K2  K3,
CIM4 = (1    + Z4)K3.
And the financial constraints at t 2 {1, 2, 3}:
x1
⇥
PB2 (u |P {u2  u} = ↵)  PA2 (u |P {u2  u} = ↵) + 2✓¯
⇤  (1   )K1, (III.12)
x2
⇥
PB3 (u |P {u3  u} = ↵)  PA3 (u |P {u3  u} = ↵) + 2✓¯
⇤  (1   )K2, (III.13)
2x3✓¯  (1   )K3. (III.14)
Here, we assume ut = uAt =  uBt > 0 and therefore in equilibrium xt = xAt =  xBt > 0 for
t 2 {1, 2, 3, 4}. Thus, households’ optimization problem reduces to the following form.
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• For Household A
max
 
lnCA1 +  E
⇥
lnCA2
⇤
+  2E
⇥
lnCA3
⇤
+  3E
⇥
lnCA4
⇤ 
where we maximize over
 
CA1 , C
A
2 , C
A
3 , C
A
4 , y
A
1 , y
A
2 , y
A
3
 
subject to
CA1 = P
A
1 (x1   x0) + h+ (u0   x0) ✓1,
CA2 = P
A
2 (x2   x1) + h+ (u1   x1) ✓2,
CA3 = P
A
3 (x3   x2) + h+ (u2   x2) ✓3,
CA4 = h+ (u3   x3) ✓4.
• For Household B,
max
 
lnCB1 +  E
⇥
lnCB2
⇤
+  2E
⇥
lnCB3
⇤
+  3E
⇥
lnCB4
⇤ 
,
where we maximize over
 
CB1 , C
B
2 , C
B
3 , C
B
4 , y
B
1 , y
B
2 , y
B
3
 
subject to
CB1 = P
B
1 (x0   x1) + h  (u0   x0) ✓1,
CB2 = P
B
2 (x1   x2) + h  (u1   x1) ✓2,
CB3 = P
B
3 (x2   x3) + h  (u2   x2) ✓3,
CB4 = h  (u3   x3) ✓4.
In the four-period model setup, a competitive equilibrium consists of price PAt , P
B
t ,
intermediaries’ capital investment Kt and positions in the financial assets xt for the
intermediaries and yAt , y
B
t for the households in market A and B, for t 2 {1, 2, 3, 4}, such
that both intermediaries and households solve their optimization problems given prices
and the markets for financial assets clear:
xt + y
A
t = 0 and   xt + yBt = 0, for t 2 {1, 2, 3}.
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Tightness of Collateral Constraints
Note that the collateral constraints, i.e. the inequality condition (III.12) and (III.13),
are di↵erent from those in the deterministic case. This is because unlike the latter, in
the setting with random shock intensity process {ut}, one cannot precisely determine the
future price spread, and hence the amount of intermediaries’ liability arising from current
arbitrage positions. These can only be revealed in the next period. As a result, the ex
ante collateral requirements can only specify a probability range of the next period’s shock
intensity, within which intermediaries must cover the maximum possible liability that their
current trading positions would incur.
Put di↵erently, the collateral requirement imposes a specific VAR control on inter-
mediaries’ positions in advance. For example, the probability range of the future shock
intensity specified in the inequality condition (III.12) and (III.13) are us 2 [0,↵], where
0  ↵  100% and s 2 {2, 3}. This indicates that intermediaries should post enough
collateral in advance so that they can account for the due liability in case the next period’s
shock intensity hits the ↵ percentile of the distribution. In this sense, the value ↵ represents
the tightness of the collateral requirement. When ↵ = 100%, it imposes the tightest
possible collateral constraint on intermediaries. That is, they have to cover for households’
maximal potential losses for all possible realization of future shock intensity. In contrast,
↵ = 0 completely disregards the risk of intermediaries walking away from their previous
positions and thus corresponds to a frictionless market without any collateral constraints.
In the following sections, we will conduct experiments and analyze model dynamics with
varying values of ↵ to shed light on the policy implications on the collateral requirement
in di↵erent settings.
In most of our following experiments, we assume collateral constraints featuring
↵ < 100%. This assumption is grounded in real world practice, as most of the margin
requirements or collateral constraints in reality are not designed to cover for the absolute
maximum potential risk or to take into account of extreme low probability events. On one
hand, both parties of the contracts in practice might not have perfect knowledge of the
underlying risk or perfect foresight of all future possible events, thus they can only form
contracts to cover for certain range of uncertainties based on their forecasts. On the other
hand, it might be too restrictive to make any transaction possible, if one party insists on
the other posting collateral against all extreme or low-probability scenarios.
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Variable ut ✓t
Value 0 8 12 20 -1 1
Probability 0.01 0.49 0.49 0.01 0.5 0.5
Table III.1: Distribution of ut and ✓t.
III.4.2 Risky Arbitrage without Unanticipated Shocks
In this section, we focus on the settings in which all agents have perfect information of
the distribution of the shock intensity {ut} as well as the shock units {✓t}. Conditional on
this, we aim to explore how varying degrees of tightness in collateral requirement a↵ect the
equilibrium dynamics in both “normal” periods and “abnormal” times with occurrence of
low-probability events. In particular, we would like to ask which collateral requirement
policy has more constructive e↵ects on the aggregate production, market liquidity, pricing
e ciency as well as overall welfare.
To achieve this, we implement simulations of two otherwise identical four-period models
which only di↵er in the tightness of collateral constraints. We modulate the tightness
of collateral constraints in the two parallel economies by assigning di↵erent values for
the parameter ↵ in the requirements (III.12) and (III.13). We then simulate the model
dynamics with the same exogenous paths of the shock intensity {ut} and the endowment
shock unit {✓t}.
In order to model extreme, low-probability shocks, we assume that the shock intensity
{ut} has an i.i.d. distribution that follows a symmetric four-point distribution. For
example, we model the “normal” events when ut takes a value in 8 or 12, each having
a probability of 49%. However, we also model the low-probability events when ut takes a
value in either 0 or 20, each with a probability of 1%. Also, for simplicity, we assume that
✓t for t 2 {2, 3, 4} follow a two-point distribution. In particular, ✓t take values of either
 ✓¯ or ✓¯ with probability equal to p and 1  p each. Table III.1 lists the parameter values
in the distribution.
Given the above distribution, we model the first economy with a relatively loose
collateral requirement by setting ↵ = 50%. That is, intermediaries at t only have to
post collateral to cover for the potential liability in case ut+1 = 8 happens. Similarly, we
set the second economy with ↵ = 99% to illustrate a policy with tighter constraints. Table
III.2 lists the common parameter values of the two economies in the experiment.
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Parameter Values
↵ 0.5 p 0.5
  0.5 x0 0
⇢ 0.9 K0 20
  0.9 u0 8
✓¯ 1 ✓0 1
✓1 -1 u1 8
ht 21 Zt 1.0
Table III.2: The set of parameter values.
Period ut K Loose X Loose CIM Loose Spread Loose Binding Collateral
1 8 25.706 4.8825 8.7235 0.9073 TRUE
2 12 27.095 5.9725 12.5070 0.9558 TRUE
3 8 19.822 4.9555 20.5470 0.2683 TRUE
4 0 0 0 29.7330 0 FALSE
Period ut K Tight X Tight CIM Tight Spread Tight Binding Collateral
1 8 25.641 4.1848 8.7235 1.0430 TRUE
2 12 26.858 5.0745 12.5500 1.0636 TRUE
3 8 19.764 4.9409 20.4880 0.2681 TRUE
4 0 0 0 29.6460 0 FALSE
Period ut K Det. X Det. CIM Det. Spread Det. Binding Collateral
1 8 25.5765 4.5647 8.7235 0.9420 TRUE
2 12 26.5786 5.8377 12.8066 0.8016 TRUE
3 8 19.4657 4.8664 20.1337 0.2765 TRUE
4 0 0 0 29.1986 0 FALSE
Table III.3: Model dynamics under a “normal” path of {ut} with random and deterministic
demands.
We show the full set of model dynamic solutions with all possible paths of {ut} and
{✓t} shocks in Table III.11 in the appendix. For expositional convenience, here we only
select some representatives sample paths. For example, Table III.3 shows the comparison
of the key variables in equilibrium to approximate the normal time dynamics. That is,
there are no low-probability events in the paths of {ut}. Also, Table III.4 and Table III.5
illustrate the paths involving rare events, i.e., ut = 0 or ut = 20. As a reference, we also
report the equilibrium dynamics of the deterministic case under the same sample paths of
{ut}.
From the paths of model dynamics involving rare, extreme realized values of ut, we
find that intermediaries with demand risks tend to trade relatively more when ut is low
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Period ut K Loose X Loose CIM Loose Spread Loose Binding Collateral
1 8 25.706 4.8825 8.7235 0.9073 TRUE
2 0 23.844 1.5715 13.648 0.3224 FALSE
3 8 18.076 4.5189 18.576 0.3003 TRUE
4 0 0 0 27.113 0 FALSE
Period ut K Tight X Tight CIM Tight Spread Tight Binding Collateral
1 8 25.641 4.1848 8.7235 1.0430 TRUE
2 0 23.919 1.5498 13.697 0.3213 FALSE
3 8 18.131 4.5328 18.6400 0.2990 TRUE
4 0 0 0 27.1970 0 FALSE
Period ut K Det. X Det. CIM Det. Spread Det. Binding Collateral
1 8 23.4178 5.2697 8.7235 0.4063 TRUE
2 0 21.6540 1.0233 12.5304 0.2219 FALSE
3 8 16.6063 4.1516 16.9160 0.3329 TRUE
4 0 0 0 24.9095 0 FALSE
Table III.4: Model dynamics of a path involving an extreme low realization of ut with
random and deterministic demands.
Period ut K Loose X Loose CIM Loose Spread Loose Binding Collateral
1 8 25.706 4.8825 8.7235 0.90727 TRUE
2 20 32.039 7.3092 10.944 1.8229 TRUE
3 8 23.213 5.8033 24.5560 0.19168 TRUE
4 0 0 0 34.8200 0 FALSE
Period ut K Tight X Tight CIM Tight Spread Tight Binding Collateral
1 8 25.641 4.1848 8.7235 1.043 TRUE
2 20 32.039 6.2874 10.903 2.1305 TRUE
3 8 23.302 5.8256 24.669 0.18879 TRUE
4 0 0 0 34.953 0 FALSE
Period ut K Det. X Det. CIM Det. Spread Det. Binding Collateral
1 8 27.8125 4.0223 8.7235 1.6249 TRUE
2 20 34.1447 7.9045 13.2314 1.4573 TRUE
3 8 24.6471 6.1618 26.2914 0.1598 TRUE
4 0 0 0 36.9707 0 FALSE
Table III.5: Model dynamics of a path involving an extreme large realization of ut with
random and deterministic demands.
and rather less when ut is high. This is because relative to the deterministic case, the
extra risk from volatile shock intensity renders the risk-averse households willing to pay
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Utility IM Utility A Utility B
Loose 11.9799 11.7964 12.5987
Tight 11.9915 11.7655 12.5679
Table III.6: Utility under two collateral policies.
more for hedging. Thus, all else equal, the price spread in the random case is larger than
the deterministic one. So is the intermediaries’ arbitrage profitability. When the collateral
constraint is not binding, such as when ut is extremely low, it is natural and also a↵ordable
for intermediaries with demand risk to take more positions. Likewise, when ut is large, the
collateral constraints endogenously become tighter, making it inhibitive for intermediaries
to take extra positions.
Table III.6 presents agents’ utility under two di↵erent collateral policies. It implies that
intermediaries under tighter collateral policy enjoy higher welfare than their counterparts
under looser collateral requirements. However, the opposite is true for households. Also,
from the model dynamics in both normal time paths and those with rare events occurrence,
intermediaries in the more liberal economy tend to take larger arbitrage positions at t 2
{1, 2}. Accordingly, the price gaps between two markets are narrower than in the more
restrictive economy. However, at t = 3, the relationship reverses. In fact, both market
liquidity and capital investment in the looser environment are lower than those with tighter
collateral policies in this period. Recall that in the four-period model, di↵erent collateral
policies only a↵ect constraints in period 1 and 2. In period three, the collateral constraints
(III.14) in these two parallel economies are essentially identical, and the intermediaries’
position sizes depend solely on their collateral input or their total income at the beginning
of period three, given the constraint is binding. Hence, we can conclude that looser
collateral constraints encourage intermediaries to provide more liquidity to the markets and
allow them to better correct the mispricings. This in turn benefits households in segmented
markets, as they can enjoy better risk sharing than their counterparts at an earlier stage.
However, intermediaries in general benefit less from the arbitrage opportunities than their
peers with tighter collateral constraints.
Since intermediaries under the looser collateral constraints can always replicate the
arbitrage strategy and capital investment decisions of their peers in the other economy,
one might wonder why they end up having less welfare? The rationale lies in the fact
that intermediaries fail to internalize the price e↵ects of their collective trading positions.
The arbitrage profitability, measured by the price spreads, decreases with the aggregate
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liquidity that intermediaries provide to the markets. Hence, though intermediaries with
looser collateral constraints are allowed to take on more arbitrage positions, they end up
having less total profits due to this externality. Because of this, in period three when the
income e↵ects solely governs the intermediaries’ arbitrage capacity, they can no longer
maintain a larger position size or capital investment than their wealthier counterparts.
III.4.3 Risky Arbitrage with Unanticipated Demand Shocks
In the above experiment, we assume that agents all have perfect information of the
underlying distribution of market demand, determined by {ut}. However, in reality, most
investors might not always be well informed. Instead, they are subject to unanticipated
and extreme shocks. To examine the e↵ects of information frictions on limits of arbitrage
and aggregate activities, we conduct the following experiment in which agents do not have
perfect information over the distribution of the shock intensity {ut}. Given this incomplete
information setting, we are further interested in studying the impact of collateral policies
on the market stability in the event of unanticipated extreme shocks. Specifically, we
analyze the sensitivity of key economic variables towards various unanticipated shocks
under di↵erent collateral policies.
To achieve this goal, we implement a similar experiment with two parallel economies
as in the first exercise. To model the responses towards unanticipated shocks, we assume
that agents in both economies believe that ut only takes the two values u = 8 and u = 12
with equal probability. The economy with loose collateral constraints imposes ↵ = 50%
and the tighter one requires full loss coverage, i.e. ↵ = 100%. Except for the incomplete
information over {ut}, agents have perfect knowledge about the other parameter values.
We also inherit the same parameter settings of the two economies as in the previous
exercise. We then simulate the model with the same set of {ut} paths and check the
specific dynamics in equilibrium.
The full set of equilibrium dynamics is listed in section III.E in the appendix. Here for
expositional convenience, we illustrate three representative sample paths in Table III.7.
These paths stand for three distinct scenarios. The first one represents a path without
unexpected shocks. The second features a path with an unanticipated large shock u2 = 20,
while the third involves an unexpected small size of {ut} with u2 = 0.
In comparison with tables III.3, III.4 and III.5, we find that the aggregate capital
investment as well as intermediaries’ consumptions are lower, compared with the
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Period ut K Loose X Loose CIM Loose Spread Loose Binding Collateral
1 8 25.659 4.8850 8.7235 0.8971 TRUE
2 12 27.013 5.9512 12.488 0.9508 TRUE
3 8 19.766 4.9415 20.482 0.2696 TRUE
4 0 0 0 29.649 0 FALSE
Period ut K Tight X Tight CIM Tight Spread Tight Binding Collateral
1 8 25.593 4.1843 8.7235 1.0317 TRUE
2 12 26.782 5.0571 12.532 1.0582 TRUE
3 8 19.711 4.9277 20.427 0.2693 TRUE
4 0 0 0 29.566 0 FALSE
Period ut K Loose X Loose CIM Loose Spread Loose Binding Collateral
1 8 25.659 4.8850 8.7235 0.8971 TRUE
2 0 23.793 1.5319 13.629 0.3181 FALSE
3 8 18.045 4.5111 18.541 0.3010 TRUE
4 0 0 0 27.067 0 FALSE
Period ut K Tight X Tight CIM Tight Spread Tight Binding Collateral
1 8 25.593 4.1843 8.7235 1.0317 TRUE
2 0 23.866 1.5106 13.677 0.3169 FALSE
3 8 18.099 4.5247 18.603 0.2997 TRUE
4 0 0 0 27.148 0 FALSE
Period ut K Loose X Loose CIM Loose Spread Loose Binding Collateral
1 8 25.659 4.8850 8.7235 0.8971 TRUE
2 20 31.953 7.2854 10.914 1.8243 TRUE
3 8 23.155 5.7887 24.486 0.1930 TRUE
4 0 0 0 34.732 0 FALSE
Period ut K Tight X Tight CIM Tight Spread Tight Binding Collateral
1 8 25.593 4.1843 8.7235 1.0317 TRUE
2 20 31.958 6.2678 10.874 2.1320 TRUE
3 8 23.247 5.8117 24.603 0.1900 TRUE
4 0 0 0 34.8700 0 FALSE
Table III.7: Three sample equilibrium paths with information friction under di↵erent
collateral policies.
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Utility IM Utility A Utility B
Loose 11.9709 11.7970 12.5993
Tight 11.9831 11.7661 12.5685
Table III.8: Utility with information friction under two collateral policies.
counterparts with demand risk and perfect information as in the previous exercise. Also,
except for t = 1 for the looser collateral case, the supply of market liquidity in the partially
informed economies is in general less than in the fully informed ones. Interestingly, despite
the smaller arbitrage volume, the price spreads in the less informed economies are yet
narrower before t = 3, the time when all uncertainty unfolds. Table III.8 shows the
agents’ utility under two di↵erent collateral policies in the imperfect information settings.
As we can see, intermediaries become worse o↵ with information friction. In contrast,
households in market A and B are better o↵.
Intuitively, due to the concave nature of the utility function, households are willing
to pay more for the insurance against extremely large shocks, such as ut = 20. Thus,
all else equal, the price spreads are narrower when households are not aware of the
possibility of extreme shocks. For intermediaries, this translates into the deterioration
of their arbitrage profitability compared to the full information case. With narrower
price spreads, intermediaries’ overall marginal return of capital falls as its collateral value,
measured by  t/
 
2✓¯
 
, becomes less. Thus, it is natural for intermediaries to cut down their
durable goods investment. Similarly, both the income e↵ects and the weakened marginal
profitability discourage intermediaries from maintaining the high level of market liquidity
supply. Overall, intermediaries’ welfare declines as their arbitrage opportunities get worse
compared with the perfect information cases. However, as households underpay for the
assets, the saved cost dominates the utility loss from less risk sharing. Due to the income
e↵ects, they are better o↵ than in the full information cases.
Apart from the e↵ects arising from the information friction, we also like to examine
the net impact of di↵erent collateral policies on the economy’s response towards various
unanticipated shocks. Specifically, to separate the common influence of the imperfect
information, we use the corresponding equilibrium paths in the full information settings
as references. We then calculate the percentage changes to capture the shock sensitivity
resulting from di↵erent collateral policies. In particular, we focus on comparing the relative
e↵ects at t = 2. This is because although unanticipated shocks might occur in both period
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Period ut K Loose X Loose Spread CIM Loose Liability Proceed
Loose Loose Loose
1 8 -0.1850% 0.0500% -1.1260% 0.0000% — -1.0760%
2 0 -0.2160% -2.5210% -1.3580% -0.1380% -1.3090% -3.8450%
3 8 -0.1710% -0.1710% 0.2100% -0.1880% -2.3190% 0.0400%
Period ut K Tight X Tight Spread CIM Tight Liability Proceed
Tight Tight Tight
1 8 0.0500% -0.0130% -1.0890% 0.0000% — -1.1010%
2 0 -0.2220% -2.5320% -1.3480% -0.1450% -1.3600% -3.8460%
3 8 -0.1770% -0.1770% 0.2200% -0.1950% -2.3210% 0.0400%
Period ut K Loose X Loose Spread CIM Loose Liability Proceed
Loose Loose Loose
1 8 -0.1850% 0.0500% -1.1260% 0.0000% — -1.0760%
2 20 -0.2670% -0.3260% 0.0800% -0.2790% 0.1300% -0.2490%
3 8 -0.2510% -0.2510% 0.6800% -0.2850% 0.3500% 0.4300%
Period ut K Tight X Tight Spread CIM Tight Liability Proceed
Tight Tight Tight
1 8 0.0500% -0.0130% -1.0890% 0.0000% NA -1.1010%
2 20 -0.2540% -0.3120% 0.0700% -0.2600% 0.0500% -0.2460%
3 8 -0.2370% -0.2370% 0.6500% -0.2690% 0.3300% 0.4100%
Table III.9: The percentage changes under loose and tight collateral policies.
two and three, the collateral constraints in the two parallel economies become essentially
identical at t = 3.
Table III.9 illustrates the percentage changes of equilibrium variables under di↵erent
collateral policies when unanticipated shocks hit at t = 2, relative to the full information
counterparts. To isolate the e↵ects of externality, we further calculate the ratio of the
loose policy cases over tight ones. For example, to compare the relative shock sensitivity
on capital investment between two policies, we construct the ratio as
Kˆ =
K loose partial/K loose full
K tight partial/K tight full
.
Table III.10 reports the relative sensitivity of equilibrium variables.
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Both tables indicate that the economies under di↵erent collateral policies vary in their
reactions towards unanticipated large and small shocks. In particular, in the presence of
the large shock, i.e. u2 = 20, intermediaries with the loose collateral constraints su↵er from
relatively higher liability and less immediate arbitrage proceeds. Consequently, relative
to the levels under tougher collateral policy, their capital investment, liquidity supply
and consumption are comparably lower. On the contrary, when the shock intensity is
surprisingly small, i.e., u2 = 0, intermediaries with looser collateral constraints tend to
earn relatively more from the current arbitrage position x2. Accordingly, they can a↵ord
to increase their consumptions, capital investment and liquidity supplies. In a nutshell,
compared to their counterparts with tighter constraints, intermediaries under a looser
collateral policy are more (less) vulnerable to unexpected large (small) shocks.
The distinct reactions towards di↵erent shocks arise from the fact that uninformed
intermediaries in the more liberal economy tend to overinvest in their arbitrage positions
at t = 1. This is due to both the looser constraints as well as the ignorance of potential
risk from extreme shocks. Hence, when a surprisingly large shock hits at t = 2, the price
spread widens and incurs heavier losses in their previous positions. Though the larger price
gap also means higher arbitrage profitability, intermediaries’ heavy losses render them less
able to gather enough collateral from their own savings and to further take advantage of
the arbitrage opportunities. Such income e↵ect contributes to the relative reduction in
their capital investment, consumption and liquidity supply.
In contrast, when the shock intensity is surprisingly low, i.e., u2 = 0, the resulting
price spread shrinks as the asset demands drop. This implies that the losses caused
by intermediaries’ previous aggressive arbitrage positions are much more limited. On
Period ut Kˆ Xˆ  ˆ CˆIM Liability Proceed
Rel. Ratio Rel. Ratio
1 8 0.002% 0.063% -0.037% 0.000% NA 0.026%
2 0 0.006% 0.012% -0.011% 0.007% 0.053% 0.001%
3 8 0.006% 0.006% -0.010% 0.006% 0.002% -0.004%
Period ut Kˆ Xˆ  ˆ CˆIM Liability Proceed
Rel. Ratio Rel. Ratio
1 8 0.002% 0.063% -0.037% 0.000% NA 0.026%
2 20 -0.013% -0.014% 0.010% -0.019% 0.073% -0.003%
3 8 -0.014% -0.014% 0.031% -0.016% 0.017% 0.017%
Table III.10: Relative sensitivity of looser collateral policy versus tighter one.
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the other hand, the looser collateral policy emboldens the intermediaries to again take
relatively larger arbitrage positions, thus earning more profits from providing liquidity.
As a result, they are relatively less a↵ected by the reduced arbitrage profitability. Put it
di↵erently, the extremely low demand shock, to some degree, exempts the intermediaries
from their due “punishment” of their overinvestment. Since intermediaries under the
looser collateral policy are more aggressive in trading at t = 1, their relative benefit from
this kind of exemption is also larger.
III.5 Conclusion
We develop a model of collateral constrained arbitrage and use it to study the links between
aggregate economic activities and the mispricings in the financial markets. Intermediaries
exploit the price discrepancies between identical securities across segmented markets
and meanwhile provide market liquidity through these market-making trades. In our
deterministic version of the model, we illustrate the workings of the riskless arbitrage:
while each of the legs of an arbitrage trade is risky, the risks o↵set each other across
markets. With this, we examine the dynamics of durable goods investment, market
liquidity and asset prices. We demonstrate the negative correlation between the aggregate
capital investment level and the degree of mispricing in the financial markets.
In our risky arbitrage models, we first include the risk arising from volatile asset
demands. We study the impact of the demand risk on welfare, market liquidity supply,
asset prices as well as the aggregate output under di↵erent collateral policies. We show
that with full awareness of the demand risk, intermediaries are able to gain higher arbitrage
profits and invest more in capital while taking countercyclical trade volumes with respect
to the arbitrage profitability. Also, thanks to the price externality e↵ects, tighter collateral
constraints allow intermediaries to better exploit the arbitrage opportunities and boost the
aggregate investment and output in the real sectors. As an extension, we also introduce
information friction to the risky arbitrage model. We investigate how di↵erent collateral
policies might a↵ect market stability and the economy’s reaction towards various types
of unanticipated shocks. We find that the economy with a more restrictive collateral
requirement tends to be more robust towards large surprising demand shocks, while the
one with looser collateral constraints is more resilient to unanticipated low-level shocks.
With the presence of information frictions, it is interesting to accommodate potential
belief updating process of market participants in the future research. This will allow us
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to further explore how agents’ belief, be it heterogeneous or homogeneous, a↵ects the
functioning of markets and the macroeconomic activities.
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III.A Proofs
III.A.1 Proof of Proposition III.1
Proof. The intermediaries Bellman equation is
Vt (St) = max
cIMt+1,xt+1,Kt+1
 
⇢ ln
 
cIMt+1
 
+ ⇢Vt+1 (St+1)
 
(III.15)
where
St := Wt   cIMt = (Zt + 1   )Kt 1    txt 1   cIMt ,
St+1 := Wt+1   cIMt+1 = (Zt+1 + 1   )Kt    t+1xt   cIMt+1
= (Zt+1 + 1   ) (St + xt t)   t+1xt   cIMt+1.
As our conjecture is equivalent to
Vt (St) = C ln (St) +D
0
t,
substituting it to (III.15), we have
C ln (St) +D
0
t
= max
cIMt+1,xt+1,Kt+1
 
⇢ ln
 
cIMt+1
 
+ ⇢C ln
⇥
(Zt+1 + 1   ) (St + xt t)   t+1xt   cIMt+1
⇤
+⇢D0t+1
 
.
The first-order condition with respect to consumption is
1
cIMt+1
  C
(Zt+1 + 1   ) (St + xt t)   t+1xt   cIMt+1
= 0. (III.16)
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Thus,
cIMt+1 =
(Zt+1 + 1   ) (St + xt t)  xt t+1
C + 1
=
Wt+1
C + 1
=
St+1
C
.
With this, we can write the right-hand side of (III.15) as
max
xt
{⇢(C + 1) ln [(Zt+1 + 1   ) (St + xt t)  xt t+1] + ⇢C lnC
 ⇢(C + 1) ln(C + 1) + ⇢D0t+1
 
(III.17)
The maximization in (III.17) is subject to the financial constraint (III.2).
(a) When the collateral constraint is not binding, applying first order condition with
respect to xt yields
 t+1   (Zt+1 + 1   ) t = 0
That means, when the financial constraint is not binding, the intermediaries are
indi↵erent between any position value of xt.The above maximization becomes
C ln (St) +D
0
t = ⇢(C + 1) ln (St) + ⇢(C + 1) ln (Zt+1 + 1   ) + ⇢C lnC
 ⇢(C + 1) ln(C + 1) + ⇢D0t+1.
Equating the coe cients in front of ln (St), we have:
C =
⇢
1  ⇢ ,
D0t =
⇢
1  ⇢ ln (Zt+1 + 1   ) +
⇢2
1  ⇢ ln ⇢+ ⇢ ln(1  ⇢) + ⇢D
0
t+1.
And the transversality condition is lims!1 ⇢sD0t+s = 0 determines D0t.
(b) Otherwise, from the collateral constraint (III.2) we get
xt =
(1   )Kt
2✓¯ +  t+1
=
(1   )St
2✓¯ +  t+1   (1   ) t ,
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where  t+1 := max
 
pBt+1   pAt+1
 
. Substitute these to (III.17), the maximization is
now
C ln (St) +D
0
t = ⇢(1 + C) ln (St)
+⇢(1 + C) ln
⇢
(Zt+1 + 1   ) + [(Zt+1 + 1   ) t    t+1] (1   )
2✓¯ +  t+1   (1   ) t
 
+⇢(C + 1) ln (Zt+1 + 1   ) + ⇢C lnC   ⇢(C + 1) ln(C + 1) + ⇢D0t+1.
Again, equating the coe cients in front of ln(Wt) and the constant terms, we have
C =
⇢
1  ⇢ ,
D0t = ⇢(1 + C) ln
⇢
(Zt+1 + 1   ) + [(Zt+1 + 1   ) t    t+1] (1   )
2✓¯ +  t+1   (1   ) t
 
+⇢(C + 1) ln (Zt+1 + 1   ) + ⇢C lnC   ⇢(C + 1) ln(C + 1) + ⇢D0t+1.
The transversality condition is lims!1 ⇢sD0t+s = 0 determines D0t.
In sum, we have
cIMt =
Wt
C + 1
= (1  ⇢)Wt,
St = ⇢Wt,
V (Kt 1, xt 1) =
⇢
1  ⇢ ln (Wt) +
⇢
1  ⇢ ln(⇢) +D
0
t
=
⇢
1  ⇢ ln {(Zt + 1   )Kt 1   xt 1 t}+Dt,
where Dt = ⇢ ln(⇢)/(1  ⇢) +D0t.
III.A.2 Proof of Proposition III.2
Proof. The households’ Bellman equation is
Vi,t
 
yit
 
= max
cit+1,yi,t+1
Et
⇥
  ln
 
cit+1
 
+  Vi,t+1
 
yit+1
 ⇤
.
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substitute the budget constraint (III.4) in period t+1 and the conjecture (III.6) and apply
iterated conditional expectation, we get
E
⇥
O ln
 
yit +N
i
t
 
+Qit
⇤
= max
cit+1,yi,t+1
Et
⇥
  ln
 
yit
 
✓t+1 + P
i
t+1
 
+ h+ uit✓t+1   P it+1yit+1
 
+ O ln
 
yit+1 +N
i
t+1
 
+  Qit+1
⇤
(III.18)
Apply the first-order condition with respect to the financial position yt+1 and we have
yit+1 =
Oyt
 
✓t+1 + P it+1
 
+Oh+Ouit✓t+1   P it+1N it+1
(1 +O)P it+1
.
Therefore, we can write the right-hand side of (III.18) as
=  Et
"
ln
 
yit
 
✓t+1 + P
i
t+1
 
+ h+ uit✓t+1  
Oyt
 
✓t+1 + P it+1
 
+Oh+Ouit✓t+1
(1 +A)
+
P it+1N
i
t+1
1 +O
!
+O ln
 
Oyt
 
✓t+1 + P it+1
 
+Oh+Ouit✓t+1   P it+1N it+1
(1 +O)P it+1
+N it+1
!
+Qit+1
#
=  Et
⇥
(1 +O) ln
 
yit
 
✓t+1 + P
i
t+1
 
+ h+ uit✓t+1 +N
i
t+1P
i
t+1
   (O + 1) ln(O + 1)
+O lnO  O ln  P it+1 +Qit+1⇤
=  Et
⇥
(1 +O)
 
ln
 
yit +N
i
t
 
+ ln
 
✓t+1 + P
i
t+1
 
+ ln(1 +O)
 
+O lnO  O ln  P it+1 +Qit+1⇤ ,
where we let
N it =
h+ uit✓t+1 +N
i
t+1P
i
t+1
✓t+1 + P it+1
.
Equating the coe cients in front of ln
 
yit +N
i
t
 
,
 (1 +O) = O
thus we get O =  /(1   ).
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Equating others makes the Bellman equation hold for all values of yit if
O =
 
1    ,
N it =
h+ uit✓t+1 +N
i
t+1P
i
t+1
✓t+1 + P it+1
,
Qit =  (1 +O)
 
ln
 
✓t+1 + P
i
t+1
 
+ ln(1 +O)
 
+  O lnO    O ln  P it+1 +  Qit+1.
The transversality condition lims!1  sQit+s = 0 determines Qit. Similarly if we define
Rit ⌘
 
P it+1 + ✓t+1
 
/P it , then the transversality condition lims!1N it+s/
Qs
m=t+1R
i
m = 0
also decides N it .
III.A.3 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof of Lemma 1. We proof this lemma through backward induction. Suppose at s =
t+ T ,
PAt+T (") =  PBt+T ( ").
Define Cis (✓s) to be the equilibrium consumption of HH in i at time s as a function of ✓s,
for i 2 {A,B}. Since {✓s} follows a symmetric distribution around zero, then it must hold
that
PAt+T (")
cAt+T (")
=  P
B
t+T ( ")
cBt+T ( ")
.
Thus,
 TE
"
pAt+T
cAt+T
#
=   TE
"
pBt+T
cBt+T
#
.
as cAt+T (") = c
B
t+T ( "), which follows from households’ budget constraints.
At s = T + t  1, from the first order condition of households, we have
pAt+T 1 =  c
A
t+T 1E
"
✓t+T + pAt+T
cAt+T
#
,
pBt+T 1 =  c
B
t+T 1E
"
✓t+T + pBt+T
cBt+T
#
.
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Substituting cAt+T 1 and c
B
t+T 1 with the households’ budget constraints at t + T   1, it
follows that
PAt+T 1(") =  PBt+T 1( "),
cAt+T 1(") = c
B
t+T 1( ").
Likewise, one can derive
PAt (") =  PBt ( "),
cAt (") = c
B
t ( ").
On the other hand, one can rewrite P it (") as
PAt (") = c
A
t (")
0@ TX
j=1
 jE
"
✓t+j
cAt+j
#
+  TE
"
pAt+T
cAt+T
#1A
=  PBt ( ")
= cBt ( ")
0@ TX
j=1
 jE
"
✓t+j
cBt+j
#
+  TE
"
pBt+T
cBt+T
#1A .
When T !1, according to the TVC in market A and B,
lim
T!1
  T p
A
T
cAT
yAT = 0,
lim
T!1
 T
pBT
cBT
yBT = 0.
If the steady state prices limT!1 pit+T 6= 0, then it must hold yit+T 6= 0 in equilibrium.
Otherwise, some IM can make arbitrage profit by increasing liquidity providing. Thus, in
this case,
lim
T!1
 TE
"
pAt+T
cAt+T
#
=   lim
T!1
 TE
"
pBt+T
cBt+T
#
= 0. (III.19)
Else if limT!1 pit+T = 0, Equation (III.19) obviously holds as well.
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Therefore, we have
PAt (") = c
A
t (") lim
T!1
0@ TX
j=1
 jE
"
✓t+j
cAt+j
#
+  TE
"
PAt+T
cAt+T
#1A
= cAt (")
0@ 1X
j=1
 jE
"
✓t+j
cAt+j
#1A
=  PBt ( ")
= cBt ( ")
0@ 1X
j=1
 jE
"
✓t+j
cBt+j
#1A .
III.A.4 Proof of Proposition III.3
Proof. From Lemma 1, we know that
PAt (") =  PBt ( ").
Also, from households’ budget constraints,
cAt (") =  PAt (")
 
yAt   yAt 1
 
+ ht +
 
u+ yAt 1
 
"
= PAt (") (xt   xt 1) + ht + (u  xt 1) ",
Similarly,
cBt (") =  PBt (") (xt   xt 1) + ht   (u  xt 1) ".
Thus, it is obvious that
cAt (") = c
B
t ( "),
E

✓t+s + pAt+s
cAt+s
 
=  E

✓t+s + pBt+s
cBt+s
 
, 8s 2 {1, 2, . . . }.
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From households’ first order conditions, it follows that
 t ⌘ pBt   pAt
=  cBt E
"
✓t+1 + pBt+1
cBt+1
#
   cAt E
"
✓t+1 + pAt+1
cAt+1
#
=  
 
cAt + c
B
t
 
E
"
✓t+1 + pBt+1
cBt+1
#
.
Thus,
pBt =  c
B
t E
"
✓t+1 + pBt+1
cBt+1
#
=
cBt
cAt + c
B
t
 t.
Likewise,
pAt =  
cAt
cAt + c
B
t
 t.
Substituting cit with households’ budget constraints in i, i 2 {A,B}, one can obtain the
following after rearranging
pBt =
h  (u  xt 1) ✓t
2h
 t, p
A
t =  
h+ (u  xt 1) ✓t
2h
 t.
On the other hand, if we continue decompose  t,
 t =  c
B
t E
"
✓t+1 + pBt+1
cBt+1
#
   cAt E
"
✓t+1 + pAt+1
cAt+1
#
=  
  pBt (xt   xt 1) + h  (u  xt 1) ✓t E
"
✓t+1 + pBt+1
cBt+1
#
    pAt (xt   xt 1) + h+ (u  xt 1) ✓t E
"
✓t+1 + pAt+1
cAt+1
#
=   (  t (xt   xt 1) + 2h)E
"
✓t+1 + pBt+1
cBt+1
#
.
After rearranging and repeatedly substituting with households’ first order condition, we
can get
 t ⌘ pBt   pAt =
2h
Mt + (xt   xt 1) .
where
1/Mt :=
1X
j=1
 jEt
"
✓t+j
cBt+j
#
,
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which is independent of the realization of ✓t.
As intermediaries take a net zero position in the financial markets, when ut is
constant, their optimization problems are deterministic. Accordingly, xt, xt 1, Kt 1 are
all independent of the realization of ✓t in equilibrium. Hence the price di↵erence  t doesn’t
depend on any particular ✓t realization.
III.A.5 Proof of Proposition III.4
Proof. Substituting cIMt from Equation (III.5) into intermediaries’ budget constraint and
solve for Kt, we get
Kt = ⇢ (Zt + 1   )Kt 1 + xt t.
If the collateral constraint in t is slack, i.e.,  t = 0, xt = u, then Kt must satisfy
(1   )Kt   u
 
 t+1 + 2✓¯
    2u✓¯.
That is,
Kt = ⇢ (Zt + 1   )Kt 1   2u✓¯
1    .
Thus, once
Kt 1   2u✓¯
⇢(1   ) (Zt + 1   ) ,
Gt = Zt + 1   .
Otherwise if
Kt 1 <
2u✓¯
⇢(1   ) (Zt + 1   )
and the collateral constraint in t is binding, i.e.,  t > 0 and xt < u, then combining
collateral constraint (III.3), we further obtain
Kt = ⇢ (Zt + 1   )Kt 1 + xt t = ⇢ (Zt + 1   )Kt 1 + (1   )Kt t
 t+1 + 2✓¯
,
Rearranging, we get
Kt =
⇢ (Zt + 1   )Kt 1
1  (1   )Kt t/
 
 t+1 + 2✓¯
  .
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Thus,
Gt =
(Zt + 1   )
1  (1   )Kt t/
 
 t+1 + 2✓¯
  .
From intermediaries’ first order condition,
✓
1  (1   )Kt t
 t+1 + 2✓¯
◆ 1
> 1.
Thus, Gt > Zt + 1   .
III.A.6 Proof of Proposition III.6
Proof. From Proposition III.4, the dynamics of Kt in the four cases implies the following.
• if ⇢(Z + 1    ) > 1, then Equation (III.10) indicates that ⇢Gt > 1, Kt will keep
growing to K = 1. Intermediaries’ collateral constraints will eventually become
slack, i.e., xt grows to x⇤ = u and  t decreases to  ⇤ = 0.
• if ⇢(Z + 1    ) = 1, then Equation (III.10) indicates that if K0   2u✓¯/(1    ),
then collateral constraints are always slack, ⇢Gt = 1 for all t. Thus, Kt will stay at
K⇤ = K0, with xt = x⇤ = u and  t =  ⇤ = 0 for all t. Else, if K0 < 2u✓¯/(1    ),
initially the collateral constraints are binding, i.e., ⇢Gt > ⇢(Z+1  ) = 1. Hence, Kt
will keep growing towards K⇤ = 2u✓¯/(1   ) until the collateral constraints become
slack. xt will grow to x⇤ = u and  t decreases to  ⇤ = 0.
• If ⇢(Z + 1    ) < 1 and ⇢G¯ < 1, where G¯ is the maximal of Gt for all t. Then
Equation (III.10) indicates that ⇢Gt < 1, Kt will eventually decreases towards K⇤ =
0, together with xt diminishing to x⇤ = 0. When x⇤ = 0, households enjoy zero
risk sharing. Thus, from the households’ first order condition, in such a steady state
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with x⇤ = 0,
 ⇤t := P
B⇤
t   PA⇤t
=  cB⇤t E
"
PB⇤t+1 + ✓t+1
cB⇤t+1
#
   cA⇤t E
"
PA⇤t+1 + ✓t+1
cA⇤t+1
#
=  
 
cB⇤t + c
A⇤
t
 
E
"
PB⇤t+1 + ✓t+1
cB⇤t+1
#
= 2 h
 
 t+1
cA⇤t+1 + cB⇤t+1
+ E
"
✓t+1
cB⇤t+1
#!
= 2 h
✓
 ⇤t+1
2h
+ E

✓t+1
h  u✓t+1
 ◆
.
Rearranging, we get
 ⇤ = 2h
 
1   Et

✓t+1
h  u✓t+1
 
.
• Otherwise, Equation (III.10) implies that Kt remains constant when ⇢Gt is equal
to one as its steady state value, i.e., ⇢G⇤ = 1. In the steady state, intermediaries’
collateral constraints are binding. Solving ⇢G⇤ = 1, we get
 ⇤ = 2
1  ⇢(Z + 1   )
⇢Z     ✓¯.
On the other hand, from households’ first order condition,  ⇤ also has to satisfy
 ⇤ = PB⇤t   PA⇤t
=  cB⇤t E
"
PB⇤t+1 + ✓t+1
cB⇤t+1
#
   cA⇤t E
"
PA⇤t+1 + ✓t+1
cA⇤t+1
#
=  
 
cB⇤t + c
A⇤
t
 
E
"
PB⇤t+1 + ✓t+1
cB⇤t+1
#
= 2 h
 
 t+1
cA⇤t+1 + cB⇤t+1
+ E
"
✓t+1
cB⇤t+1
#!
= 2 h
✓
 ⇤
2h
+ E

✓t+1
h  (u  x⇤) ✓t+1
 ◆
.
Thus, we can solve for the unique steady state x⇤ that satisfy the above. The binding
collateral constraints indicates that K⇤ = x⇤
 
 ⇤ + 2✓¯
 
/(1   ).
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III.A.7 Proof of Proposition III.5
Proof. Suppose that in equilibrium (1) the positions in market A and B are opposite with
the same absolute size; (2) given the price gap, the intermediaries and the households’
optimization problems are solved in Section III.2.6; (3) the price gap  t are given either
by solving the agents’ optimization problem backwards with the terminal condition  ⇤ = 0
for the slack case or
 ⇤ = 2
1  ⇢(Z + 1   )
⇢Z     ✓¯
for the binding case in Section III.3.2 through market clearing conditions. Thus the
equilibrium exist.
III.B The Infinite Horizon Model with Risky Arbitrage
III.B.1 Recursive Formulation
For the general case, it is remarkably di cult to analytically solve for the prices and capital
accumulation in the sequential trading economy, especially we do not know the mappings
from the historical path of productivity shocks and shock intensity. Therefore, we try
to avoid the di culty by restating the equilibrium through recursive formulation. Based
on the recursive structure, we consider applying numerical algorithms to find equilibrium
prices and asset allocations.
Intermediaries
Denote the intermediaries’ current position in financial market A as x = xA,t. Therefore,
their position in market B is  x. Similarly, the A-households’ position in equilibrium will
be yA =  x and the B-households’ position is yB = x. Also in the following formulation,
we denote the intermediaries’ capital input and position in market A for the previous
period by KP,  and x . Similarly, the shock intensity of the previous and current periods
in market A are u  and u respectively.
To form a recursive expression for the intermediaries, we use the last period’s and
current period’s shock intensities u  and u, the current period’s productivity shock ✓, the
intermediaries’ physical capital P holding at the beginning of the period KP,  within each
market, and the previous period’s position in the financial asset in market A x  = xA, 
as state variables.
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Also we denote the next period production shock and asset prices as ✓+ and Pi,+ for
i 2 {A,B}.
The recursive formulation for the intermediaries can be expressed as
V IM (KP, , x , u , ✓) = max
KP,x,cIM
 
ln
 
cIM
 
+ ⇢E
⇥
V IM(KP, x, u, ✓+)
⇤ 
subject to the budget constraints
cIM = (PA   PB) (x    x) + a(1   )K↵P, L  + (1   )KP,   KP, (III.20)
cIM+ = (PA,+   PB,+) (x  x+) + a(1   )K↵PL  + (1   )KP  KP,+. (III.21)
and subject to the collateral constraints
(type I) 0  min{min
PA,+
{x (PA,+   PA)} , 0}+min{min
PB,+
{( x) (PB,+   PB)} , 0}
+ a(1   )K↵PL  + (1   )KP,
(type II) 0  min{min
PA,+
{x (PA,+   PA)} , 0}+min{min
PB,+
{( x) (PB,+   PB)} , 0}+KP.
Households
For households, the recursive form is easier as they are not subject to any collateral
constraints. Their maximization problem can also be expressed in a recursive form with
state variables KP, , x , u , u, and ✓. This is because of the market clearing condition
and the symmetry between two markets. The A-households’ position in the financial
market is y =  x, and the B-households’ position is therefore equal to x in equilibrium.
Thus, x can serve as state variable in the households’ recursive formulation as well.
The A-households’ optimization problem in a recursive form is given by
V A (KP, , x , u , ✓) = max
yA,cA
 
ln
 
cA
 
+  E
⇥
V A (KP, x, u, ✓+)
⇤ 
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cA =   PA (x  + yA) + 1
2
a K↵P, L
  + bKF + (u    x ) ✓, (III.22)
cA+ =   PA,+ ( yA + yA,+) +
1
2
a K↵PL
  + bKF + (u+ yA) ✓+. (III.23)
The corresponding B-households’ optimization problem is given by
V B (KP, , x , u , ✓) = max
yB,cB
 
ln
 
cB
 
+  E
⇥
V B (KP, x, u, ✓+)
⇤ 
subject to the budget constraints
cB = PB (x    yB) + 1
2
a K↵P, L
  + bKF   (u    x ) ✓, (III.24)
cB+ = PB,+ (yB   yB,+) +
1
2
a K↵PL
  + bKF   (u  yB) ✓+. (III.25)
The market clearing condition implies that
yA =   x, (III.26)
yB = x, (III.27)
yA,+ =   x+, (III.28)
yB,+ = x+. (III.29)
III.B.2 Garcia and Zangwill (1981) Trick
In order to transform the inequality into an equality, we apply a change of variables fol-
lowing Garcia and Zangwill (1981). Then the transformed equality for the intermediaries’
optimality problem is given by
V IM (KP, , x , u , ✓) = max
KP,x,cIM
 
ln
 
cIM
 
+ ⇢E
⇥
V IM(KP, x, u, ✓+
⇤ 
subject to
cIM = (PA   PB) (x    x) + a(1   )K↵P, L  + (1   )KP,   KP
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and
(type I) 0 =  1,P+( )  {min [x(PA,+   PA)] + min [( x)(PB,+   PB)]
+a(1   )K↵PL  + (1   )KP} , (III.30a)
(type II) 0 =  2,P+( )  {min [x(PA,+   PA)] + min [( x)(PB,+   PB)] +KP}
(III.30b)
for all u+ 2 U . Here,
 1,P+( ) =
 
max
   1P+ , 0  2 ,
 2,P+( ) =
 
max
   2,P+ , 0  2
are the inequality multipliers in Garcia and Zangwill (1981).
III.B.3 First Order Conditions
The first order conditions for the intermediaries with two di↵erent friction types are given
by
1
cIM
= ⇢E

1
cIM+
 
a↵(1   )K↵ 1P L  + (1   )
  
+  1,P+(+)
 
a↵(1   )K↵ 1P L  + (1   )
 
, (III.31)
1
cIM
(PA   PB) = ⇢E

1
cIM+
(PA,+   PB,+)
 
+  1,P+(+){ xmin(PA,+) + (1  x)max(PA,+)  PA
  [ xmax(PB,+) + (1  x)min(PB,+)] + PB}. (III.32)
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in case of type I frictions and
1
cIM
= ⇢E

1
cIM+
 
a↵(1   )K↵ 1P L  + (1   )
  
+  2,P+(+), (III.33)
1
cIM
(PA   PB) = ⇢E

1
cIM+
(PA,+   PB,+)
 
+  2,P+(+){ xmin(PA,+) + (1  x)max(PA,+)  PA
  [ xmax(PB,+) + (1  x)min(PB,+)] + PB} (III.34)
in case of type II frictions, where x is the sign indicator of x. Here,
 1,P+(+) =
 
max
 
 1,P+ , 0
  2
,
 2,P+(+) =
 
max
 
 2,P+ , 0
  2
are the inequality multipliers in Garcia and Zangwill (1981).
The corresponding first order conditions for the households read
PA
cA
=  E

PA,+ + ✓+
cA+
 
, (III.36)
PB
cB
=  E

PB,+ + ✓+
cB+
 
. (III.37)
III.C Numerical Implementation
To derive a quantitative characterization of the equilibrium, we apply a similar approxi-
mation algorithm to approximate the equilibrium asset allocations and prices as in Ku¨bler
and Schmedders (2003).
The six budget constraint equations (III.20) through (III.25), the four market
clearing conditions (III.26) through (III.29), together with one collateral constraint
(III.30a)/(III.30b) and four first order condition equations (III.31), (III.33), (III.32) and
(III.34) constitute a non-linear system of equations in 19 unknowns. It consists of
• four price variables PA, PA,+, PB, PB,+,
• six consumption variables cIM, cIM+ , cA, cA+, cB, cB+,
113
• asset position variables x, x+, yA, yA,+, yB, yB,+,
• two capital accumulation levels KP, KP,+,
• and one multiplier  1,P+/ 2,P+ .
Denote the above equations as F (x ,KP, , u, u , ✓) = 015, where 0n is an n-dimensional
column vector of zeros.
We compute an approximate policy function via an iterative algorithm. In particular,
we assume that the values of the prices, the endogenous intermediaries’ financial asset
allocation and capital accumulation in the next period, PA,+, PB,+, x+ and KP,+, are
functions of the intermediaries’ current capital accumulation KP,  and financial asset
holdings x , which we denote as
⇣ : [ u, u]| {z }
x 
⇥ R+|{z}
KP, 
⇥U ⇥ U ⇥ S ! [ u, u]| {z }
x+
⇥ R|{z}
PA,+
⇥ R|{z}
PB,+
⇥ R+|{z}
KP,+
.
By approximating those variables as functions of current state, we manage to transform
F (x ,KP, , u, u , ✓) = 0 into a well-defined system of equations. As a starting point,
we choose a continuous function ⇣0 to serve as an initial guess to approximate the next
period’s prices, asset allocations and capital accumulation levels. During each iteration of
the algorithm, given the approximated next period prices and asset holdings ⇣n, we solve
the well-defined system to obtain the equilibrium prices and holdings in the current period.
We then move one period back, and update the approximation of ⇣n+1 by mapping the
current period values to the state variables. We define the convergence of the iteration by
a predetermined criterion. For some predetermined ✏ > 0,
sup
x ,KP, ,
u,u ,✓
k⇣n+1   ⇣nk  ✏.
The algorithm terminates once ⇣n+1 reaches convergence and we accept ⇣⇤ = ⇣n+1 as
approximated price and policy functions for the next period.
At the end, we will compute the maximum relative errors in Euler equations after
substituting the approximated value into the first order conditions to examine the quality
of the approximation. For errors that exceeds our preset criterion, we will restart the
above iteration with a lower ✏ as convergence threshold.
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III.C.1 Implementation Procedure
Specifically, we construct a piecewise linear spline with coe cient ⇠0 to obtain approxi-
mation ⇣0 as an initial set up. In each iteration given ⇣n, we solve the above system of
nonlinear equations (III.20) through (III.37) and thus obtain the value of current period
prices and control variables. Then we interpolate them against the state variables and
get an updated ⇣n+1 by updating the coe cient vectors ⇠n+1 and. Repeat this procedure
until the convergence of ⇠n+1.
III.C.2 Algorithm
We applied the following time iteration linear collocation algorithm similar to Ku¨bler and
Schmedders (2003) and Judd (1998).
• Step 0: select an error tolerance ✏ for the stopping criterion sup k⇣n+1   ⇣nk  ✏, a
finite grid composed of KP,  2 [0,K] and x  2 [ u, u] for each combination of (u ,
u, ✓) and the piecewise linear coe cients ⇠0 for a starting point ⇣0.
• Step 1: Given the piecewise linear coe cients ⇠n, or the approximation ⇣n, solve the
system of nonlinear equations (III.20) through (III.37), for the finite grids composed
of x 2 [ u, u] and KP,  2 [0,K], finding a solution (PA, PB, x, KP) in terms of
(KP, , x ).
• Step 2: Compute the new approximations ⇣n+1, that is, the new coe cient vectors
⇠n+1 by interpolating (PA, PB, x, KP) on (KP, , x ).
• Step 3: Check stopping criterion. If sup k⇣n+1 ⇣nk    then go to Step 4. Otherwise
increase n by 1 and go to Step 1.
• Step 4: The algorithm terminates. Set ⇣⇤ = ⇣n+1.
III.D Solutions of Four-Period Model Dynamics under Per-
fect Information
Table III.11 presents the equilibrium results under all possible paths of {ut}.
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Table III.11: Equilibrium solutions with all possible {ut} paths given perfect information.
Period ut K Loose X Loose CIM Loose Spread Bind. K Tight X Tight CIM Tight Spread Tight Bind. Tight
1 8 25.7063 4.8825 8.7235 0.9073 TRUE 25.6415 4.1848 8.7235 1.0430 TRUE
2 0 23.8442 1.5715 13.6477 0.3224 FALSE 23.9191 1.5498 13.6966 0.3213 FALSE
3 0 16.9419 0 18.8244 0 FALSE 16.9951 0 18.8834 0 FALSE
4 0 0 0 25.4129 0 FALSE 0 0 25.4927 0 FALSE
Period ut K Loose X Loose CIM Loose Spread Bind. K Tight X Tight CIM Tight Spread Tight Bind. Tight
1 8 25.7063 4.8825 8.7235 0.9073 TRUE 25.6415 4.1848 8.7235 1.0430 TRUE
2 0 23.8442 1.5715 13.6477 0.3224 FALSE 23.9191 1.5498 13.6966 0.3213 FALSE
3 8 18.0756 4.5189 18.5759 0.3003 TRUE 18.1310 4.5328 18.6396 0.2990 TRUE
4 0 0 0 27.1134 0 FALSE 0 0 27.1966 0 FALSE
Period ut K Loose X Loose CIM Loose Spread Bind. K Tight X Tight CIM Tight Spread Tight Bind. Tight
1 8 25.7063 4.8825 8.7235 0.9073 TRUE 25.6415 4.1848 8.7235 1.0430 TRUE
2 0 23.8442 1.5715 13.6477 0.3224 FALSE 23.9191 1.5498 13.6966 0.3213 FALSE
3 12 19.6518 4.9130 18.2867 0.6501 TRUE 19.7131 4.9283 18.3549 0.6480 TRUE
4 0 0 0 29.4778 0 FALSE 0 0 29.5696 0 FALSE
Period ut K Loose X Loose CIM Loose Spread Bind. K Tight X Tight CIM Tight Spread Tight Bind. Tight
1 8 25.7063 4.8825 8.7235 0.9073 TRUE 25.6415 4.1848 8.7235 1.0430 TRUE
2 0 23.8442 1.5715 13.6477 0.3224 FALSE 23.9191 1.5498 13.6966 0.3213 FALSE
3 20 26.1563 6.5391 17.5092 1.5901 TRUE 26.2169 6.5542 17.5910 1.5845 TRUE
4 0 0 0 39.2345 0 FALSE 0 0 39.3253 0 FALSE
Period ut K Loose X Loose CIM Loose Spread Bind. K Tight X Tight CIM Tight Spread Tight Bind. Tight
1 8 25.7063 4.8825 8.7235 0.9073 TRUE 25.6415 4.1848 8.7235 1.0430 TRUE
2 8 25.9756 5.6813 13.0890 0.6325 TRUE 25.8276 4.8418 13.0996 0.7078 TRUE
3 0 18.4563 0 20.5071 0 FALSE 18.3512 0 20.3902 0 FALSE
4 0 0 0 27.6845 0 FALSE 0 0 27.5267 0 FALSE
Period ut K Loose X Loose CIM Loose Spread Bind. K Tight X Tight CIM Tight Spread Tight Bind. Tight
1 8 25.7063 4.8825 8.7235 0.9073 TRUE 25.6415 4.1848 8.7235 1.0430 TRUE
2 8 25.9756 5.6813 13.0890 0.6325 TRUE 25.8276 4.8418 13.0996 0.7078 TRUE
3 8 19.0488 4.7622 19.6517 0.2861 TRUE 19.0534 4.7634 19.6656 0.2843 TRUE
4 0 0 0 28.5732 0 FALSE 0 0 28.5801 0 FALSE
Period ut K Loose X Loose CIM Loose Spread Bind. K Tight X Tight CIM Tight Spread Tight Bind. Tight
1 8 25.7063 4.8825 8.7235 0.9073 TRUE 25.6415 4.1848 8.7235 1.0430 TRUE
2 8 25.9756 5.6813 13.0890 0.6325 TRUE 25.8276 4.8418 13.0996 0.7078 TRUE
3 12 20.0354 5.0088 18.4699 0.6813 TRUE 20.1882 5.0471 18.6901 0.6672 TRUE
4 0 0 0 30.0530 0 FALSE 0 0 30.2823 0 FALSE
Period ut K Loose X Loose CIM Loose Spread Bind. K Tight X Tight CIM Tight Spread Tight Bind. Tight
1 8 25.7063 4.8825 8.7235 0.9073 TRUE 25.6415 4.1848 8.7235 1.0430 TRUE
2 8 25.9756 5.6813 13.0890 0.6325 TRUE 25.8276 4.8418 13.0996 0.7078 TRUE
3 20 25.6611 6.4153 14.7223 1.9346 TRUE 26.0506 6.5127 15.7399 1.8249 TRUE
4 0 0 0 38.4917 0 FALSE 0 0 39.0760 0 FALSE
III.E Solutions of Four-Period Model Dynamics under Im-
perfect Information
Table III.12 presents the equilibrium results under all possible paths of {ut} with
imperfection information.
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Period ut K Loose X Loose CIM Loose Spread Bind. K Tight X Tight CIM Tight Spread Tight Bind. Tight
1 8 25.7063 4.8825 8.7235 0.9073 TRUE 25.6415 4.1848 8.7235 1.0430 TRUE
2 12 27.0946 5.9725 12.5066 0.9558 TRUE 26.8581 5.0745 12.5502 1.06361 TRUE
3 0 19.2515 0 21.3905 0 FALSE 19.0834 0 21.2038 0 FALSE
4 0 0 0 28.8772 0 FALSE 0 0 28.6251 0 FALSE
Period ut K Loose X Loose CIM Loose Spread Bind. K Tight X Tight CIM Tight Spread Tight Bind. Tight
1 8 25.7063 4.8825 8.7235 0.9073 TRUE 25.6415 4.1848 8.7235 1.0430 TRUE
2 12 27.0946 5.9725 12.5066 0.9558 TRUE 26.8581 5.0745 12.5502 1.0636 TRUE
3 8 19.8220 4.9555 20.5472 0.2683 TRUE 19.7637 4.9409 20.4877 0.2681 TRUE
4 0 0 0 29.7329 0 FALSE 0 0 29.6455 0 FALSE
Period ut K Loose X Loose CIM Loose Spread Bind. K Tight X Tight CIM Tight Spread Tight Bind. Tight
1 8 25.7063 4.8825 8.7235 0.9073 TRUE 25.6415 4.1848 8.7235 1.0430 TRUE
2 12 27.0946 5.9725 12.5066 0.9558 TRUE 26.8581 5.0745 12.5502 1.0636 TRUE
3 12 20.8153 5.2038 19.3205 0.6585 TRUE 20.9085 5.2271 19.4774 0.6464 TRUE
4 0 0 0 31.2229 0 FALSE 0 0 31.3627 0 FALSE
Period ut K Loose X Loose CIM Loose Spread Bind. K Tight X Tight CIM Tight Spread Tight Bind. Tight
1 8 25.7063 4.8825 8.7235 0.9073 TRUE 25.6415 4.1848 8.7235 1.0430 TRUE
2 12 27.0946 5.9725 12.5066 0.9558 TRUE 26.8581 5.0745 12.5502 1.0636 TRUE
3 20 26.3473 6.5868 15.4548 1.8883 TRUE 26.6950 6.6737 16.4430 1.7825 TRUE
4 0 0 0 39.5209 0 FALSE 0 0 40.0424 0 FALSE
Period ut K Loose X Loose CIM Loose Spread Bind. K Tight X Tight CIM Tight Spread Tight Bind. Tight
1 8 25.7063 4.8825 8.7235 0.9073 TRUE 25.6415 4.1848 8.7235 1.0430 TRUE
2 20 32.0389 7.3092 10.9442 1.8229 TRUE 32.0392 6.2874 10.9027 2.1305 TRUE
3 0 22.7645 0 25.2939 0 FALSE 22.7647 0 25.2941 0 FALSE
4 0 0 0 34.1467 0 FALSE 0 0 34.1470 0 FALSE
Period ut K Loose X Loose CIM Loose Spread Bind. K Tight X Tight CIM Tight Spread Tight Bind. Tight
1 8 25.7063 4.8825 8.7235 0.9073 TRUE 25.6415 4.1848 8.7235 1.0430 TRUE
2 20 32.0389 7.3092 10.9442 1.8229 TRUE 32.0392 6.2874 10.9027 2.1305 TRUE
3 8 23.2132 5.8033 24.5565 0.1917 TRUE 23.3022 5.8256 24.6694 0.1888 TRUE
4 0 0 0 34.8198 0 FALSE 0 0 34.9534 0 FALSE
Period ut K Loose X Loose CIM Loose Spread Bind. K Tight X Tight CIM Tight Spread Tight Bind. Tight
1 8 25.7063 4.8825 8.7235 0.9073 TRUE 25.6415 4.1848 8.7235 1.0430 TRUE
2 20 32.0389 7.3092 10.9442 1.8229 TRUE 32.0392 6.2874 10.9027 2.1305 TRUE
3 12 24.2253 6.0563 23.1275 0.5631 TRUE 24.4869 6.1217 23.4811 0.5479 TRUE
4 0 0 0 36.3379 0 FALSE 0 0 36.7303 0 FALSE
Period ut K Loose X Loose CIM Loose Spread Bind. K Tight X Tight CIM Tight Spread Tight Bind. Tight
1 8 25.7063 4.8825 8.7235 0.9073 TRUE 25.6415 4.1848 8.7235 1.0430 TRUE
2 20 32.0389 7.3092 10.9442 1.8229 TRUE 32.0392 6.2874 10.9027 2.1305 TRUE
3 20 29.3671 7.3418 18.7466 1.7019 TRUE 29.9215 7.4804 20.0336 1.5897 TRUE
4 0 0 0 44.0507 0 FALSE 0 0 44.8823 0 FALSE
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Table III.12: Equilibrium solutions with all possible {ut} paths given imperfect informa-
tion.
Period ut K Loose X Loose CIM Loose Spread Bind. K Tight X Tight CIM Tight Spread Tight Bind. Tight
1 8 25.6586 4.8850 8.7235 0.8971 TRUE 25.5934 4.1843 8.7235 1.0317 TRUE
2 0 23.7926 1.5319 13.6289 0.3180 FALSE 23.8660 1.5106 13.6767 0.3169 FALSE
3 0 16.9053 0 18.7836 0 FALSE 16.9574 0 18.8415 0 FALSE
4 0 0 0 25.3579 0 FALSE 0 0 25.4361 0 FALSE
Period ut K Loose X Loose CIM Loose Spread Bind. K Tight X Tight CIM Tight Spread Tight Bind. Tight
1 8 25.6586 4.8850 8.7235 0.8971 TRUE 25.5934 4.1843 8.7235 1.0317 TRUE
2 0 23.7926 1.5319 13.6289 0.3180 FALSE 23.8660 1.5106 13.6767 0.3169 FALSE
3 8 18.0446 4.5111 18.5410 0.3010 TRUE 18.0989 4.5247 18.6033 0.29968 TRUE
4 0 0 0 27.0669 0 FALSE 0 0 27.1484 0 FALSE
Period ut K Loose X Loose CIM Loose Spread Bind. K Tight X Tight CIM Tight Spread Tight Bind. Tight
1 8 25.6586 4.8850 8.7235 0.8971 TRUE 25.5934 4.1843 8.7235 1.0317 TRUE
2 0 23.7926 1.5319 13.6289 0.3180 FALSE 23.8660 1.5106 13.6767 0.3169 FALSE
3 12 19.6247 4.9062 18.2592 0.6505 TRUE 19.6847 4.9212 18.3260 0.6485 TRUE
4 0 0 0 29.4370 0 FALSE 0 0 29.5271 0 FALSE
Period ut K Loose X Loose CIM Loose Spread Bind. K Tight X Tight CIM Tight Spread Tight Bind. Tight
1 8 25.6586 4.8850 8.7235 0.8971 TRUE 25.5934 4.1843 8.7235 1.0317 TRUE
2 0 23.7926 1.5319 13.6289 0.3180 FALSE 23.8660 1.5106 13.6767 0.3169 FALSE
3 20 26.1361 6.5340 17.5023 1.5892 TRUE 26.1954 6.5489 17.5825 1.5837 TRUE
4 0 0 0 39.2042 0 FALSE 0 0 39.2932 0 FALSE
Period ut K Loose X Loose CIM Loose Spread Bind. K Tight X Tight CIM Tight Spread Tight Bind. Tight
1 8 25.6586 4.8850 8.7235 0.8971 TRUE 25.5934 4.1843 8.7235 1.0317 TRUE
2 8 25.9014 5.6621 13.0733 0.6263 TRUE 25.7572 4.8260 13.0830 0.7015 TRUE
3 0 18.4036 0 20.4484 0 FALSE 18.3012 0 20.3346 0 FALSE
4 0 0 0 27.6054 0 FALSE 0 0 27.4517 0 FALSE
Period ut K Loose X Loose CIM Loose Spread Bind. K Tight X Tight CIM Tight Spread Tight Bind. Tight
1 8 25.6586 4.8850 8.7235 0.8971 TRUE 25.5934 4.1843 8.7235 1.0317 TRUE
2 8 25.9014 5.6621 13.0733 0.6263 TRUE 25.7572 4.8260 13.0830 0.7015 TRUE
3 8 18.9974 4.7494 19.5924 0.2872 TRUE 19.0048 4.7512 19.6096 0.2854 TRUE
4 0 0 0 28.4961 0 FALSE 0 0 28.5072 0 FALSE
Period ut K Loose X Loose CIM Loose Spread Bind. K Tight X Tight CIM Tight Spread Tight Bind. Tight
1 8 25.6586 4.8850 8.7235 0.8971 TRUE 25.5934 4.1843 8.7235 1.0317 TRUE
2 8 25.9014 5.6621 13.0733 0.6263 TRUE 25.7572 4.8260 13.0830 0.7015 TRUE
3 12 19.9835 4.9959 18.4136 0.6828 TRUE 20.1389 5.0347 18.6364 0.6686 TRUE
4 0 0 0 29.9753 0 FALSE 0 0 30.2084 0 FALSE
Period ut K Loose X Loose CIM Loose Spread Bind. K Tight X Tight CIM Tight Spread Tight Bind. Tight
1 8 25.6586 4.8850 8.7235 0.8971 TRUE 25.5934 4.1843 8.7235 1.0317 TRUE
2 8 25.9014 5.6621 13.0733 0.6263 TRUE 25.7572 4.8260 13.0830 0.7015 TRUE
3 20 25.6156 6.4039 14.6738 1.9377 TRUE 26.0066 6.5017 15.6920 1.8278 TRUE
4 0 0 0 38.4233 0 FALSE 0 0 39.0099 0 FALSE
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Period ut K Loose X Loose CIM Loose Spread Bind. K Tight X Tight CIM Tight Spread Tight Bind. Tight
1 8 25.6586 4.8850 8.7235 0.8971 TRUE 25.5934 4.1843 8.7235 1.0317 TRUE
2 12 27.0133 5.9512 12.4883 0.9508 TRUE 26.7815 5.0571 12.5321 1.0582 TRUE
3 0 19.1937 0 21.3263 0 FALSE 19.0290 0 21.1433 0 FALSE
4 0 0 0 28.7905 0 FALSE 0 0 28.5435 0 FALSE
Period ut K Loose X Loose CIM Loose Spread Bind. K Tight X Tight CIM Tight Spread Tight Bind. Tight
1 8 25.6586 4.8850 8.7235 0.8971 TRUE 25.5934 4.1843 8.7235 1.0317 TRUE
2 12 27.0133 5.9512 12.4883 0.9508 TRUE 26.7815 5.0571 12.5321 1.0582 TRUE
3 8 19.7659 4.94146372 20.4819408 0.26957766 TRUE 19.7110 4.92774665 20.4265031 0.2693186 TRUE
4 0 0 0 29.6487823 0 FALSE 0 0 29.5664799 0 FALSE
Period ut K Loose X Loose CIM Loose Spread Bind. K Tight X Tight CIM Tight Spread Tight Bind. Tight
1 8 25.6586 4.8850 8.7235 0.8971 TRUE 25.5934 4.1843 8.7235 1.0317 TRUE
2 12 27.0133 5.9512 12.4883 0.9508 TRUE 26.7815 5.0571 12.5321 1.0582 TRUE
3 12 20.7587 5.1897 19.2586 0.6602 TRUE 20.8551 5.2138 19.4187767 0.6479 TRUE
4 0 0 0 31.1381 0 FALSE 0 0 31.2826 0 FALSE
Period ut K Loose X Loose CIM Loose Spread Bind. K Tight X Tight CIM Tight Spread Tight Bind. Tight
1 8 25.6586 4.8850 8.7235 0.8971 TRUE 25.5934 4.1843 8.7235 1.0317 TRUE
2 12 27.0133 5.9512 12.4883 0.9508 TRUE 26.7815 5.0571 12.5321 1.0582 TRUE
3 20 26.2975 6.5744 15.4014 1.8916 TRUE 26.6471 6.6618 16.3906 1.7856 TRUE
4 0 0 0 39.4462 0 FALSE 0 0 39.9707 0 FALSE
Period ut K Loose X Loose CIM Loose Spread Bind. K Tight X Tight CIM Tight Spread Tight Bind. Tight
1 8 25.6586 4.8850 8.7235 0.8971 TRUE 25.5934 4.1843 8.7235 1.0317 TRUE
2 20 31.9534 7.2854 10.9137 1.8243 TRUE 31.9577 6.2678 10.87427 2.1320 TRUE
3 0 22.7038 0 25.2264 0 FALSE 22.7068 0 25.2298 0 FALSE
4 0 0 0 34.0556 0 FALSE 0 0 34.0602 0 FALSE
Period ut K Loose X Loose CIM Loose Spread Bind. K Tight X Tight CIM Tight Spread Tight Bind. Tight
1 8 25.6586 4.8850 8.7235 0.8971 TRUE 25.5934 4.1843 8.7235 1.0317 TRUE
2 20 31.9534 7.2854 10.9137 1.8243 TRUE 31.9577 6.2678 10.87427 2.1320 TRUE
3 8 23.1548924 5.7887 24.4864 0.1930 TRUE 23.2470 5.8117 24.6030 0.1900 TRUE
4 0 0 0 34.7323 0 FALSE 0 0 34.8705 0 FALSE
Period ut K Loose X Loose CIM Loose Spread Bind. K Tight X Tight CIM Tight Spread Tight Bind. Tight
1 8 25.6586 4.8850 8.7235 0.8971 TRUE 25.5934 4.1843 8.7235 1.0317 TRUE
2 20 31.9534 7.2854 10.9137 1.8243 TRUE 31.9577 6.2678 10.87427 2.1320 TRUE
3 12 24.1668 6.0417 23.0610 0.5647 TRUE 24.4311 6.1078 23.4175 0.5493 TRUE
4 0 0 0 36.2501 0 FALSE 0 0 36.6467 0 FALSE
Period ut K Loose X Loose CIM Loose Spread Bind. K Tight X Tight CIM Tight Spread Tight Bind. Tight
1 8 25.6586 4.8850 8.7235 0.8971 TRUE 25.5934 4.1843 8.7235 1.0317 TRUE
2 20 31.9534 7.2854 10.9137 1.8243 TRUE 31.9577 6.2678 10.87427 2.120 TRUE
3 20 29.3151 7.3288 18.6890 1.7049 TRUE 29.8709 7.4677 19.9765 1.5925 TRUE
4 0 0 0 43.9727 0 FALSE 0 0 44.8064 0 FALSE
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Chapter IV
Arbitrage, Financial Accelerator, and
Sudden Market Freezes
We develop an infinite horizon model that links the intermediation in both the
financial and real sectors. Intermediaries provide market liquidity and exploit
the arbitrage profits in segmented financial markets. To do so, they use their
productive capital as collateral. We show that the weakened intermediation and
arbitrage losses are mutually reinforcing during an economic downturn. This
forces intermediaries to de-lever and leads to liquidity spirals in both financial
and real sectors. Also, the distress might further open up the possibility of
sudden run-like market freezes, where intermediaries are denied access to
renewed funding through arbitrage. We evaluate the e↵ect of three intervention
policies: direct purchase of distressed assets, interest rate cuts, and capital
injection. We find that capital injection is most e↵ective as it loosens the
margin requirement. The interest cut is least e↵ective because it exacerbates
the capital misallocation.
Keywords: limit of arbitrage, financial intermediary, haircut, segmented
markets, financial crises, market liquidity, collateral constraints
JEL Classification: D52 D58 E44 G01 G12
Suggested Bibliographic Citation: Zhang, Ally Quan, Arbitrage, Finan-
cial Accelerator, and Sudden Market Freezes (October 3, 2017). Available at
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IV.1 Introduction
There are two distinct approaches in the theoretical literature to capture the relationship
between limits of arbitrage and the financial intermediaries, as well as the crises caused
by intermediation failure. The first, in the finance literature and pioneered by Shleifer
and Vishny (1997), focuses on how financial frictions hinder arbitrageurs’ capability to
fully eliminate the mispricings in financial markets. A contraction in the arbitrageurs’
capital weakens their ability to speculate in the price anomalies. In turn, this might
further exacerbate mispricings, trigger the liquidity and loss spirals, and eventually lead
to the market collapse. The other approach, summarized by Gertler et al. (2016) in
the macroeconomic literature, emphasizes how financial frictions give rise to limits of
arbitrage reflected in the real sector via the credit cycle. Fueled by high leverage ratios,
tiny negative shocks can propagate into heavy contractions in borrower’s wealth, further
depressing collateral price and raising the credit spreads. Moreover, liquidity mismatch
can also render banks vulnerable to the threat of runs.
Nonetheless, less attention has been paid to the interactions between limits of arbitrage
in the financial markets and that in the real sector. We aim to fill the gap by connecting
the arbitrage trading in the financial market and the intermediation in the real sector via
collateral constraints. We are also interested in providing an alternative perspective on
explaining both the linear and non-linear aspects of the market collapse.
Rather than modeling the market collapse through explicit credit cycles, our approach
focuses on the intermediation failure associated with arbitrage trading. The market freezes
when all arbitrageurs become insolvent and are denied access to renewed funding. Put it
di↵erently, the whole intermediary sector is excluded from exploiting arbitrage profits and
from intermediation of productive capital altogether. As a result, the market liquidity
dries up in both financial and real sectors. Our motivation draws heavily from the
recent episodes. During the 1998 hedge fund crisis and the 2007–2009 subprime crisis,
many quantitative broker-dealers, who had engaged in various arbitrage trade strategies,
su↵ered huge losses. They were then haunted by margin calls and forced into fire sales.
For example, in March of 2008, Bear Stearns’ counterparties altogether terminated their
brokerage relationships and ran on it. In September 2008, several counterparties requested
additional collateral from AIG for its credit default swap positions. Had the Fed not
intervened, such requests would have driven the firm out of market. In October 2008,
almost all the major quant funds and investment banks suddenly failed, credit spreads
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soared, and markets for many financial securities froze. The distress quickly spilled over
to the real sector. Though absent from any significant adverse shocks, the output and the
real investment experienced an eight and a forty percent sharp contraction, respectively.
To capture this phenomenon, we develop a simple model to incorporate the arbitrage
trading and the real activities, which features financial accelerator e↵ects, market
co-movement and sudden self-fulfilling market freezes. As a complementary approach to
modeling the transmission channel of the financial distress, we focus on the pecuniary
externality when arbitrageurs unwind their trading positions. We show that such
externality can generate a much more amplified contraction in arbitrageurs’ budget during
an economic downturn, triggering the liquidity to dry up across markets and opening the
door for self-fulfilling crises. As a result, a very moderate leverage ratio can produce strong
financial accelerator e↵ects and render the economy susceptible to run-like market freezes.
In particular, we consider an infinite horizon, small and open economy with a fixed
supply of capital and two segmented financial markets. There are two types of price-taking
agents: the household investors and the intermediaries. Similar to Gromb and Vayanos
(2017), household investors live in segmented markets and they are subject to negatively
correlated endowment shocks. Thus, households in di↵erent markets have opposite hedging
demands to smooth their consumptions, giving rise to price discrepancies between identical
financial securities. The intermediaries, on the other hand, assume dual roles in our model.
On one hand, they are arbitrageurs who can trade in both segmented financial markets.
While exploiting the price spreads, they also provide liquidity to each market. Meanwhile,
they are more e cient in managing productive capital than the households. Moreover,
agents can use capital as collateral in the financial markets.
Due to the margin requirement, the market liquidity in the financial markets, measured
by intermediaries’ arbitrage capability, a↵ects and is a↵ected by the market liquidity
of capital in the real sector. An initial contraction in net worth during an economic
downturn forces intermediaries to sell some of their collateral, depressing the capital price
and increasing the haircut rate. This in turn tightens the margin requirement and further
hinders intermediaries’ capability to exploit arbitrage profits. This is because with less
collateral, they have to unwind some of their arbitrage positions. As intermediaries fail
to internalize the price e↵ects when they collectively do so, they also su↵er losses on their
initial positions. Thus, the worsening balance sheet condition triggers more fire sale of
capital and aggressive unwinding. While intermediaries’ financial losses reinforce their
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weakened intermediation capacity, the market liquidity quickly dries up in both financial
and capital markets.
Similar to Gertler and Kiyotaki (2015), apart from the recession caused by the
procyclical movement of market liquidity, crises can also occur as a sunspot phenomenon.
Due to liquidity mismatch in di↵erent sectors, a sudden market freeze may be possible.
The existence of such an equilibrium relies on three critical factors: 1) intermediaries’
net worth; 2) the liquidation capital price and 3) asset price spreads. A heavy portfolio
loss can render intermediaries vulnerable to sudden bankruptcy during a market freeze,
though they are immune to funding failure in normal times.
Our specific modeling of the sudden market freeze follows the approach as in Cole
and Kehoe (2000)’s self-fulfilling debt crises and Gertler and Kiyotaki (2015)’s bank runs.
In these papers, the sunspot self-fulfilling crises arise from a panic failure to roll over
short-term debt. The market freeze here, however, reflects a denial of intermediaries’
access to arbitrage trading as a critical part of their funding sources.
We also use the model as a laboratory to quantitatively evaluate government
interventions. Starting from the state shortly after the market freeze, we track the
recovery paths conditional on three common intervention policies: (i) capital injection
by infusing equity or lending loans to the intermediaries; (ii) direct purchase of capital by
the government; (iii) lowering the interest rate. In our experiment, we compare the direct
capital purchase to the same amount of equity infusion. As in He and Krishnamurthy
(2013), we find that equity infusion is much more e↵ective in stimulating the economy
and helping the intermediary sector to recover faster. This is because part of the friction
in our model comes from the constraint on intermediaries’ net worth. Accordingly, direct
funding support to intermediaries can most e↵ectively restore the overall e ciency and
revive the economy.
By acting as buyers in the capital market, the government helps mitigate the sharp
contraction in aggregate output, raise the capital price and in turn alleviate the margin
requirement in the financial markets. However, this comes at the cost of slowing down the
recapitalization of the intermediary sector in the long run, as the government purchase
partially crowds out intermediaries in the capital market by raising their marginal cost.
Comparably, we find that the interest rate policy has rather limited stimulating e↵ects.
Except for moderately raising the capital price at the beginning, lowering the interest rate
overall exacerbates the ine ciency in asset allocation and slows down the recovery process
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as a whole. This occurs because in our model the leverage of intermediaries does not rely
on the credit channel explicitly. The interest cut instead leads the less e cient households
to flood the capital market, pushing out intermediaries and thus hindering their capability
to recapitalize.
The key contribution of our paper is to work out an equilibrium model linking
intermediation in both financial and real sectors, and is dynamic, parsimonious and
tractable. It complements a growing theoretical literature on the limits of arbitrage, and
especially to the strand focusing on the arbitrageurs’ margin requirement. We contribute
to this literature by associating the collateral constraints with intermediation in the real
sector.
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) are the first to study how trading restrictions may
a↵ect arbitrageurs’ capability to correct mispricing. Due to frictions arising from the
asymmetric information and moral hazard, arbitrageurs bear insolvency risk under the
margin requirement.
Our setup of arbitrage trading borrows heavily from Gromb and Vayanos (2002, 2017).
They develop a general equilibrium model in which collateral constrained arbitrageurs
intermediate trade across segmented markets. Our main departure from these models is
that we allow for a broader range of assets (as opposed to only the riskless asset) to serve
as collateral in the financial market. This enables us to study the spillover e↵ects between
the financial and real sector. Also, instead of emphasizing the self-correcting dynamics
and cross-sectional relationship as in Gromb and Vayanos (2017), our model stresses the
amplification and spillover e↵ects, as well as the nonlinear nature of intermediation failure.
Our paper also shares similarities with many other models featuring financially
constrained arbitrageurs. To name a few, Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) study the
feedback loops of arbitrageurs’ funding liquidity and market liquidity, and how they
interact through the collateral constraints. There the funding liquidity captures the
arbitrageurs’ capability of raising debt to facilitate the arbitrage trading. Our principle
di↵erence lies in the source and the objective of arbitrageurs’ funding. In our model, the
major funding comes from arbitrage profits rather than from direct borrowing, and it is
used to acquire productive capital. Hence, the funding liquidity is reflected by the market
liquidity of financial assets. In He and Krishnamurthy (2012, 2013), arbitrageurs can raise
funds from other investors to invest in a risky financial security, but this external funding
cannot exceed a given ratio of their own wealth. Consistent with our policy implication, He
and Krishnamurthy (2013) demonstrate that ex post equity injection is a superior policy
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compared to interest rate cuts or asset purchasing programs by the government. Liu and
Longsta↵ (2004) study the optimal arbitrage strategy of risk-averse, collateral-constrained
arbitrageurs in a partial equilibrium. Xiong (2001) and Kyle and Xiong (2001) examine the
impact of arbitrage capital on asset prices by analyzing the wealth e↵ects of arbitrageurs
with log utility in a continuous-time model. However, the above papers do not study the
ine ciency caused by capital misallocation.
In addition, our paper is also related to macro models stressing the financial accelerator
e↵ects. (See e.g., Bernanke and Gertler (1989); Kiyotaki and Moore (1997); Bernanke et al.
(1999); Kocherlakota (2000); Gertler et al. (2012); Gertler and Kiyotaki (2015); Gertler
et al. (2016)). These models highlight the feedback loop from the fall in collateral prices
to a fall in credit capacity. Key to this mechanism is the role of leverage: the exposure of
balance sheets to systemic risk is increasing in the degree of borrowers’ leverage. We di↵er
by identifying the price externality of the arbitrage activities. Instead of facing fixed debt
commitment, intermediaries su↵er increasing mark-to-market losses when they collectively
unwind their arbitrage positions. In this respect, some recent works also underscore similar
externality, as borrowers do not internalize the impact of their own leverage decisions on
the systemic risk. Examples include Lorenzoni (2008); Bianchi (2011); Chari and Kehoe
(2016); and Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014).
Our paper also joins the literature characterizing the nonlinear nature of financial
crises. One strand features the occasionally binding borrowing constraints as the source
of nonlinearity. Examples are Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014); He and Krishnamurthy
(2014); Mendoza (2010). In these models, a negative shock might shift the economy
into a crisis state with binding credit constraints, in which shocks get amplified and the
intermediation is disrupted. Another stream to address the nonlinearity is through network
interactions, e.g., Gaˆrleanu et al. (2015). Yet another approach is to model the discrete
and sudden nature of crises as an abrupt cease of financing possibilities, such as bank
runs. Pioneered by Diamond and Dybvig (1983), recent work includes Cole and Kehoe
(2000); Ennis and Keister (2003); Uhlig (2010); Gorton and Metrick (2012); Angeloni and
Faia (2013); Martin et al. (2014); Gertler and Kiyotaki (2015); Boissay et al. (2016) and
Gertler et al. (2016, 2017). Our modeling of market freezes belongs to this approach.
Both the externality and the sudden stop of arbitrage trading provide the source of the
nonlinearity. Di↵erent from Gertler and Kiyotaki (2015) and Gertler et al. (2016, 2017),
the externality in our model gives rise to a procyclical optimal maximum leverage ratio,
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Figure IV.1: The structure of the economic system.
which tightens the margin constraints in a downturn and thus strengthens the nonlinear
e↵ects.
IV.2 Baseline Model
Figure IV.1 lays out the building blocks of our model. We consider a discrete time, infinite
horizon, small and open economy with two segmented markets, market A and B. There
are two types of competitive agents: household investors within each single market and
specialized intermediaries. Each constitute a continuum of unit measure.
Within each segmented market, there exists an identical, long-lived risky financial
asset, which pays out dividends in every period and is each in zero net supply. We identify
them in di↵erent markets as asset A and B. Households in market A (B) can only trade
asset A (B). As will become clear later, households’ demands for the risky asset is opposite
in market A and B. Besides, all agents have access to a riskless financial asset with an
exogenous return r > 0.
In the production sector, there are two types of goods: the perishable one as nume´raire,
and the durable one as productive capital. The capital doesn’t depreciate and is fixed in
total supply, which we normalize to be unity. Both intermediaries and households can
hold and operate on the capital.
Intermediaries can exploit arbitrage profits through intermediating between segmented
markets. They reinvest part of the profits to acquire the capital. As opposed to studying
the mechanism of intermediation in the credit cycle like those seminal papers such as
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Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), we are centrally interested
in the intermediary channel of speculative security trading.
IV.2.1 Risky Assets
The risky assets that we model here is similar to the ones in Gromb and Vayanos (2017).
In period t, it pays out a dividend dt:
dt = d¯+ ✓t. (IV.1)
d¯ is a positive constant, and ✓t is a sequence of independent identically distributed (i.i.d)
random variables, whose probability density function is symmetric around zero over the
bounded support
⇥ ✓¯, ✓¯⇤. We denote P it as the ex-dividend price of asset i in period t,
i 2 {A,B}. The asset’s risk premium in period t is given by
 it =
d¯
r
  P it , (IV.2)
the present value of expected future dividends discounted at the riskless rate r, minus the
current price.
As in Gromb and Vayanos (2017), the assumption of identical payo↵s is for expositional
convenience. The aim is to reflect the real world mispricings among assets or portfolios
of similar payo↵s, yet traded at significantly di↵erent prices. Examples include (i) bonds
and their corresponding CDS, (ii) Siamese-twin stocks, traded in di↵erent exchanges with
identical dividends, (iii) Chinese A and B shares of stocks, (iv) the two legs of covered
interest arbitrage strategies in the currency markets. The modeling of bounded support of
✓t is to facilitate the derivation of the collateral constraint on which we will elaborate later.
Further, the zero net supply assumption is to ensure that intermediaries will hold opposite
positions in the risky asset across markets and are thus immune from the randomness of
the asset payo↵s.
IV.2.2 Production
We adopt a similar setting of productivity di↵erences between intermediaries and
households as in Gertler and Kiyotaki (2015). In particular, we assume that when one
128
intermediary operates on kIMt units of capital in period t, there is a payo↵ of Zt+1k
IM
t
units of consumption goods in period t + 1 plus the residual capital, where Zt+1 is a
multiplicative aggregate shock to productivity.
date t date t+ 1
kIMt capital
o
!
8<: Zt+1kIMt output,kIMt capital.
We also suppose that when the households invest kit units of capital at t for a payo↵ at
t+1, they are facing a management cost of f
 
Qtkit
 
units of perishable goods at t, where
Qt is the capital price. Specifically,
date t date t+ 1
kit capital
f
 
kit
 
goods
9=; !
8<: Zt+1kit output,kit capital.
The management cost is intended to capture the households’ lack of competence relative to
intermediaries, such as commercial and investment banks or hedge funds, in screening and
monitoring investment projects. Or they are not as specialized or sophisticated investors as
those financial experts in analyzing and deciphering the complicated securitized products.
Further, we assume that for household investors, the management cost is increasing and
convex in the total value of their capital holdings:
f(Qt, k
i
t) =
a
2
Qt(k
i
t)
2,
with a > 0. The cost function implies that households’ management burden increases with
the price and the size of their capital. Thus, it becomes more expensive at the margin for
households to manage capital directly.
As explained in Gertler and Kiyotaki (2015), without financial frictions, the more
e cient intermediaries will manage all the capital stock and households do not directly
invest in production. However, if the intermediaries cannot a↵ord to finance the purchase
of all capital, households will directly hold some of it. Moreover, to the extent that the
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intermediaries’ purchasing capability becomes more constrained in a recession, as will be
the case in our model, households’ total share of capital will expand.
IV.2.3 Households
Households are competitive and infinitely lived. They consume in each period and have
negative exponential utility. They save by investing in financial assets and capital. In
period t, a typical household in market i chooses positions
 
yis
 
s t and
 
Bis
 
s t in the
risky and riskless securities, the capital holdings
 
kis
 
s t and consumption
 
cis
 
s t to
maximize
 Et
" 1X
s=t
 s t exp
  ↵cis 
#
,
where ↵ is the coe cient of absolute risk aversion and   is the subjective discount factor.
The assumption of negative exponential utility rules out wealth e↵ects on asset pricing
and facilitates our later analysis.
The market segmentation of the risky assets simply means that households in market
A cannot trade asset B directly with those in market B and vice versa. This assumption
is to reflect the high cost faced by investors in di↵erent countries or di↵erent markets, due
to regulatory constraints or informational asymmetries.
Similar to the settings in Gromb and Vayanos (2017), we assume that households in
markets A and B receive random endowments, which a↵ect their demand to hold risky
assets. In period t, households in market i receive an endowment shock equal to
uit 1✓t, i 2 {A,B},
where uit 1 is known in period t   1. We refer uit as the shock intensity and the random
variable ✓t as the shock unit. As uit is always revealed one period earlier than the shock
unit, households know their hedging demands in advance.
To ensure that the demands of asset A and B di↵er and thus also their prices, we
assume ut := uAt =  uBt > 0 for expositional convenience. This assumption, together with
that of zero net supply, simplifies our analysis by ensuring that intermediaries’ positions
in asset A and B are opposite.
As uAt > 0, households in market A receive an endowment which is positively correlated
with the shock unit ✓t and hence with asset A’s payo↵. Therefore, asset A becomes
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riskier and less desirable for households in market A. By contrast, asset B becomes more
attractive for local households. In the absence of market segmentation, households in the
two markets can directly trade ut units of risky assets with each other, realizing full risk
sharing and price parity. However, the market segmentation implies that without further
intermediation the price of asset A is lower than that in the full risk sharing case, while
asset B’s price is higher. This leads to a potential arbitrage opportunity for intermediaries
who can trade risky assets in both markets. They can lock in profits by longing asset A
and shorting asset B. In doing so, intermediaries essentially provide liquidity to households
as they allow them to hedge.
Our assumptions regarding the risky asset and household investors aim to resemble
real-world examples. For instance, in the bond markets, the household investors can
represent those institutions, which are obliged to hold bonds with particular coupon rates
and times to maturity, such as pension funds or insurance companies. Their specific
demands could stem from asset-liability management purpose or tax considerations.
Similarly in the equity markets, domestic-equity mutual funds are often constrained to
invest only in local stock markets. Domestic investment inflows and outflows might
determine their asset demands, which correspond to our endowment shocks, thus giving
rise to significant demand and price discrepancies in similar stocks traded in di↵erent
countries.
Accordingly, households in market i, i 2 A,B, are subject to the following budget
constraint.
cit = y
i
t 1
 
dt + P
i
t
 | {z }
value and dividend
of risky asset
holdings
+ (Zt +Qt) k
i
t 1| {z }
value and output
of capital holdings
+(1 + r)Bit 1| {z }
return from
the riskless
asset
+ uit 1✓t| {z }
endowment
shocks
  yitP it  Qtkit  Bit| {z }
investment on
financial assets
and capital
  a
2
Qt
 
kit
 2| {z }
management
cost
. (IV.3)
Here, consumption, saving, investment and the management cost are financed by the
endowment as well as returns on the saving and investment from previous period.
Thus, the first order condition for riskless assets is given by
Et [ t,t+1] (1 + r) = 1, (IV.4)
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where the stochastic discount factor  t,t+1 satisfies
 t,t+1 =   exp
  ↵  cit+1   cit  . (IV.5)
Given all agents have perfect foresight of aggregate productivity {Zs}s t in period t in
our baseline model, the first order condition for direct capital holdings is given by
Et [ t,t+1RK,t+1] = 1 (IV.6)
with
RK,t+1 =
Zt+1 +Qt+1
Qt + f 0K
 
Qt, kit
  = Zt+1 +Qt+1
Qt
 
1 + akit
  = 1 + r,
where RK,t+1 is the households’ gross marginal rate of return from direct capital holdings.
In equilibrium it should be equal to the return of the riskless assets.
Note that as long as the households have some positive share of the capital, the first
order condition (IV.6) will help determine the market price of capital. Also, the capital
price tends to decrease in the households’ capital share as the marginal cost f 0K(Qt, k
i
t) is
increasing. As we will discuss later, in the wake of financial distress, intermediaries are
forced to liquidate their capital, which will further depress the price. In the limiting case
of a total collapse of the intermediary sector, households absorb all the capital and the
price slumps to a minimum level.
Likewise, the first order condition for the risky asset i is given by
Et

 t,t+1
P it+1 + dt+1
P it
 
= 1. (IV.7)
We denote the excess return per share of asset i (i 2 {A,B}) relative to the riskless asset
as
Rit+1 ⌘ dt+1 + P it+1   (1 + r)P it = (1 + r) it    it+1 + ✓t+1,
where the second step follows from (IV.1) and (IV.2). In our baseline model, we assume
that agents also have perfect foresight of the shock intensity {uis}s t and thus the risk
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premia are deterministic. For simplicity, we refer to
 it ⌘ (1 + r) it    it+1,
as the expected excess return of asset i and we present a more revealing first order condition
for the risky assets below.
Proposition IV.1. The household’s optimal position in asset i is given by the first order
condition
✓¯g0
 ⇥
uit + y
i
t
⇤
✓¯
 
=  it, (IV.8)
where the function g(x) is defined by
exp {↵g(x)} ⌘ E

exp
⇢
 ↵x✓t
✓¯
  
.
The function g(x) is non-negative, symmetric around the vertical axis, and strictly convex,
with limx!1 g0(x) = 1.
If we view the expected excess return of asset i,  it as the marginal benefits of risk-
taking, we can conclude that the position yit is increasing in the asset’s expected excess
return  it, since the function g(x) is convex. In addition, as implied by (IV.8), when
the risk premia or the expected excess returns in two markets are opposite, then the
optimal positions for households in market A are also opposite to those in market B. This
follows from the symmetric endowment shocks and that g0(x) =  g0( x) as implied by
Proposition IV.1.
IV.2.4 Intermediaries
Unlike the households, the intermediaries can invest in the risky assets simultaneously
in both markets. This assumption, together with them being more e cient in managing
capital, capture the idea that intermediaries are more sophisticated than other investors.
They correspond best to those financial institutions, which are involved in a wide spectrum
of investment opportunities, ranging from trading complex financial assets to providing
loans to productive manufacturers. For example, hedge funds, which are less subject to the
informational or regulatory frictions contributing to market segmentation, or investment
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banks that both trade diverse financial assets and are involved in the shadow banking
system. As intermediaries can invest in all assets, they are uniquely able to exploit price
discrepancies between markets and provide liquidity to households.
We assume that intermediaries are competitive and risk neutral. Intermediaries fund
capital investments by exploiting the arbitrage profits as well as by using their own net
worth nt. Due to financial market frictions, intermediaries may be constrained in their
ability to eliminate arbitrage opportunities.
As pointed out by Gertler and Kiyotaki (2015), to the extent that intermediaries may
face frictions to gain external funding, they will attempt to save their way out of funding
hurdles by accumulating retained earnings in order to achieve 100 percent self-financing.
To rule out this uninteresting case, we follow Bernanke et al. (1999) by assuming that
intermediaries have a finite expected lifetime. In particular, whether an intermediary
would exit at t follows a geometric distribution with a survival probability of   2 (0, 1).
The expected lifetime of an intermediary is thus 11   .
To fill the void left by the exiting intermediaries, in every period new ones enter with
a constant endowment wIM, which is received only in the first period of their life. The
number of entering intermediaries is equal to the number of exiting ones. This setup
provides a simple way to generate a compulsory “dividend payout” from the intermediary
sector in order to ensure that intermediaries are financially constrained in equilibrium.
Specifically, we assume that intermediaries draw utility from consumptions in the very
period they exit. The expected utility of a surviving intermediary at the end of period t
is thus given by
Et
" 1X
s=1
 s(1   ) s 1cIMt+s
#
,
where (1    ) s 1 is the probability of exiting in period t + s, and cIMt+s is the terminal
consumption if the intermediary exits at that time.
Figure IV.2 shows the timing. The aggregate shock Zt is realized at the start of t.
Conditional on this shock, the net worth of surviving intermediaries is given by the gross
return on assets minus their liability from arbitrage trading:
nt = (Zt +Qt) k
IM
t 1 +
X
i2{A,B}
xit 1P
i
t ,
where kIMt is the intermediary’s capital holding at the end of period t.
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Figure IV.2: Timing
To simplify our analysis, we assume that intermediaries will encounter high manage-
ment cost if they fail to take a net zero position in the risky assets. That is, they will have
to take opposite positions with identical size in the two markets, i.e., xAt =  xBt . This
assumption follows naturally when intermediaries are risk-averse. As will become clear
later, even with risk neutral intermediaries, when their collateral constraints are binding,
it is also not optimal for them to take unbalanced positions, as they will either “waste”
collateral or induce ine cient spending on the purchase of risky assets instead of capital.
Taking an extra unit of unbalanced risky asset will yield an expected return 1+r, whereas
purchasing capital will generate overall much higher returns.
Denote the price di↵erence as  t ⌘ PBt   PAt , and the intermediary’s risky position
size as xt ⌘ xAt . Then we can simplify the above as
nt = (Zt +Qt) k
IM
t 1   xt 1 t.
For the new born intermediaries at t, the net worth equals the initial endowment:
nt = w
IM.
On the other hand, exiting intermediaries sell their capital and cease trading risky assets.
They then consume all their net worth:
cIMt = nt.
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In each period t, a continuing intermediary, new or surviving, finances capital holdings
QtkIMt with arbitrage income and the net worth:
Qtk
IM
t =  
X
i2{A,B}
xitP
i
t + nt = xt t + nt.
IV.2.5 Collateral Constraints
Collateral constraints arise in our model because agents need to collateralize their short
positions in financial assets. This is consistent with observations from real-world markets.
In general, restrictions on trading strategies are imposed through the standard requirement
that investors provide collateral as security for their short positions. In particular, once a
party incurs a liability by either shorting an asset or borrowing cash (which is essentially
shorting the riskless asset), the central trading institutions usually require them to post
collateral against mark-to-market losses.
Consider an agent who wants to enter a short position in a risky asset. The agent
has to first borrow the asset so that he can sell it afterwards. In order to do so, he must
post collateral to ensure that the asset loan will be repaid. We assume that agents are
obliged to deposit enough collateral to guarantee they would honor any liabilities that
their positions may generate, and do so in each market separately. In addition, we impose
that intermediaries cannot use their long positions in the risky asset in one market as
collateral for their short positions elsewhere. This is in the spirit of market segmentation:
the same informational or regulatory frictions that prohibit households in market A from
investing in asset B could also prohibit intermediaries’ counterparties in market A from
accepting asset B as collateral. Thus, we assume that agents can only use capital holdings
or riskless assets as collateral. As we set E [Zt] > r, it is not optimal for intermediaries to
hold riskless asset and hence they will end up only using capital as collateral. Households
might use both. But for convenience, we assume that they will first resort to capital,
which is preferred by intermediaries, before using the riskless assets. We also assume that
households have enough wealth to collateralize any position they may want to establish,
i.e., up to the magnitude of their shock intensity uit. In this way, we are spared from
discussing the situation where households are financially constrained to trade risky assets.
However, the intermediaries might be constrained by their net worth.
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To illustrate the collateral constraints, we consider an intermediary who intends to
establish a short position in asset i. To capture the economics of collateralization in
a simple, yet realistic way, we assume that the intermediary must post enough capital
holdings such that her counterparty has collateral value at least equal to the amount owed
by her plus a precautionary dividend deposit ✓¯ per unit of position. Thus, if she enters one
unit of short position in asset i, and gains the proceeds of P it , then she must post capital
holdings with collateral value in the amount of P it+✓¯. While our modeling of including ✓¯ in
the collateral constraint is out of technical convenience, i.e., to avoid computing multiple
equilibria, it can also well be interpreted as the asset i’s specific margin requirement or as
a precautionary measure against potential default on the uncertain dividend in the next
period.
Also, we implicitly assume that if one party defaults, the counterparty can only seize
the capital without the output in that period. This is consistent with the limited liability
practice, in the sense that the output is essentially part of the debtor’s labor income and
is protected against creditors. Moreover, we assume that while the ownership of capital
can be posted to the counterparty as collateral, the actual operation or management is
still run by the party who enters the short position and thus we exclude the potential loss
from moral hazard.
To account for the illiquidity of the capital relative to the riskless asset, we also model
the margin requirement. In particular, the di↵erence between the capital price and the
collateral value per unit is denoted as the margin, or the haircut. We assume that the size
of the required haircut increases with the market illiquidity of the capital. Specifically, an
intermediary with xt unit of short positions in asset i at t has to post “e↵ective” collateral
up to P it + ✓¯, after discounting by the haircut rate:
(1 mt)Qtkt   xt
 
P it + ✓¯
 
.
Here, 1   mt ⌘ g + hQt 2 (0, 1] is the margin or haircut rate, with g > 0 and h > 0.
Note that we use the capital price Qt as a measure of the market liquidity of capital.
This is because Qt increases with intermediaries’ collective share of aggregate capital and
reflects their demand. Thus, when Qt is high, households find it easier to sell the capital
to an intermediary who appreciates it more than household investors do, relative to the
riskless asset. By establishing the mapping of the prevailing capital liquidity to the margin
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requirement, we intend to capture the real-world e↵ect that the haircut tightens when the
market of collateral becomes more illiquid.
Likewise, when an intermediary enters a long position in asset i, her counterparty
also has to transfer collateral to her. As will become clear, in equilibrium intermediaries
will enter long positions in asset A and short positions in asset B to satisfy households’
hedging demands. Thus, intermediaries will post capital in market B while receiving
collateral from market A. Intermediaries can use their received collateral in market B, as
the capital market is not segmented. In market A, we assume that households will only
need to post collateral to account for the current asset value without including ✓¯. Thus,
if an intermediary enters a unit of long position in asset A and a short position in asset
B, then she has to post collateral equal to
PBt + ✓¯   PAt =  t + ✓¯.
The asymmetry in the collateral requirement between the two markets is driven by
technical convenience to avoid multiple equilibria in our numerical computation. However,
we can also interpret this as capturing the diversity in collateral requirements across
di↵erent markets.
Thus, we can write the intermediaries’ collateral constraints of taking arbitrage size xt
as
(1 mt) kIMt Qt   xt
 
 t + ✓¯
    0.
This form of the margin requirement closely follows the prevailing market practice in
reality. For OTC derivatives, according to the ISDA Collateral Survey, “The amount by
which the value assigned to the collateral is less than full face value is termed the ‘haircut’,
usually expressed as a percentage of face value”. As the market value of capital posted
as collateral corresponds to the face or notional amount, (1 mt) is directly a percentage
of the notional amount. Likewise, the haircuts for exchange-traded futures contracts at
major futures exchanges such as the Chicago Board of Trade and the Chicago Mercantile
Exchange are defined as a specified amount per contract or per notional amount, which is
consistent with our setup. In the primary fixed-income markets, for example, repo lending
for Treasury, corporate and mortgage-backed securities stipulates that a haircut amounts
to a certain ratio of the face amount of the bond. Thus our specification of the margin as
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a fraction of collateral is also consistent with market practice in the primary fixed-income
markets.
In general, by assuming productive capital as collateral, we aim to capture the recent
real-world market practice. Although our model is abstract from details of financial
innovation or securitization, the collateral with positive haircut rate in our model can
be interpreted as securitized agency assets, such as mortgage-backed securities (MBS),
credit default swaps (CDS), collateralized debt obligations (CDO), asset-backed securities
(ABS), agency bonds, etc. Those securitized products are widely used as collateral in
various trading environments, including the markets of CDS, repo and many other OTC
derivatives. The corresponding haircut rates reflect the counterparty and market-liquidity
risk of these products. These assets are usually very sophisticated and often opaque. Most
of them are originated, packed and traded by global investment banks. This is consistent
with our assumption that the specialized intermediaries are more e cient than ordinary
households in managing the capital.
IV.3 Equilibrium and Aggregation
A competitive equilibrium consists of asset and capital prices P it and Qt, intermediaries’
positions in the risky asset xit and capital allocation k
IM
t , and households’ position in risky
asset yit in market i and capital holdings k
i
t, where i 2 {A,B}, such that given prices,
• both intermediaries and households maximize their utility;
• and the markets for risky assets and capital clear:
Xit + Y
i
t = 0,
KIMt +K
A
t +K
B
t = 1,
where KIMt , K
A
t , K
B
t are the aggregate capital holdings in the intermediary sector,
market A and market B at t, and Xit and Y
i
t are the aggregate positions of
intermediaries and households in market i at t.
From the first order condition (IV.6), we can conclude that households’ capital holdings
in both markets are the same: kAt = k
B
t and K
A
t = K
B
t , as they share identical preferences
and management costs.
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Further, because risky assets are in zero net supply and the endowment shocks in
market A and B are opposite, the symmetry implies that risk premia are also opposite,
i.e.  At =   Bt . Thus, the price di↵erence is equal to twice the absolute value of the risk
premium, i.e.,  t = PBt   PAt = 2 At . As the risk premium measures the price divergence
between the two assets, its magnitude is also an inverse measure of risky asset market
liquidity. When the risk premium is zero, the two assets trade at an equal price and
intermediaries provide full liquidity to households across markets. When instead the risk
premium is non-zero, liquidity is imperfect.
Intuitively, as pointed out by Gromb and Vayanos (2017), as the intermediaries’
positions in risky assets across markets are opposite, their net worth nt doesn’t depend
on the dividend dt of the two assets. Accordingly, risk premia and intermediaries’
optimal decisions are also independent of dt. Since asset dividends are the only source of
uncertainty, the price di↵erences and the risk premium are deterministic.
Given the parametrization with which the collateral constraint is binding in equilib-
rium, we aggregate across intermediaries to obtain the relationship between their total
capital value QtKIMt and their net worth Nt:
QtK
IM
t = Xt t +Nt.
Summing across both surviving and entering intermediaries yields the evolution of Nt:
Nt =  
⇥
(Zt +Qt)K
IM
t 1  Xt 1 t
⇤
+W IM, (IV.9)
where W IM ⌘ (1    )wIM is the total endowment of new born intermediaries. The first
term is the accumulated net worth of intermediaries that operated at t   1 and survived
to t. It equals to the product of the survival rate   and the net income over capital
and arbitrage (Zt +Qt)KIMt 1   Xt 1 t. Meanwhile, exiting intermediaries consume the
fraction 1    of the total net worth:
cIMt = (1   )
⇥
(Zt +Qt)K
IM
t 1  Xt 1 t
⇤
.
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IV.3.1 Steady State
If the aggregate productivity multiplier Zt and the shock intensity ut are constant, i.e.,
Zt ⌘ Z and ut = u, then we can derive a steady state of the economy. In particular, we
obtain the following relationship reflecting the market liquidity of capital and risky assets.
Q =
Z
r + aKi(1 + r)
=
Z
r + a (1 KIM) (1 + r)/2 , (IV.10)
and
X =
(1 M)KIMQ
 + ✓¯
=
(1 M)N
M + ✓¯
, (IV.11)
where Ki, KIM, X, M , Q, N ,   are the corresponding steady state variables.
(IV.10) shows that the steady state capital price increases with the proportion of
capital held by the intermediary sector. (IV.11) implies that the market liquidity of risky
asset increases with intermediaries’ net worth while it decreases with the haircut rate in
the steady state.
IV.4 Unanticipated Market Freeze
We now consider the possibility of an unanticipated market freeze. Specifically, we use
the term “market freeze” to refer to the equilibrium in which intermediaries as a whole
are excluded from both financial and capital markets due to insolvency. That is, the
entire intermediary sector collapses and hence markets freeze between intermediaries and
households. We maintain the assumption that when the counterparty take intermediaries’
short positions in period t  1, they attach zero probability to a market freeze event at t.
Nevertheless, we now allow for the possibility of a freeze ex post when the settlement of
the positions is due at t and intermediaries’ counterparty must decide whether to continue
longing assets from them for another period.
As implied previously, for an intermediary to continue to exploit arbitrage opportu-
nities it must have positive net worth (i.e., nt > 0). Otherwise, it will not fulfill the
collateral constraint, which essentially requires intermediaries to use their net worth as
part of the collateral. Therefore, it is individually rational for the counterparty to cease
longing assets from intermediaries, or provide short-term funding to them, if (i) it perceives
that others will also stop buying, forcing intermediaries into a fire sale of the capital and
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(ii) this fire sale makes the intermediaries insolvent (i.e., nt  0). In this case, beyond the
“normal” equilibrium in which the counterparty keeps trading assets with intermediaries,
one other exists: a “freeze” equilibrium. In this equilibrium, the counterparties en masse
stop renewing their long positions of assets. Intermediaries are forced into liquidation
and eventually out of business, as their net worth evaporates. Consequently, households
purchase and manage all the capital, while the liquidity of risky assets in segmented
markets dries up altogether.
Our modeling of a market freeze as sunspot phenomena is similar to the Gertler and
Kiyotaki (2015) model of self-fulfilling bank runs. However, it is not exactly the same.
In Gertler and Kiyotaki (2015), intermediaries face a fixed or predetermined amount
of debt obligations and a run happens when they are perceived not to have enough
net worth to meet the debt requirement at the liquidation price. In contrast, in our
model intermediaries’ liability (i.e., xt 1 t) stems from the mark-to-market settlement of
previous arbitrage positions. The amount of this settlement is determined by the prevailing
price di↵erence  t, or risk premium  t. Once the counterparties collectively choose to
cease trading with intermediaries, the price di↵erence between segmented markets widens
endogenously as the market liquidity dries up, e↵ectively raising intermediaries’ liability.
Thus, a market freeze equilibrium may exist even if the intermediaries’ liquidation of
capital at t is su cient to cover the amount of liability anticipated by both parties at
t   1. Since intermediaries cannot internalize the price impact of their asset trading
volume, in the event of forced liquidation, not only their capital will be worth less, their
obligated repayment will also soar.
IV.4.1 Conditions for a Freeze Equilibrium
As in Gertler and Kiyotaki (2015), the market freeze equilibrium occurs when the whole
intermediary sector is insolvent. Given the homogeneity of intermediaries in our model,
the conditions for a market freeze will be the same for the individual intermediaries’
insolvency.
Consider that at the beginning of period t and after the realization of Zt, the
counterparty decides to cease renewing their long positions with intermediaries. The
intermediaries then have to liquidate their capital and transfer the proceeds to the
counterparty households, who then manage capital in a less e cient manner. Define Q⇤t
and  ⇤t to be the liquidation capital price and the asset spread. Then a market freeze is
likely when the liquidation value of capital, i.e., (Zt +Q⇤t )KIMt 1, is less than intermediaries’
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due liability, i.e., Xt 1 ⇤t . In this case, intermediaries’ net worth falls to zero or below.
Let lt be the leverage ratio of QtKIMt to the net worth Nt, and vt be the recovery rate in
the market freeze as the ratio of (Zt +Q⇤t )KIMt 1 to Xt 1 ⇤t . Then the condition for the
market freeze equilibrium to exist is that the recovery rate is less than one:
vt =
(Zt +Q⇤t )KIMt 1
Xt 1 ⇤t
< 1.
The condition is determined by three key endogenous factors, the liquidation capital
price Q⇤t , the liquidation price spread  ⇤t and intermediaries’ investment allocation. By
rearrangement, we can get a concise form of the freeze equilibrium condition:
vt = R
⇤
t
lt 1
lt 1   1
 t 1
 ⇤t
< 1, (IV.12)
with
R⇤t ⌘
Zt +Q⇤t
Qt 1
.
where R⇤t is the realized return on capital conditional on the market freezing in period t,
and lt 1 is the intermediaries’ leverage ratio at t   1. A market freeze equilibrium exists
if the realized return on capital given liquidation R⇤t is su ciently low, and the realized
price spread conditional on liquidation  ⇤t as well as the leverage ratio lt 1 are su ciently
high to satisfy condition (IV.12). Such condition does not rely on intermediary-specific
factors, as (R⇤t ,  ⇤t ,  t 1, lt 1) are identical for all intermediaries in equilibrium.
Figure IV.3 shows how the possibility of a market freeze may hinge on endogenous
variables. The vertical axis measures the ratio of realized capital return R⇤t over the
risk premium growth  ⇤t / t 1 conditional on liquidation. The horizontal axis gauges
intermediary’s leverage ratios lt 1. The curve which is increasing and concave in
(R⇤t t 1/ ⇤t , lt 1) space represents combinations for which the recovery rate vt equals
unity. To the left of this curve, intermediaries always stay solvent and the market freeze
equilibrium does not exist. To the right, vt < 1 and a market freeze is possible. Similar
to Gertler and Kiyotaki (2015), later we conduct simulations with the economy initiating
at a point like C in the figure where a market freeze is impossible. A negative shock then
raises the asset price spread and reduces the liquidation capital price, shifting the economy
to a point like D where the market freeze equilibrium is possible.
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Figure IV.3: Market freeze threshold.
IV.4.2 The Liquidation Capital Price and Risk Premium
In order to determine the liquidation prices, Q⇤t and  ⇤t , and to make them quantitatively
significant during a market freeze, we adopt Gertler and Kiyotaki (2015)’s assumptions
that (i) once a freeze happens, all existing intermediaries liquidate their capital and asset
positions, permanently quitting the markets; (ii) the intermediary sector then reconstruct
itself over time as new intermediaries enter, and the rebuilding period length is set to be
one; (iii) During the reconstruction period, new intermediaries cannot start trading risky
assets or acquire capital. One plausible interpretation is that during the freeze it is too
costly for the counterparty to identify new intermediaries which are financially independent
of those in distress: new intermediaries therefore wait for the air to clear and then engage
in arbitrage and manage capital in the following period. The numerical results shown later
are robust to alternative timing of the new intermediaries’ entry. Given that everything
else equal, the severity of the crisis increases with the time it takes for new intermediaries
to start operating.
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In particular, when intermediaries are forced into liquidation at t, they sell all their
capital to households and take no further asset positions, i.e.,
KAt +K
B
t = 1.
Xt = 0.
The intermediary sector then starts to accumulate capital and net worth as new
intermediaries enter from t + 1 onwards. Thus, given the above timing assumptions
and (IV.9) intermediaries’ net worth evolves in the periods following the market freeze
according to
Nt+1 = w
IM +  wIM,
Nt+j =  [(Zt+j +Qt+j)K
IM
t+j 1  Xt+j 1 t+j ] + wIM, 8j   2.
In the period after the market freeze, the aggregate net worth of intermediaries consists
of the endowment of newcomers and that of the intermediaries who enter with a delay,
supposing that the endowment is durable one-for-one between the periods.
Rearranging the first order condition for the households’ capital stocks (IV.6) and
financial asset positions (IV.8) yields the following expressions for the liquidation capital
price and asset risk premium:
Q⇤t = Et
24 1X
j=1
Zt+j
(1 + r)j
Qj
s=1
 
1 + aKit+s 1
 
35 , (IV.13)
 ⇤t = 2 
⇤
t = 2✓¯Et
24 1X
j=0
g0 ([ut+j   xt+j ])
(1 + r)j+1
35 , i 2 {A,B}. (IV.14)
With the proviso that all else equal, the longer it takes for the intermediary industry to
fully recover, as measured by the time it takes KIMt+j and Xt+j to converge to steady state,
the lower will be Q⇤t and the larger will be  ⇤t . Note also that the liquidation price and
risk premium vary cyclically with productivity. For example, a negative shock to Zt will
decrease Q⇤t and increase  ⇤t or  ⇤t , potentially moving the economy into a regime where
a market freeze is possible. On the other hand, as will become clearer later, those price
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variables also fluctuate countercyclically with the shocks to asset dividend volatility ✓¯,
with the similar tendency of directing the economy into a state where a market freeze
becomes possible.
Comparably, the concept of the liquidation prices in our model corresponds to
Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009)’s notion of market liquidity, while our modeling of
margin requirement resonates with their funding liquidity. In our framework and in
theirs, the two types of liquidity work jointly in the fire sale panic. Also, the relationship
between intermediaries’ solvency and market liquidity is similar to that in Gertler and
Kiyotaki (2015). When a freeze equilibrium exists, intermediaries become bankrupt, i.e.,
their liability, when evaluated at  ⇤t , exceeds their net worth, when capital is valued at
Q⇤t . However, if the price spread and capital are valued at the level in the “normal”
equilibrium, i.e.,  t and Qt, then the intermediaries are all solvent. Hence, the solvency
of intermediaries hinges upon the equilibrium prices, which in turn a↵ects and is a↵ected
by the funding liquidity of the intermediary sector. Also, both types of liquidity can dry
up suddenly in the wake of a market freeze. As a real-world example of this phenomenon,
consider the collapse of the hedge funds during the Asia financial crisis. Though some
funds took the right direction of arbitrage positions, which would be profitable in the long
run, a sudden liquidity shortage escalated into a solvency problem as margin calls lead to
price collapse followed by forced liquidation of would-be profitable arbitrage positions and
fire sale of long-term capital.
IV.5 Numerical Examples
In this section, we construct two shock scenarios to illustrate how our model works. In
particular, in our first example, we let a tiny, temporary negative shock hit the aggregate
productivity Zt at the steady state and then we trace out the e↵ects on financial and
real variables. Second, we simulate a small and sudden positive shock in the volatility
✓¯ of the asset’s dividend and then portray the corresponding impact on both real and
financial sectors. After looking at the basic workings of the model, we then allow for an
unexpected market freeze ex post and track the subsequent responses. In our examples,
the market freeze equilibrium does not exist in the pre-shock state. However, a recession
triggered by exogenous shocks might open up the possibility of a sudden market collapse.
In general, these numerical exercises aim to study the cyclical responses to macroeconomic
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Table IV.1: Parameters
Baseline model
a 0.01 Households’ managmerial cost
g 0.02 Margin requirement coe cient
h 1.02 Margin requirement coe cient
r 0.005 Riskless interest rate
u 16 Households’ endowment shock intensity
wIM 0.008 Intermediaries’ endowment
Z 0.012 Steady state productivity
↵ 0.8 Households’ coe cient of risk aversion
  0.99 Households’ discount rate
⇢ 0.9 Serial correlation of productivity shock
  0.95 Intermediaries’ survival probability
✓¯ 0.004 Upper bound of endowment shock unit
Table IV.2: Steady State Values
Baseline model
K 1
KIM 0.5906
KA 0.2047
KB 0.0472
Q 0.4835
X 1.9283
Y 0.0103
N 0.1467
n 0.1540
  0.0720
 0.0360
m 0.4864
and financial shocks as well as to illustrate the real e↵ects of the market freeze. Given the
abstract nature of our model, these numerical examples are not accurate estimates.
IV.5.1 Parameter Choices and Computation
Table IV.1 lists the choice of parameter values for our baseline model, while Table IV.2
presents the steady state values of the endogenous variables. We take the time interval to
be one month. Overall, there are eleven key parameters in the baseline model. Except for
the serial correlation ⇢ of the productivity shock Zt, the remaining ten parameters (↵,  ,
✓¯, a, g, h, r, u, wIM, Z) are specific to our model.
As we noted earlier, the intermediaries in our model correspond best to the speculating
institutions in the shadow banking system, such as hedge funds or other market makers,
147
who tend to operate with rather moderate leverage ratios. Also, we aim to capture the
real world phenomenon that there are unabsorbed arbitrage opportunities or persistent
price di↵erences between similar assets in di↵erent markets or subsectors. Therefore, we
choose values for the riskless interest rate r, households’ aggregate size of asset demand u,
their coe cient of risk aversion ↵, the endowment shock unit magnitude ✓¯, intermediary’s
initial endowment wIM and margin requirement parameters g and h to satisfy the following
targets in the steady state: an intermediary’s leverage ratio is below two and its collateral
constraint is binding. It is hard to gather precise income statements or capital flows
for the entire intermediary industry. Thus, the values we choose here are intended to be
reasonable benchmarks that reflect the fragility of the financial positions of the speculating
institutions. The results are robust to plausible variations, such as higher leverage ratios
and more risk averse intermediaries.
In addition, we set the intermediary’s survival probability   equal to 0.95, which
implies an expected horizon of twenty months. Also, we set the parameter that reflects
“managerial cost” a to 0.1, a value low enough to ensure that households find it profitable
to directly hold capital, but high enough to produce a reasonable degree of decrease in the
capital price in the event of the intermediaries’ financial distress.
IV.5.2 Amplification and Spillover E↵ects Initiated from Production
Sector
Figure IV.4 shows the response of the baseline model to an unanticipated negative 2.8
percent shock to productivity Zt. We choose the size of shock in order to generate a fall
in output close to the one that occurred during the Great Recession. The shock leads
to a drop in aggregate output (total output minus management costs) up to 8 percent,
a magnitude that matches the data during the Great Recession. The recession induces
financial distress that amplifies the fall in the capital price and raises the haircut rate in the
financial markets. In particular, the unexpected 2.8 percent fall in productivity Zt reduces
the capital price Qt by over 6 percent and pushes up the risk premium  t by nearly 0.4
percent. The depressed capital price further tightens the haircut mt by about 6 percent.
Meanwhile, the sudden negative shock sharply reduces the intermediaries’ net worth Nt
roughly by 12 percent, causing a slump in the arbitrage positions up to 21 percent and a
fire sale of 11 percent of the capital.
Overall, as illustrated by Figure IV.5, the recession induces two di↵erent feedback
loops, which reinforce each other and give rise to a more complicated financial accelerator
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Figure IV.4: A recession in the baseline model.
mechanism than the ones prevalent in Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Kiyotaki and
Moore (1997). One feedback loop is similar to the above mentioned literature. The
recession causes financial distress that amplifies the fall in capital prices and raises the cost
of intermediaries’ arbitrage trading. The unanticipated drop in Zt reduces the production
income ZtKIMt 1 and hence net worth Nt. This tightens their budgets and leads to a fire
sale of capital, which in turn magnifies the decline of the capital price Qt. Households
purchase some of the capital. But as it is increasingly costly for them to manage capital,
the amount they absorb is limited. As a result, the net e↵ect is a sharp increase in the
spread between the expected return to capital and the riskless rate.
The other feedback loop is specific to our model. The fall in capital price Qt raises
the intermediaries’ funding cost through the rise in the margin mt. This not only reduces
the capital worth, but also tightens the margin requirement. Thus, intermediaries no
longer can maintain their previous level of liquidity supply in the financial markets, even
if their capital were not depreciated in value. Since they cannot internalize the price
e↵ects of their collective liquidity supply, when they unwind part of their positions, the
price spread widens and this incurs losses in their previous positions. Consequently, the
losses further fuel the fire sale of capital and the price decline. Similar to the mechanism
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Figure IV.5: The structure of the economic system.
in Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) and Gromb and Vayanos (2017), the intermediaries’
funding capability gets damaged the most when their arbitrage profitability is the highest.
Thus, in this sense, the negative shock in the production sector spills over to financial
markets, causing losses in intermediaries’ net worth. This in turn deepens the distress
in the real economy: it exacerbates the fire sale of capital and asset misallocation. The
loss spiral reinforces the market liquidity spirals for both risky asset and capital, together
contributing to a sharp contraction in the aggregate activities.
IV.5.3 Amplification and Spillover E↵ects Triggered from Financial
Markets
Figure IV.6 exhibits the response of the baseline model to an unanticipated positive 4
percent shock to the volatility measure of asset dividends or the upper bound of household
endowment shock unit ✓¯. We assume that ✓¯ also follows an AR(1) process with serial
correlation ⇢✓¯ = 0.96. This leads to a drop in aggregate output of over 2 percent, which
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Figure IV.6: A recession in the baseline model triggered by a shock in financial markets.
amounts to a medium-sized recession in the real economy, though there is no change to
productivity itself and households’ wealth e↵ect is isolated. The shock in the payo↵ of
financial assets increases the asset specific margin requirement, which raises intermediaries’
funding costs and triggers the spillover e↵ects to the real economy. The unexpected shock
in ✓¯ reduces intermediaries’ net worth nt by roughly 4 percent, which tightens their budget
and triggers a fire sale of capital and the contraction of arbitrage volume. In particular,
intermediaries’ capital holding drops by 4 percent, the market liquidity slumps by about
8 percent, and the risk premium rallies by almost 1.3 percent.
As illustrated by Figure IV.7, the spillover and amplification e↵ects arise from the
intermediaries’ increasing funding illiquidity. Though a surge in asset dividend volatility
helps increase their arbitrage profitability, the more dominating e↵ect is that it also
significantly raises the asset specific margin, hence suppressing their funding capability
through arbitrage. Thus, despite the increasing profitability, intermediaries cannot a↵ord
to maintain the pre-shock capital size and liquidity supply. As they cannot internalize the
impact of their unwinding decisions on the risk premium, they su↵er further losses from
increasing liability of their previous positions. The unexpected losses with less renewed
funding from arbitrage lead to a fire sale of capital, which depresses the capital prices and
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Figure IV.7: The transmission channel of shocks from financial markets
further raises intermediaries’ funding cost through an even tighter margin requirement
mt (up to 1.5 percent in our example). In a nutshell, the subsequent decline in funding
liquidity not only results in magnified evaporation of market liquidity in asset markets,
but also spills over to the real economy by aggravating the capital misallocation.
IV.5.4 Unanticipated Market Freeze
Figure IV.8 presents the response of a productivity shock with an ex post sudden market
freeze. As we mentioned before, a freeze equilibrium exists if the recovery rate vt is less
than one. Thus, denote the variable FREEZEt as the indicator variable that accounts for
the deficit of the recovery rate below one:
FREEZEt ⌘ 1  vt.
A freeze equilibrium exists if and only if FREEZEt > 0. The first panel of the last row
shows that the freeze indicator turns above zero upon the shock and stays positive for
some periods. An unexpected market collapse is thus likely to happen at any period
in this interval. The direct trigger is that the negative productivity shock reduces the
liquidation price Q⇤t and hence lowers the intermediaries’ net worth. Meanwhile, the price
decline leads to the rise of the haircut rate, further damaging intermediaries’ funding
capacity. Indirectly, this widens the price spread  ⇤t and raises intermediaries’ liability.
Both e↵ects work to increase intermediaries’ leverage ratio ex post and make the whole
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Figure IV.8: Ex post market freeze.
sector susceptible to a sudden market freeze, as implied by (IV.12). In our example,
the freeze indicator of the steady state is negative, which implies that the market freeze
equilibrium is not feasible in its neighborhood.
In Figure IV.8 we let an unexpected freeze happen half a year after the shock. The
blue densely dotted line traces the no-freeze equilibrium and the red dashed line describes
the path with a sudden freeze. The market freeze leads to complete liquidation of
intermediaries’ capital and asset positions as KIMt and Xt fall to zero in period 6 following
the shock. The capital price accordingly drops to its liquidation price at nearly 50 percent
below the steady state. Meanwhile, the asset price spread soars to its liquidation level at
around 6 percent above the pre-shock state. Total production output net of management
costs falls by about 40 percent. Higher management costs arise because of the extremely
ine cient capital allocation after the collapse. Intermediaries’ net worth also slumps
almost to zero as existing intermediaries are completely out of business and newcomers
take a very long time to recapitalize.
From the seventh period onward, new intermediaries enter and the intermediary sector
starts to rebuild itself. Unlike Gertler and Kiyotaki (2015)’s bank run case, due to the high
funding cost arising from the low capital price, intermediaries initially recover in a very
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slow pace despite the high arbitrage profitability and production return. The recovery
speed hinges on how fast intermediaries can accumulate their net worth, as low net worth
turns to be associated with low leverage ratio in our model.
IV.6 Intervention Policy Experiments
In this section, we quantify the e↵ects of three types of ex-post policy interventions in
the market freeze of the model: (i) direct purchase of capital by the government; (ii)
government acting as the lender of last resort by infusing equity to intermediaries or
providing loans; (iii) lowering the interest rate. We choose these policies because they are
among the ones undertaken by central banks in reality. Our goal is to study the e↵ects of
these policies on recovery based on our model. We are not concerned with the potential
costs associated with implementing these interventions.
Our ex-post policy experiments correspond to the following exercise. Suppose we
are in a state where the old intermediaries are already wiped out and the newly formed
intermediary sector is about to operate. From this initial condition, suppose that the
central bank implements a policy that was not anticipated by the agents. We track the
e↵ects of this policy on the recovery of the economy from this state. Specifically, we
compute a new with-policy equilibrium and compare it with the one without intervention,
which we have studied in Section IV.5.4.
IV.6.1 Direct Capital Purchase
During both the subprime crisis and the Great Depression, central banks entered the
capital markets and conducted a series of direct purchases of the distressed assets, which
were held mainly by intermediaries. For example, following the collapse of the intermediary
sector, the Federal Reserve initiated the large scale asset purchases (LSAPs) of high grade
long term debt, including primarily agency mortgage backed securities (AMBS). From
August 2007 to August 2009, around USD 1.8 trillion was injected by the Fed and the US
government to the mortgage-backed securities market. By acting as buyers in the capital
market, the goal is to raise the capital price and increase the liquidity in the financial
sector.
To evaluate the e↵ects of this policy, we conduct a similar experiment as in Gertler
and Karadi (2011); Gertler et al. (2016). Specifically, we assume that the central bank
can directly manage the capital. Like the household investors, the central bank also
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bears quadratic managerial costs 12Qta
g (Kgt )
2, where Kgt is the size of the central bank’s
purchase and ah > ag. To discourage the central banks from holding capital in a non-freeze
time or to only allow them to purchase capital upon crises, we further introduce certain
degrees of ine ciency in their overall capital return. That is, we impose a discount factor
  2 (0, 1) on their capital return:
Rgt+1 =  
Zt+1 +Qt+1
Qt (1 + agK
g
t )
.
We assume that the central bank enters the capital market once the expected capital
return exceeds its borrowing costs, which is 1 + r in our model. Accordingly, the policy
rule for central bank’s capital purchase is
Kgt = 0, if E
⇥
Rgt+1
⇤  (1 + r) < 0,
E
⇥
Rgt+1
⇤  (1 + r) = 0, if Kgt   0.
We choose the value of   to ensure that the central bank only intervenes after a market
freeze happens. We also select the management cost parameter ag such that the amount
of government purchase is around 10 percent of the total capital supply.
Figure IV.9 shows the e↵ect of the government capital purchase when a market freeze
happens six months after the initial productivity shock. The total purchase is around
10 percent of the aggregate capital. It dampens the drop in the capital price and the
aggregate output by around 4.9 percent and 5.5 percent respectively. However, after this
initial improvement, the following recovery path of the economy is slower than the one
without intervention. Intuitively, the purchase has no further stimulating e↵ect because
though the higher capital price helps alleviate intermediaries’ funding di culty, it also
raises their cost of acquiring capital. In e↵ect, the government purchase does not only
crowd out household investors, but also crowds out intermediaries by lowering their overall
capital return, giving rise to a slower recovery.
IV.6.2 Capital Injections
Another type of common interventions aims at directly increasing the intermediaries’
ability to purchase capital, either through direct lending or equity injection. For instance,
during the subprime crisis, the US Treasury acquired USD 205 billion of preferred shares
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Figure IV.9: Government direct purchase of capital after a crisis.
in the intermediary sector through the capital purchase program. The treasury’s capital
injection was distributed across many institutions, from pure lending banks to trading
firms. Also, in the wake of market collapse, the Fed established special programs such as
Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF) and Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF)
to provide loans to primary broker-dealers and investment vehicles.
We focus our attention on the case of equity injections, in which the government
acquires ownership shares in intermediaries. To model this type of intervention, we assume
that the central bank acquires equity from the newly born intermediaries after the market
freeze. The central bank may hold the equity stake until the intermediaries exit and then
receive the liquidation value of its net worth, equal to their share of (Qt+1 + Zt+1) kIMt  
xt t+1. Or it may sell o↵ its holding at the market price before the intermediaries exit,
when the market recovers to a satisfying level. As our aim is to study and compare the
recovery paths of the economy, we assume that the central bank will inject the same amount
of resources as the maximal level in the previous direct purchase experiment. Since we
do not explicitly model the agency cost, as long as it fulfills the intermediaries’ incentive
constraints, the specific price at which the central bank acquires the equity relative to the
market price is irrelevant to our experiment. For simplicity, in our experiment, we assume
that the central bank holds the equity until the intermediaries quit.
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Figure IV.10: Government injection of equity after a crisis.
Figure IV.10 shows the e↵ects of the equity injection after the market freeze six months
following the initial productivity shock. The injection dampens the capital price and
output drop by around 11 and 7 percent respectively. Also it helps narrow the asset
spread by 2 percent. Moreover, this policy significantly speeds up the recovery of the
market liquidity as well as intermediaries’ recapitalization process. The simulation from
the policy of direct lending to intermediaries yields quantitatively similar results. This
kind of policy has better e↵ect since part of the friction in our model stems from the
constraint on intermediaries’ net worth. Both injecting equity and direct lending help
intermediaries quickly restore their net worth.
IV.6.3 Interest Rate Cut
Following the onset of the recent crisis, the central bank lowered its discount rate and its
target for the overnight interbank interest rate, while expanding the range of assets that
qualify as collateral. To the extent that intermediaries rely heavily on rolling over the
external funding for their operations, lowering interest rate aims to ease the funding cost
and mitigate the stress of forced fire sales. For example, between September 2007 and
May 2008, the Fed lowered its target for the Federal funds rate from 5.25% to 2% and the
discount rate from 5.75% to 2.25% through six separate actions.
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Figure IV.11: Interest rate cut after a crisis.
To study the ex-post intervention of the sharp interest cut, we assume that the central
bank lowers the interest rate r after the market freezes six months following the initial
shocks in aggregate productivity Z. For simplicity, we model the cut in interest rate as a
60% decline with an autoregressive factor of 0.95.
Figure IV.11 compares the e↵ect of an interest cut with the policy-free one. The
intervention leads to an upward jump in the risk premium and the capital price. The
lower interest rate significantly raises households’ demand for the risky asset as well as the
capital. In turn, this implies that intermediaries now face higher marginal cost of capital,
and accordingly their demand of capital falls. E↵ectively, this policy redirects capital
from intermediaries to households, thereby reducing the overall e ciency and output level.
After the initial few periods, the recovery path is nearly the same as in the case without
intervention. Intuitively, the interest rate cut has an overall detrimental e↵ect on recovery,
as intermediaries’ improved arbitrage profitability and better funding liquidity are o↵set by
their diminished return of capital. Similar to the direct purchase case, the intermediaries
are crowded out from the capital market by the households. Therefore, less overall return
accrues to their net worth, leading to a slower recovery.
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IV.7 Conclusion
We have developed a model to study the interaction of intermediation in both financial
and real sectors and its e↵ects on limits of arbitrage. By linking the market liquidity of
productive capital to arbitrageurs’ margin requirements in financial markets, we show that
market liquidity across the fundamentally independent asset markets co-move, leading
to correlated limits of arbitrage. In doing so, we provide an alternative channel to
model the financial accelerator e↵ects and self-fulfilling market collapse. We demonstrate
that intermediaries’ arbitrage losses reinforce the deterioration of intermediation in both
sectors. Also, we illustrate that, while in normal times a self-fulfilling market freeze
equilibrium might not exist, the possibility can arise during an economic downturn. This
can occur even to intermediaries with a very modest degree of leverage.
There are many possible extensions of this model. For example, we can allow for more
uncertainties in asset demands in the financial markets, in which arbitrageurs have to
develop non-trivial optimal trading strategies. We can then examine the e↵ects on the
price volatility and the risk premia. Also, by adding more distinct financial securities and
segmented markets, we can investigate the cross-sectional dynamics and the implications
of capital mobility.
One limitation of our model is that it does not fully endogenize the collateral
constraints. Potential improvement can be made by incorporating moral hazard, or by
allowing for a complete market of collateral contracts. Also, by fixing the total supply
of capital, the model sheds no light on how the intermediation performance a↵ects the
economic growth. Including capital accumulation and the process of securitization will
help us conduct the welfare analysis and evaluate the e↵ects of policies in a more precise
and comprehensive way.
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IV.A Proofs
IV.A.1 Proof of Proposition IV.1
Proof. From the first order condition in (IV.7)
Et

 t,t+1
P it+1 + dt+1
P it
 
= 1.
and
P it =
d¯
r
   it,
P it+1 =
d¯
r
   it+1
we have
Et

 t,t+1
d¯/r    it+1 + d¯+ ✓t+1
d¯/r    it
 
= Et

 t,t+1
(1 + r)d¯  r it+1
d¯  r it
 
+ Et

 t,t+1
r✓t+1
d¯  r it
 
= 1.
As
R ⌘ (1 + r)d¯  r 
i
t+1
d¯  r it
is deterministic and using (IV.4) we obtain
E [ t,t+1✓t+1] =
 it+1
1 + r
   it =  
 it
1 + r
.
On the other hand, from the definition of (IV.5), we have
 t,t+1 =   exp
  ↵  cit+1   cit  
=   exp
  ↵  St+1   cit +  yit + uit  ✓t+1  ,
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where
St+1 ⌘ yit
 
d¯+ P it+1
 
+ (Zt+1 +Qt+1)K
i
t + (1 + r)B
i
t   yit+1P it+1  Qt+1Kit+1
  a
2
Qt+1
 
Kit+1
 2  Bit+1
is the deterministic part of the cit+1. Thus, combining Equations (IV.4) and (IV.A.1), we
can derive
E
⇥
✓t+1 exp
  ↵  yit + uit  ✓t+1 ⇤
E
⇥
exp
  ↵  yit + uit  ✓t+1 ⇤ =   it. (IV.15)
Define a function g(x) as
exp {↵g(x)} = E

exp
⇢
 ↵x✓t
✓¯
  
,
then
E
⇥
exp
  ↵  yit + uit  ✓t+1 ⇤ = exp ↵g   yit + uit  ✓¯  . (IV.16)
Thus, if we take first order derivatives with respect to yit of (IV.16), we can obtain
 ↵E ⇥exp  ↵  yit + uit  ✓t+1 ✓t+1⇤ = ↵✓¯g0   yit + uit  ✓¯ E ⇥exp  ↵  yit + uit  ✓t+1 ⇤ .
(IV.17)
Combining with (IV.15) and simplifying, we get
g0
  
yit + u
i
t
 
✓¯
 
✓¯ =  it. (IV.18)
The proof of the properties of function g(x) is shown in Gromb and Vayanos (2017), we
rewrite it here with minor adjustments to adapt to our notations.
For expositional convenience, we set ✓ˆt ⌘ ✓t/✓¯. Since the distribution of ✓ˆt is
independent of t, so if the function g(x). As ✓ˆt has mean zero, Jensen’s inequality implies
that
E
h
exp
n
 ↵x✓ˆt
oi
  1,
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and thus g(x)   0. Because ✓ˆt is symmetric around zero,
E
h
exp
n
 ↵x✓ˆt
oi
= E
h
exp
n
↵x✓ˆt
oi
,
g(x) is symmetric around the vertical axis.
To show that g(x) is strictly convex, we prove that g00(x) > 0 in the following. As
g(x) =
1
↵
log
⇣
E
h
exp
n
 ↵x✓ˆt
oi⌘
,
di↵erentiating it, we get
g0(x) =  
E
h
✓ˆt exp
n
 ↵x✓ˆt
oi
E
h
exp
n
 ↵x✓ˆt
oi .
Di↵erentiating it again, we obtain
g00(x) = ↵
E
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✓ˆ2t exp
n
 ↵x✓ˆt
oi
E
h
exp
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✓ˆt exp
n
 ↵x✓ˆt
oi⌘2
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E
h
✓ˆt exp
n
 ↵x✓ˆt
oi⌘2 . (IV.19)
The numerator in (IV.19) is positive because of the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality
(mathbbE[ST ])2  E ⇥S2⇤E ⇥T 2⇤, which is strict when the random variables S and T
are not proportional. Thus, we can apply the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality by setting
S ⌘ ✓ˆt exp
(
 ↵x✓ˆt
2
)
,
T ⌘ exp
(
 ↵x✓ˆt
2
)
,
and S and T are not proportional as ✓ˆt is stochastic. Hence, g00(x) > 0.
To prove that limx!1 g0(x) = 1, one can show that |g0(x)  1| can be made smaller
than 2⌘ for any arbitrary ⌘ > 0 when x ! 1. Following Equations (IV.A.1) and ✓ˆt is
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symmetrically distributed around zero with the supremum of its support being one,
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As ⇣
1 + ✓ˆt
⌘
1{✓ˆt2[ 1, 1+⌘]}  ⌘,
the first term in the right hand side of (IV.20) is less than ⌘. The second term can
also be less than ⌘ given large enough x. Multiplying numerator and denominator by
exp { ↵x(1  ⌘)}, one can rewrite the term as
E
h⇣
1 + ✓ˆt
⌘
exp
n
 ↵x
⇣
✓ˆt + 1  ⌘
⌘o
1{✓ˆt2[ 1+⌘,1]}
i
E
h
exp
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 ↵x
⇣
✓ˆt + 1  ⌘
⌘oi . (IV.21)
Since ✓ˆt in the numerator in (IV.21) is greater than  1+⌘, the numerator remains bounded
when x ! 1. Yet, the denominator in (IV.21) converges to infinity, as ✓ˆt takes value in
[ 1, 1 + ⌘) with positive probability.
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